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arm-trusted-firmware/docs/user-guide.md
Antonio Nino Diaz 044bb2faab Remove build option ASM_ASSERTION 
The build option `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS` should be used instead. That way
both C and ASM assertions can be enabled or disabled together.

All occurrences of `ASM_ASSERTION` in common code and ARM platforms have
been replaced by `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS`.

ASM_ASSERTION has been removed from the user guide.

Change-Id: I51f1991f11b9b7ff83e787c9a3270c274748ec6f
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
2017-04-20 09:58:28 +01:00

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ARM Trusted Firmware User Guide
===============================
Contents :
1. [Introduction](#1--introduction)
2. [Host machine requirements](#2--host-machine-requirements)
3. [Tools](#3--tools)
4. [Getting the Trusted Firmware source code](#4--getting-the-trusted-firmware-source-code)
5. [Building the Trusted Firmware](#5--building-the-trusted-firmware)
6. [Building a FIP for Juno and FVP](#6--building-a-fip-for-juno-and-fvp)
7. [EL3 payloads alternative boot flow](#7--el3-payloads-alternative-boot-flow)
8. [Preloaded BL33 alternative boot flow](#8--preloaded-bl33-alternative-boot-flow)
9. [Running the software on FVP](#9--running-the-software-on-fvp)
10. [Running the software on Juno](#10--running-the-software-on-juno)
1. Introduction
----------------
This document describes how to build ARM Trusted Firmware (TF) and run it with a
tested set of other software components using defined configurations on the Juno
ARM development platform and ARM Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) models. It is
possible to use other software components, configurations and platforms but that
is outside the scope of this document.
This document assumes that the reader has previous experience running a fully
bootable Linux software stack on Juno or FVP using the prebuilt binaries and
filesystems provided by [Linaro][Linaro Release Notes]. Further information may
be found in the [Instructions for using the Linaro software deliverables]
[Linaro SW Instructions]. It also assumes that the user understands the role of
the different software components required to boot a Linux system:
* Specific firmware images required by the platform (e.g. SCP firmware on Juno)
* Normal world bootloader (e.g. UEFI or U-Boot)
* Device tree
* Linux kernel image
* Root filesystem
Note: the ARM TF v1.3 release was tested with Linaro Release 16.06, and the
latest version of ARM TF is tested with Linaro Release 16.12.
This document also assumes that the user is familiar with the FVP models and
the different command line options available to launch the model.
This document should be used in conjunction with the [Firmware Design].
2. Host machine requirements
-----------------------------
The minimum recommended machine specification for building the software and
running the FVP models is a dual-core processor running at 2GHz with 12GB of
RAM. For best performance, use a machine with a quad-core processor running at
2.6GHz with 16GB of RAM.
The software has been tested on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (64-bit). Packages used for
building the software were installed from that distribution unless otherwise
specified.
The software has also been built on Windows 7 Enterprise SP1, using CMD.EXE,
Cygwin, and Msys (MinGW) shells, using version 4.9.1 of the GNU toolchain.
3. Tools
---------
Install the required packages to build Trusted Firmware with the following
command:
sudo apt-get install build-essential gcc make git libssl-dev
Download and install the AArch64 little-endian GCC cross compiler as indicated
in the [Linaro instructions][Linaro SW Instructions].
In addition, the following optional packages and tools may be needed:
* `device-tree-compiler` package if you need to rebuild the Flattened Device
Tree (FDT) source files (`.dts` files) provided with this software.
* For debugging, ARM [Development Studio 5 (DS-5)][DS-5].
4. Getting the Trusted Firmware source code
--------------------------------------------
Download the Trusted Firmware source code from Github:
git clone https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware.git
5. Building the Trusted Firmware
---------------------------------
* Before building Trusted Firmware, the environment variable `CROSS_COMPILE`
must point to the Linaro cross compiler.
For AArch64:
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-linux-gnu-
For AArch32:
export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch32-gcc>/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-
* Change to the root directory of the Trusted Firmware source tree and build.
For AArch64:
make PLAT=<platform> all
For AArch32:
make PLAT=<platform> ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min all
Notes:
* If `PLAT` is not specified, `fvp` is assumed by default. See the
"Summary of build options" for more information on available build
options.
* (AArch32 only) Currently only `PLAT=fvp` is supported.
* (AArch32 only) `AARCH32_SP` is the AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software and it
corresponds to the BL32 image. A minimal `AARCH32_SP`, sp_min, is
provided by ARM Trusted Firmware to demonstrate how PSCI Library can
be integrated with an AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software. Some AArch32 EL3
Runtime Software may include other runtime services, for example
Trusted OS services. A guide to integrate PSCI library with AArch32
EL3 Runtime Software can be found [here][PSCI Lib Integration].
* (AArch64 only) The TSP (Test Secure Payload), corresponding to the BL32
image, is not compiled in by default. Refer to the "Building the Test
Secure Payload" section below.
* By default this produces a release version of the build. To produce a
debug version instead, refer to the "Debugging options" section below.
* The build process creates products in a `build` directory tree, building
the objects and binaries for each boot loader stage in separate
sub-directories. The following boot loader binary files are created
from the corresponding ELF files:
* `build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl1.bin`
* `build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl2.bin`
* `build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl31.bin` (AArch64 only)
* `build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl32.bin` (mandatory for AArch32)
where `<platform>` is the name of the chosen platform and `<build-type>`
is either `debug` or `release`. The actual number of images might differ
depending on the platform.
* Build products for a specific build variant can be removed using:
make DEBUG=<D> PLAT=<platform> clean
... where `<D>` is `0` or `1`, as specified when building.
