arm-trusted-firmware/bl2/aarch64/bl2_el3_entrypoint.S
Anthony Steinhauser f461fe346b Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).

This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
679db70801
29fb48ace4
3a08873ece
abfd092aa1

It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c

Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
2020-01-22 21:42:51 +00:00

99 lines
2.7 KiB
ArmAsm

/*
* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <arch.h>
#include <asm_macros.S>
#include <common/bl_common.h>
#include <el3_common_macros.S>
.globl bl2_entrypoint
.globl bl2_el3_run_image
.globl bl2_run_next_image
func bl2_entrypoint
/* Save arguments x0-x3 from previous Boot loader */
mov x20, x0
mov x21, x1
mov x22, x2
mov x23, x3
el3_entrypoint_common \
_init_sctlr=1 \
_warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
_secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
_init_memory=1 \
_init_c_runtime=1 \
_exception_vectors=bl2_el3_exceptions \
_pie_fixup_size=0
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Restore parameters of boot rom
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
mov x0, x20
mov x1, x21
mov x2, x22
mov x3, x23
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Perform BL2 setup
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bl bl2_el3_setup
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Program APIAKey_EL1 and enable pointer authentication.
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bl pauth_init_enable_el3
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Jump to main function.
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bl bl2_main
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Should never reach this point.
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
no_ret plat_panic_handler
endfunc bl2_entrypoint
func bl2_run_next_image
mov x20,x0
/* ---------------------------------------------
* MMU needs to be disabled because both BL2 and BL31 execute
* in EL3, and therefore share the same address space.
* BL31 will initialize the address space according to its
* own requirement.
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bl disable_mmu_icache_el3
tlbi alle3
bl bl2_el3_plat_prepare_exit
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Disable pointer authentication before jumping
* to next boot image.
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bl pauth_disable_el3
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
ldp x0, x1, [x20, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_PC_OFFSET]
msr elr_el3, x0
msr spsr_el3, x1
ldp x6, x7, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x30)]
ldp x4, x5, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x20)]
ldp x2, x3, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x10)]
ldp x0, x1, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x0)]
exception_return
endfunc bl2_run_next_image