The build tree can be removed completely using:
make realclean
### Summary of build options
ARM Trusted Firmware build system supports the following build options. Unless
mentioned otherwise, these options are expected to be specified at the build
command line and are not to be modified in any component makefiles. Note that
the build system doesn't track dependency for build options. Therefore, if any
of the build options are changed from a previous build, a clean build must be
performed.
#### Common build options
* `AARCH32_SP` : Choose the AArch32 Secure Payload component to be built as
as the BL32 image when `ARCH=aarch32`. The value should be the path to the
directory containing the SP source, relative to the `bl32/`; the directory
is expected to contain a makefile called `<aarch32_sp-value>.mk`.
* `ARCH` : Choose the target build architecture for ARM Trusted Firmware.
It can take either `aarch64` or `aarch32` as values. By default, it is
defined to `aarch64`.
* `ARM_CCI_PRODUCT_ID`: Choice of ARM CCI product used by the platform. This
is used to determine the number of valid slave interfaces available in the
ARM CCI driver. Default is 400 (that is, CCI-400).
* `ARM_ARCH_MAJOR`: The major version of ARM Architecture to target when
compiling ARM Trusted Firmware. Its value must be numeric, and defaults to
8. See also, _ARMv8 Architecture Extensions_ in [Firmware Design].
* `ARM_ARCH_MINOR`: The minor version of ARM Architecture to target when
compiling ARM Trusted Firmware. Its value must be a numeric, and defaults
to 0. See also, _ARMv8 Architecture Extensions_ in [Firmware Design].
* `ARM_GIC_ARCH`: Choice of ARM GIC architecture version used by the ARM
Legacy GIC driver for implementing the platform GIC API. This API is used
by the interrupt management framework. Default is 2 (that is, version 2.0).
This build option is deprecated.
* `ARM_PLAT_MT`: This flag determines whether the ARM platform layer has to
cater for the multi-threading `MT` bit when accessing MPIDR. When this
flag is set, the functions which deal with MPIDR assume that the `MT` bit
in MPIDR is set and access the bit-fields in MPIDR accordingly. Default
value of this flag is 0.
* `BL2`: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to BL2
image for the `fip` target. In this case, the BL2 in the ARM Trusted
Firmware will not be built.
* `BL2U`: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to
BL2U image. In this case, the BL2U in the ARM Trusted Firmware will not
be built.
* `BL31`: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to
BL31 image for the `fip` target. In this case, the BL31 in the ARM
Trusted Firmware will not be built.
* `BL31_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It specifies the
file that contains the BL31 private key in PEM format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`,
this file name will be used to save the key.
* `BL32`: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to
BL32 image for the `fip` target. In this case, the BL32 in the ARM
Trusted Firmware will not be built.
* `BL32_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It specifies the
file that contains the BL32 private key in PEM format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`,
this file name will be used to save the key.
* `BL33`: Path to BL33 image in the host file system. This is mandatory for
`fip` target in case the BL2 from ARM Trusted Firmware is used.
* `BL33_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It specifies the
file that contains the BL33 private key in PEM format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`,
this file name will be used to save the key.
* `BUILD_MESSAGE_TIMESTAMP`: String used to identify the time and date of the
compilation of each build. It must be set to a C string (including quotes
where applicable). Defaults to a string that contains the time and date of
the compilation.
* `BUILD_STRING`: Input string for VERSION_STRING, which allows the TF build
to be uniquely identified. Defaults to the current git commit id.
* `COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU`: This option indicates whether the platform may
release several CPUs out of reset. It can take either 0 (several CPUs may be
brought up) or 1 (only one CPU will ever be brought up during cold reset).
Default is 0. If the platform always brings up a single CPU, there is no
need to distinguish between primary and secondary CPUs and the boot path can
be optimised. The `plat_is_my_cpu_primary()` and
`plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup()` platform porting interfaces do not need
to be implemented in this case.
* `CRASH_REPORTING`: A non-zero value enables a console dump of processor
register state when an unexpected exception occurs during execution of
BL31. This option defaults to the value of `DEBUG` - i.e. by default
this is only enabled for a debug build of the firmware.
* `CREATE_KEYS`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It tells the
certificate generation tool to create new keys in case no valid keys are
present or specified. Allowed options are '0' or '1'. Default is '1'.
* `CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS` : Boolean option that, when set to 1, will cause
the AArch32 system registers to be included when saving and restoring the
CPU context. The option must be set to 0 for AArch64-only platforms (that
is on hardware that does not implement AArch32, or at least not at EL1 and
higher ELs). Default value is 1.
* `CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS`: Boolean option that, when set to 1, will cause the FP
registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context. Default
is 0.
* `DEBUG`: Chooses between a debug and release build. It can take either 0
(release) or 1 (debug) as values. 0 is the default.
* `DISABLE_PEDANTIC`: When set to 1 it will disable the -pedantic option in
the GCC command line. Default is 0.
* `EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE`: This option enables booting an EL3 payload instead of
the normal boot flow. It must specify the entry point address of the EL3
payload. Please refer to the "Booting an EL3 payload" section for more
details.
* `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS`: This option controls whether or not calls to `assert()`
are compiled out. For debug builds, this option defaults to 1, and calls to
`assert()` are left in place. For release builds, this option defaults to 0
and calls to `assert()` function are compiled out. This option can be set
independently of `DEBUG`. It can also be used to hide any auxiliary code
that is only required for the assertion and does not fit in the assertion
itself.
* `ENABLE_PMF`: Boolean option to enable support for optional Performance
Measurement Framework(PMF). Default is 0.
* `ENABLE_PSCI_STAT`: Boolean option to enable support for optional PSCI
functions `PSCI_STAT_RESIDENCY` and `PSCI_STAT_COUNT`. Default is 0.
In the absence of an alternate stat collection backend, `ENABLE_PMF` must
be enabled. If `ENABLE_PMF` is set, the residency statistics are tracked in
software.
* `ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION`: Boolean option to enable runtime
instrumentation which injects timestamp collection points into
Trusted Firmware to allow runtime performance to be measured.
Currently, only PSCI is instrumented. Enabling this option enables
the `ENABLE_PMF` build option as well. Default is 0.
* `ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR`: String option to enable the stack protection
checks in GCC. Allowed values are "all", "strong" and "0" (default).
"strong" is the recommended stack protection level if this feature is
desired. 0 disables the stack protection. For all values other than 0, the
`plat_get_stack_protector_canary()` platform hook needs to be implemented.
The value is passed as the last component of the option
`-fstack-protector-$ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR`.
* `ERROR_DEPRECATED`: This option decides whether to treat the usage of
deprecated platform APIs, helper functions or drivers within Trusted
Firmware as error. It can take the value 1 (flag the use of deprecated
APIs as error) or 0. The default is 0.
* `FIP_NAME`: This is an optional build option which specifies the FIP
filename for the `fip` target. Default is `fip.bin`.
* `FWU_FIP_NAME`: This is an optional build option which specifies the FWU
FIP filename for the `fwu_fip` target. Default is `fwu_fip.bin`.
* `GENERATE_COT`: Boolean flag used to build and execute the `cert_create`
tool to create certificates as per the Chain of Trust described in
[Trusted Board Boot]. The build system then calls `fiptool` to
include the certificates in the FIP and FWU_FIP. Default value is '0'.
Specify both `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1` and `GENERATE_COT=1` to include support
for the Trusted Board Boot feature in the BL1 and BL2 images, to generate
the corresponding certificates, and to include those certificates in the
FIP and FWU_FIP.
Note that if `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=0` and `GENERATE_COT=1`, the BL1 and BL2
images will not include support for Trusted Board Boot. The FIP will still
include the corresponding certificates. This FIP can be used to verify the
Chain of Trust on the host machine through other mechanisms.
Note that if `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1` and `GENERATE_COT=0`, the BL1 and BL2
images will include support for Trusted Board Boot, but the FIP and FWU_FIP
will not include the corresponding certificates, causing a boot failure.
* `HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST`: When defined External Aborts and SError Interrupts
will be always trapped in EL3 i.e. in BL31 at runtime.
* `HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY`: On most ARM systems to-date, platform-specific
software operations are required for CPUs to enter and exit coherency.
However, there exists newer systems where CPUs' entry to and exit from
coherency is managed in hardware. Such systems require software to only
initiate the operations, and the rest is managed in hardware, minimizing
active software management. In such systems, this boolean option enables ARM
Trusted Firmware to carry out build and run-time optimizations during boot
and power management operations. This option defaults to 0.
* `LOAD_IMAGE_V2`: Boolean option to enable support for new version (v2) of
image loading, which provides more flexibility and scalability around what
images are loaded and executed during boot. Default is 0.
Note: `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT` is currently only supported for AArch64 when
`LOAD_IMAGE_V2` is enabled.
* `LOG_LEVEL`: Chooses the log level, which controls the amount of console log
output compiled into the build. This should be one of the following:
0 (LOG_LEVEL_NONE)
10 (LOG_LEVEL_NOTICE)
20 (LOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
30 (LOG_LEVEL_WARNING)
40 (LOG_LEVEL_INFO)
50 (LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
All log output up to and including the log level is compiled into the build.
The default value is 40 in debug builds and 20 in release builds.
* `NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It
specifies the file that contains the Non-Trusted World private key in PEM
format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`, this file name will be used to save the key.
* `NS_BL2U`: Path to NS_BL2U image in the host file system. This image is
optional. It is only needed if the platform makefile specifies that it
is required in order to build the `fwu_fip` target.
* `NS_TIMER_SWITCH`: Enable save and restore for non-secure timer register
contents upon world switch. It can take either 0 (don't save and restore) or
1 (do save and restore). 0 is the default. An SPD may set this to 1 if it
wants the timer registers to be saved and restored.
* `PL011_GENERIC_UART`: Boolean option to indicate the PL011 driver that
the underlying hardware is not a full PL011 UART but a minimally compliant
generic UART, which is a subset of the PL011. The driver will not access
any register that is not part of the SBSA generic UART specification.
Default value is 0 (a full PL011 compliant UART is present).
* `PLAT`: Choose a platform to build ARM Trusted Firmware for. The chosen
platform name must be subdirectory of any depth under `plat/`, and must
contain a platform makefile named `platform.mk`.
* `PRELOADED_BL33_BASE`: This option enables booting a preloaded BL33 image
instead of the normal boot flow. When defined, it must specify the entry
point address for the preloaded BL33 image. This option is incompatible with
`EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE`. If both are defined, `EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE` has priority
over `PRELOADED_BL33_BASE`.
* `PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS`: This option indicates whether the reset
vector address can be programmed or is fixed on the platform. It can take
either 0 (fixed) or 1 (programmable). Default is 0. If the platform has a
programmable reset address, it is expected that a CPU will start executing
code directly at the right address, both on a cold and warm reset. In this
case, there is no need to identify the entrypoint on boot and the boot path
can be optimised. The `plat_get_my_entrypoint()` platform porting interface
does not need to be implemented in this case.
* `PSCI_EXTENDED_STATE_ID`: As per PSCI1.0 Specification, there are 2 formats
possible for the PSCI power-state parameter viz original and extended
State-ID formats. This flag if set to 1, configures the generic PSCI layer
to use the extended format. The default value of this flag is 0, which
means by default the original power-state format is used by the PSCI
implementation. This flag should be specified by the platform makefile
and it governs the return value of PSCI_FEATURES API for CPU_SUSPEND
smc function id. When this option is enabled on ARM platforms, the
option `ARM_RECOM_STATE_ID_ENC` needs to be set to 1 as well.
* `RESET_TO_BL31`: Enable BL31 entrypoint as the CPU reset vector instead
of the BL1 entrypoint. It can take the value 0 (CPU reset to BL1
entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to BL31 entrypoint).
The default value is 0.
* `RESET_TO_SP_MIN`: SP_MIN is the minimal AArch32 Secure Payload provided in
ARM Trusted Firmware. This flag configures SP_MIN entrypoint as the CPU
reset vector instead of the BL1 entrypoint. It can take the value 0 (CPU
reset to BL1 entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to SP_MIN entrypoint). The default
value is 0.
* `ROT_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It specifies the
file that contains the ROT private key in PEM format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`, this
file name will be used to save the key.
* `SAVE_KEYS`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It tells the
certificate generation tool to save the keys used to establish the Chain of
Trust. Allowed options are '0' or '1'. Default is '0' (do not save).
* `SCP_BL2`: Path to SCP_BL2 image in the host file system. This image is optional.
If a SCP_BL2 image is present then this option must be passed for the `fip`
target.
* `SCP_BL2_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It specifies the
file that contains the SCP_BL2 private key in PEM format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`,
this file name will be used to save the key.
* `SCP_BL2U`: Path to SCP_BL2U image in the host file system. This image is
optional. It is only needed if the platform makefile specifies that it
is required in order to build the `fwu_fip` target.
* `SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA`: Whether code and read-only data should be
isolated on separate memory pages. This is a trade-off between security and
memory usage. See "Isolating code and read-only data on separate memory
pages" section in [Firmware Design]. This flag is disabled by default and
affects all BL images.
* `SPD`: Choose a Secure Payload Dispatcher component to be built into the
Trusted Firmware. This build option is only valid if `ARCH=aarch64`. The
value should be the path to the directory containing the SPD source,
relative to `services/spd/`; the directory is expected to
contain a makefile called `<spd-value>.mk`.
* `SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT`: This option introduces an infinite loop in BL1. It can
take either 0 (no loop) or 1 (add a loop). 0 is the default. This loop stops
execution in BL1 just before handing over to BL31. At this point, all
firmware images have been loaded in memory, and the MMU and caches are
turned off. Refer to the "Debugging options" section for more details.
* `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT`: Boolean flag to include support for the Trusted Board
Boot feature. When set to '1', BL1 and BL2 images include support to load
and verify the certificates and images in a FIP, and BL1 includes support
for the Firmware Update. The default value is '0'. Generation and inclusion
of certificates in the FIP and FWU_FIP depends upon the value of the
`GENERATE_COT` option.
Note: This option depends on `CREATE_KEYS` to be enabled. If the keys
already exist in disk, they will be overwritten without further notice.
* `TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY`: This option is used when `GENERATE_COT=1`. It
specifies the file that contains the Trusted World private key in PEM
format. If `SAVE_KEYS=1`, this file name will be used to save the key.
* `TSP_INIT_ASYNC`: Choose BL32 initialization method as asynchronous or
synchronous, (see "Initializing a BL32 Image" section in [Firmware
Design]). It can take the value 0 (BL32 is initialized using
synchronous method) or 1 (BL32 is initialized using asynchronous method).
Default is 0.
* `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT`: A non zero value enables the interrupt
routing model which routes non-secure interrupts asynchronously from TSP
to EL3 causing immediate preemption of TSP. The EL3 is responsible
for saving and restoring the TSP context in this routing model. The
default routing model (when the value is 0) is to route non-secure
interrupts to TSP allowing it to save its context and hand over
synchronously to EL3 via an SMC.
* `USE_COHERENT_MEM`: This flag determines whether to include the coherent
memory region in the BL memory map or not (see "Use of Coherent memory in
Trusted Firmware" section in [Firmware Design]). It can take the value 1
(Coherent memory region is included) or 0 (Coherent memory region is
excluded). Default is 1.
* `V`: Verbose build. If assigned anything other than 0, the build commands
are printed. Default is 0.
* `VERSION_STRING`: String used in the log output for each TF image. Defaults
to a string formed by concatenating the version number, build type and build
string.
#### ARM development platform specific build options
* `ARM_BL31_IN_DRAM`: Boolean option to select loading of BL31 in TZC secured
DRAM. By default, BL31 is in the secure SRAM. Set this flag to 1 to load
BL31 in TZC secured DRAM. If TSP is present, then setting this option also
sets the TSP location to DRAM and ignores the `ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION` build
flag.
* `ARM_BOARD_OPTIMISE_MEM`: Boolean option to enable or disable optimisation
of the memory reserved for each image. This affects the maximum size of each
BL image as well as the number of allocated memory regions and translation
tables. By default this flag is 0, which means it uses the default
unoptimised values for these macros. ARM development platforms that wish to
optimise memory usage need to set this flag to 1 and must override the
related macros.
* `ARM_CONFIG_CNTACR`: boolean option to unlock access to the CNTBase<N>
frame registers by setting the CNTCTLBase.CNTACR<N> register bits. The
frame number <N> is defined by `PLAT_ARM_NSTIMER_FRAME_ID`, which should
match the frame used by the Non-Secure image (normally the Linux kernel).
Default is true (access to the frame is allowed).
* `ARM_DISABLE_TRUSTED_WDOG`: boolean option to disable the Trusted Watchdog.
By default, ARM platforms use a watchdog to trigger a system reset in case
an error is encountered during the boot process (for example, when an image
could not be loaded or authenticated). The watchdog is enabled in the early
platform setup hook at BL1 and disabled in the BL1 prepare exit hook. The
Trusted Watchdog may be disabled at build time for testing or development
purposes.
* `ARM_RECOM_STATE_ID_ENC`: The PSCI1.0 specification recommends an encoding
for the construction of composite state-ID in the power-state parameter.
The existing PSCI clients currently do not support this encoding of
State-ID yet. Hence this flag is used to configure whether to use the
recommended State-ID encoding or not. The default value of this flag is 0,
in which case the platform is configured to expect NULL in the State-ID
field of power-state parameter.
* `ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION`: used when `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1`. It specifies the
location of the ROTPK hash returned by the function `plat_get_rotpk_info()`
for ARM platforms. Depending on the selected option, the proper private key
must be specified using the `ROT_KEY` option when building the Trusted
Firmware. This private key will be used by the certificate generation tool
to sign the BL2 and Trusted Key certificates. Available options for
`ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION` are:
- `regs` : return the ROTPK hash stored in the Trusted root-key storage
registers. The private key corresponding to this ROTPK hash is not
currently available.
- `devel_rsa` : return a development public key hash embedded in the BL1
and BL2 binaries. This hash has been obtained from the RSA public key
`arm_rotpk_rsa.der`, located in `plat/arm/board/common/rotpk`. To use
this option, `arm_rotprivk_rsa.pem` must be specified as `ROT_KEY` when
creating the certificates.
* `ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION`: location of the TSP binary. Options:
- `tsram` : Trusted SRAM (default option)
- `tdram` : Trusted DRAM (if available)
- `dram` : Secure region in DRAM (configured by the TrustZone controller)
For a better understanding of these options, the ARM development platform memory
map is explained in the [Firmware Design].
#### ARM CSS platform specific build options
* `CSS_DETECT_PRE_1_7_0_SCP`: Boolean flag to detect SCP version
incompatibility. Version 1.7.0 of the SCP firmware made a non-backwards
compatible change to the MTL protocol, used for AP/SCP communication.
Trusted Firmware no longer supports earlier SCP versions. If this option is
set to 1 then Trusted Firmware will detect if an earlier version is in use.
Default is 1.
* `CSS_LOAD_SCP_IMAGES`: Boolean flag, which when set, adds SCP_BL2 and
SCP_BL2U to the FIP and FWU_FIP respectively, and enables them to be loaded
during boot. Default is 1.
#### ARM FVP platform specific build options
* `FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT` : Configures the cluster count to be used to
build the topology tree within Trusted Firmware. By default the
Trusted Firmware is configured for dual cluster topology and this option
can be used to override the default value.
* `FVP_INTERCONNECT_DRIVER`: Selects the interconnect driver to be built. The
default interconnect driver depends on the value of `FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT` as
explained in the options below:
- `FVP_CCI` : The CCI driver is selected. This is the default
if 0 < `FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT` <= 2.
- `FVP_CCN` : The CCN driver is selected. This is the default
if `FVP_CLUSTER_COUNT` > 2.
* `FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER` : Selects the GIC driver to be built. Options:
- `FVP_GICV2` : The GICv2 only driver is selected
- `FVP_GICV3` : The GICv3 only driver is selected (default option)
- `FVP_GICV3_LEGACY`: The Legacy GICv3 driver is selected (deprecated)
Note: If Trusted Firmware is compiled with this option on FVPs with
GICv3 hardware, then it configures the hardware to run in GICv2
emulation mode
* `FVP_USE_SP804_TIMER` : Use the SP804 timer instead of the Generic Timer
for functions that wait for an arbitrary time length (udelay and mdelay).
The default value is 0.
### Debugging options
To compile a debug version and make the build more verbose use
make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all
AArch64 GCC uses DWARF version 4 debugging symbols by default. Some tools (for
example DS-5) might not support this and may need an older version of DWARF
symbols to be emitted by GCC. This can be achieved by using the
`-gdwarf-<version>` flag, with the version being set to 2 or 3. Setting the
version to 2 is recommended for DS-5 versions older than 5.16.
When debugging logic problems it might also be useful to disable all compiler
optimizations by using `-O0`.
NOTE: Using `-O0` could cause output images to be larger and base addresses
might need to be recalculated (see the **Memory layout on ARM development
platforms** section in the [Firmware Design]).
Extra debug options can be passed to the build system by setting `CFLAGS`:
CFLAGS='-O0 -gdwarf-2' \
make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all
It is also possible to introduce an infinite loop to help in debugging the
post-BL2 phase of the Trusted Firmware. This can be done by rebuilding BL1 with
the `SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT=1` build flag. Refer to the "Summary of build options"
section. In this case, the developer may take control of the target using a
debugger when indicated by the console output. When using DS-5, the following
commands can be used:
# Stop target execution
interrupt
#
# Prepare your debugging environment, e.g. set breakpoints
#
# Jump over the debug loop
set var $AARCH64::$Core::$PC = $AARCH64::$Core::$PC + 4
# Resume execution
continue
### Building the Test Secure Payload
The TSP is coupled with a companion runtime service in the BL31 firmware,
called the TSPD. Therefore, if you intend to use the TSP, the BL31 image
must be recompiled as well. For more information on SPs and SPDs, see the
"Secure-EL1 Payloads and Dispatchers" section in the [Firmware Design].
First clean the Trusted Firmware build directory to get rid of any previous
BL31 binary. Then to build the TSP image use:
make PLAT=<platform> SPD=tspd all
An additional boot loader binary file is created in the `build` directory:
build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl32.bin
### Checking source code style
When making changes to the source for submission to the project, the source
must be in compliance with the Linux style guide, and to assist with this check
the project Makefile contains two targets, which both utilise the
`checkpatch.pl` script that ships with the Linux source tree.
To check the entire source tree, you must first download a copy of
`checkpatch.pl` (or the full Linux source), set the `CHECKPATCH` environment
variable to point to the script and build the target checkcodebase:
make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkcodebase
To just check the style on the files that differ between your local branch and
the remote master, use:
make CHECKPATCH=<path-to-linux>/linux/scripts/checkpatch.pl checkpatch
If you wish to check your patch against something other than the remote master,
set the `BASE_COMMIT` variable to your desired branch. By default, `BASE_COMMIT`
is set to `origin/master`.
### Building and using the FIP tool
Firmware Image Package (FIP) is a packaging format used by the Trusted Firmware
project to package firmware images in a single binary. The number and type of
images that should be packed in a FIP is platform specific and may include TF
images and other firmware images required by the platform. For example, most
platforms require a BL33 image which corresponds to the normal world bootloader
(e.g. UEFI or U-Boot).
The TF build system provides the make target `fip` to create a FIP file for the
specified platform using the FIP creation tool included in the TF project.
Examples below show how to build a FIP file for FVP, packaging TF images and a
BL33 image.
For AArch64:
make PLAT=fvp BL33=<path/to/bl33.bin> fip
For AArch32:
make PLAT=fvp ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min BL33=<path/to/bl33.bin> fip
Note that AArch32 support for Normal world boot loader (BL33), like U-boot or
UEFI, on FVP is not available upstream. Hence custom solutions are required to
allow Linux boot on FVP. These instructions assume such a custom boot loader
(BL33) is available.
The resulting FIP may be found in:
build/fvp/<build-type>/fip.bin
For advanced operations on FIP files, it is also possible to independently build
the tool and create or modify FIPs using this tool. To do this, follow these
steps:
It is recommended to remove old artifacts before building the tool:
make -C tools/fiptool clean
Build the tool:
make [DEBUG=1] [V=1] fiptool
The tool binary can be located in:
./tools/fiptool/fiptool
Invoking the tool with `--help` will print a help message with all available
options.
Example 1: create a new Firmware package `fip.bin` that contains BL2 and BL31:
./tools/fiptool/fiptool create \
--tb-fw build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl2.bin \
--soc-fw build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl31.bin \
fip.bin
Example 2: view the contents of an existing Firmware package:
./tools/fiptool/fiptool info <path-to>/fip.bin
Example 3: update the entries of an existing Firmware package:
# Change the BL2 from Debug to Release version
./tools/fiptool/fiptool update \
--tb-fw build/<platform>/release/bl2.bin \
build/<platform>/debug/fip.bin
Example 4: unpack all entries from an existing Firmware package:
# Images will be unpacked to the working directory
./tools/fiptool/fiptool unpack <path-to>/fip.bin
Example 5: remove an entry from an existing Firmware package:
./tools/fiptool/fiptool remove \
--tb-fw build/<platform>/debug/fip.bin
Note that if the destination FIP file exists, the create, update and
remove operations will automatically overwrite it.
The unpack operation will fail if the images already exist at the
destination. In that case, use -f or --force to continue.
More information about FIP can be found in the [Firmware Design document]
[Firmware Design].
#### Migrating from fip_create to fiptool
The previous version of fiptool was called fip_create. A compatibility script
that emulates the basic functionality of the previous fip_create is provided.
However, users are strongly encouraged to migrate to fiptool.
* To create a new FIP file, replace "fip_create" with "fiptool create".
* To update a FIP file, replace "fip_create" with "fiptool update".
* To dump the contents of a FIP file, replace "fip_create --dump"
with "fiptool info".
### Building FIP images with support for Trusted Board Boot
Trusted Board Boot primarily consists of the following two features:
* Image Authentication, described in [Trusted Board Boot], and
* Firmware Update, described in [Firmware Update]
The following steps should be followed to build FIP and (optionally) FWU_FIP
images with support for these features:
1. Fulfill the dependencies of the `mbedtls` cryptographic and image parser
modules by checking out a recent version of the [mbed TLS Repository]. It
is important to use a version that is compatible with TF and fixes any
known security vulnerabilities. See [mbed TLS Security Center] for more
information. The latest version of TF is tested with tag `mbedtls-2.4.2`.
The `drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_*.mk` files contain the list of mbed TLS
source files the modules depend upon.
`include/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h` contains the configuration
options required to build the mbed TLS sources.
Note that the mbed TLS library is licensed under the Apache version 2.0
license. Using mbed TLS source code will affect the licensing of
Trusted Firmware binaries that are built using this library.
2. To build the FIP image, ensure the following command line variables are set
while invoking `make` to build Trusted Firmware:
* `MBEDTLS_DIR=<path of the directory containing mbed TLS sources>`
* `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1`
* `GENERATE_COT=1`
In the case of ARM platforms, the location of the ROTPK hash must also be
specified at build time. Two locations are currently supported (see
`ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION` build option):
* `ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=regs`: the ROTPK hash is obtained from the Trusted
root-key storage registers present in the platform. On Juno, this
registers are read-only. On FVP Base and Cortex models, the registers
are read-only, but the value can be specified using the command line
option `bp.trusted_key_storage.public_key` when launching the model.
On both Juno and FVP models, the default value corresponds to an
ECDSA-SECP256R1 public key hash, whose private part is not currently
available.
* `ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa`: use the ROTPK hash that is hardcoded
in the ARM platform port. The private/public RSA key pair may be
found in `plat/arm/board/common/rotpk`.
Example of command line using RSA development keys:
MBEDTLS_DIR=<path of the directory containing mbed TLS sources> \
make PLAT=<platform> TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 GENERATE_COT=1 \
ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa \
ROT_KEY=plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/arm_rotprivk_rsa.pem \
BL33=<path-to>/<bl33_image> \
all fip
The result of this build will be the bl1.bin and the fip.bin binaries. This
FIP will include the certificates corresponding to the Chain of Trust
described in the TBBR-client document. These certificates can also be found
in the output build directory.
3. The optional FWU_FIP contains any additional images to be loaded from
Non-Volatile storage during the [Firmware Update] process. To build the
FWU_FIP, any FWU images required by the platform must be specified on the
command line. On ARM development platforms like Juno, these are:
* NS_BL2U. The AP non-secure Firmware Updater image.
* SCP_BL2U. The SCP Firmware Update Configuration image.
Example of Juno command line for generating both `fwu` and `fwu_fip`
targets using RSA development:
MBEDTLS_DIR=<path of the directory containing mbed TLS sources> \
make PLAT=juno TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 GENERATE_COT=1 \
ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa \
ROT_KEY=plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/arm_rotprivk_rsa.pem \
BL33=<path-to>/<bl33_image> \
SCP_BL2=<path-to>/<scp_bl2_image> \
SCP_BL2U=<path-to>/<scp_bl2u_image> \
NS_BL2U=<path-to>/<ns_bl2u_image> \
all fip fwu_fip
Note: The BL2U image will be built by default and added to the FWU_FIP.
The user may override this by adding `BL2U=<path-to>/<bl2u_image>`
to the command line above.
Note: Building and installing the non-secure and SCP FWU images (NS_BL1U,
NS_BL2U and SCP_BL2U) is outside the scope of this document.
The result of this build will be bl1.bin, fip.bin and fwu_fip.bin binaries.
Both the FIP and FWU_FIP will include the certificates corresponding to the
Chain of Trust described in the TBBR-client document. These certificates
can also be found in the output build directory.
### Building the Certificate Generation Tool
The `cert_create` tool is built as part of the TF build process when the `fip`
make target is specified and TBB is enabled (as described in the previous
section), but it can also be built separately with the following command:
make PLAT=<platform> [DEBUG=1] [V=1] certtool
Specifying the platform is mandatory since the tool is platform specific.
`DEBUG=1` builds the tool in debug mode. `V=1` makes the build process more
verbose. The following command should be used to obtain help about the tool:
./tools/cert_create/cert_create -h
6. Building a FIP for Juno and FVP
-----------------------------------
This section provides Juno and FVP specific instructions to build Trusted
Firmware, obtain the additional required firmware, and pack it all together in
a single FIP binary. It assumes that a [Linaro Release][Linaro Release Notes]
has been installed.
Note: Linaro Release 16.06 only includes pre-built binaries for AArch64. For
AArch32, pre-built binaries are only available from Linaro Release 16.12.
Note: follow the full instructions for one platform before switching to a
different one. Mixing instructions for different platforms may result in
corrupted binaries.
1. Clean the working directory
make realclean
2. Obtain SCP_BL2 (Juno) and BL33 (all platforms)
Use the fiptool to extract the SCP_BL2 and BL33 images from the FIP
package included in the Linaro release:
# Build the fiptool
make [DEBUG=1] [V=1] fiptool
# Unpack firmware images from Linaro FIP
./tools/fiptool/fiptool unpack \
<path/to/linaro/release>/fip.bin
The unpack operation will result in a set of binary images extracted to the
working directory. The SCP_BL2 image corresponds to `scp-fw.bin` and BL33
corresponds to `nt-fw.bin`.
Note: the fiptool will complain if the images to be unpacked already
exist in the current directory. If that is the case, either delete those
files or use the `--force` option to overwrite.
Note for AArch32, the instructions below assume that nt-fw.bin is a custom
Normal world boot loader that supports AArch32.
3. Build TF images and create a new FIP
# Juno
make PLAT=juno SCP_BL2=scp-fw.bin BL33=nt-fw.bin all fip
# FVP AArch64
make PLAT=fvp BL33=nt-fw.bin all fip
# FVP AArch32
make PLAT=fvp ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min BL33=nt-fw.bin all fip
The resulting BL1 and FIP images may be found in:
# Juno
./build/juno/release/bl1.bin
./build/juno/release/fip.bin
# FVP
./build/fvp/release/bl1.bin
./build/fvp/release/fip.bin
7. EL3 payloads alternative boot flow
--------------------------------------
On a pre-production system, the ability to execute arbitrary, bare-metal code at
the highest exception level is required. It allows full, direct access to the
hardware, for example to run silicon soak tests.
Although it is possible to implement some baremetal secure firmware from
scratch, this is a complex task on some platforms, depending on the level of
configuration required to put the system in the expected state.
Rather than booting a baremetal application, a possible compromise is to boot
`EL3 payloads` through the Trusted Firmware instead. This is implemented as an
alternative boot flow, where a modified BL2 boots an EL3 payload, instead of
loading the other BL images and passing control to BL31. It reduces the
complexity of developing EL3 baremetal code by:
* putting the system into a known architectural state;
* taking care of platform secure world initialization;
* loading the SCP_BL2 image if required by the platform.
When booting an EL3 payload on ARM standard platforms, the configuration of the
TrustZone controller is simplified such that only region 0 is enabled and is
configured to permit secure access only. This gives full access to the whole
DRAM to the EL3 payload.
The system is left in the same state as when entering BL31 in the default boot
flow. In particular:
* Running in EL3;
* Current state is AArch64;
* Little-endian data access;
* All exceptions disabled;
* MMU disabled;
* Caches disabled.
### Booting an EL3 payload
The EL3 payload image is a standalone image and is not part of the FIP. It is
not loaded by the Trusted Firmware. Therefore, there are 2 possible scenarios:
* The EL3 payload may reside in non-volatile memory (NVM) and execute in
place. In this case, booting it is just a matter of specifying the right
address in NVM through `EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE` when building the TF.
* The EL3 payload needs to be loaded in volatile memory (e.g. DRAM) at
run-time.
To help in the latter scenario, the `SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT=1` build option can be
used. The infinite loop that it introduces in BL1 stops execution at the right
moment for a debugger to take control of the target and load the payload (for
example, over JTAG).
It is expected that this loading method will work in most cases, as a debugger
connection is usually available in a pre-production system. The user is free to
use any other platform-specific mechanism to load the EL3 payload, though.
#### Booting an EL3 payload on FVP
The EL3 payloads boot flow requires the CPU's mailbox to be cleared at reset for
the secondary CPUs holding pen to work properly. Unfortunately, its reset value
is undefined on the FVP platform and the FVP platform code doesn't clear it.
Therefore, one must modify the way the model is normally invoked in order to
clear the mailbox at start-up.
One way to do that is to create an 8-byte file containing all zero bytes using
the following command:
dd if=/dev/zero of=mailbox.dat bs=1 count=8
and pre-load it into the FVP memory at the mailbox address (i.e. `0x04000000`)
using the following model parameters:
--data cluster0.cpu0=mailbox.dat@0x04000000 [Base FVPs]
--data=mailbox.dat@0x04000000 [Foundation FVP]
To provide the model with the EL3 payload image, the following methods may be
used:
1. If the EL3 payload is able to execute in place, it may be programmed into
flash memory. On Base Cortex and AEM FVPs, the following model parameter
loads it at the base address of the NOR FLASH1 (the NOR FLASH0 is already
used for the FIP):
-C bp.flashloader1.fname="/path/to/el3-payload"
On Foundation FVP, there is no flash loader component and the EL3 payload
may be programmed anywhere in flash using method 3 below.
2. When using the `SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT=1` loading method, the following DS-5
command may be used to load the EL3 payload ELF image over JTAG:
load /path/to/el3-payload.elf
3. The EL3 payload may be pre-loaded in volatile memory using the following
model parameters:
--data cluster0.cpu0="/path/to/el3-payload"@address [Base FVPs]
--data="/path/to/el3-payload"@address [Foundation FVP]
The address provided to the FVP must match the `EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE` address
used when building the Trusted Firmware.
#### Booting an EL3 payload on Juno
If the EL3 payload is able to execute in place, it may be programmed in flash
memory by adding an entry in the `SITE1/HBI0262x/images.txt` configuration file
on the Juno SD card (where `x` depends on the revision of the Juno board).
Refer to the [Juno Getting Started Guide], section 2.3 "Flash memory
programming" for more information.
Alternatively, the same DS-5 command mentioned in the FVP section above can
be used to load the EL3 payload's ELF file over JTAG on Juno.
8. Preloaded BL33 alternative boot flow
----------------------------------------
Some platforms have the ability to preload BL33 into memory instead of relying
on Trusted Firmware to load it. This may simplify packaging of the normal world
code and improve performance in a development environment. When secure world
cold boot is complete, Trusted Firmware simply jumps to a BL33 base address
provided at build time.
For this option to be used, the `PRELOADED_BL33_BASE` build option has to be
used when compiling the Trusted Firmware. For example, the following command
will create a FIP without a BL33 and prepare to jump to a BL33 image loaded at
address 0x80000000:
make PRELOADED_BL33_BASE=0x80000000 PLAT=fvp all fip
#### Boot of a preloaded bootwrapped kernel image on Base FVP
The following example uses the AArch64 boot wrapper. This simplifies normal
world booting while also making use of TF features. It can be obtained from its
repository with:
git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/boot-wrapper-aarch64.git
After compiling it, an ELF file is generated. It can be loaded with the
following command:
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C bp.secureflashloader.fname=bl1.bin \
-C bp.flashloader0.fname=fip.bin \
-a cluster0.cpu0=<bootwrapped-kernel.elf> \
--start cluster0.cpu0=0x0
The `-a cluster0.cpu0=<bootwrapped-kernel.elf>` option loads the ELF file. It
also sets the PC register to the ELF entry point address, which is not the
desired behaviour, so the `--start cluster0.cpu0=0x0` option forces the PC back
to 0x0 (the BL1 entry point address) on CPU #0. The `PRELOADED_BL33_BASE` define
used when compiling the FIP must match the ELF entry point.
#### Boot of a preloaded bootwrapped kernel image on Juno
The procedure to obtain and compile the boot wrapper is very similar to the case
of the FVP. The execution must be stopped at the end of bl2_main(), and the
loading method explained above in the EL3 payload boot flow section may be used
to load the ELF file over JTAG on Juno.
9. Running the software on FVP
-------------------------------
The latest version of the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware has been tested
on the following ARM FVPs (64-bit host machine only).
* `Foundation_Platform` (Version 10.2, Build 10.2.20)
* `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` (Version 8.2, Build 0.8.8202)
* `FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4` (Version 8.2, Build 0.8.8202)
* `FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x1-A53x1` (Version 8.2, Build 0.8.8202)
* `FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x2-A53x4` (Version 8.2, Build 0.8.8202)
The latest version of the AArch32 build of ARM Trusted Firmware has been tested
on the following ARM FVPs (64-bit host machine only).
* `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` (Version 8.2, Build 0.8.8202)
* `FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4` (Version 10.1, Build 10.1.32)
NOTE: The build numbers quoted above are those reported by launching the FVP
with the `--version` parameter.
NOTE: The software will not work on Version 1.0 of the Foundation FVP.
The commands below would report an `unhandled argument` error in this case.
NOTE: FVPs can be launched with `--cadi-server` option such that a
CADI-compliant debugger (for example, ARM DS-5) can connect to and control its
execution.
The Foundation FVP is a cut down version of the AArch64 Base FVP. It can be
downloaded for free from [ARM's website][ARM FVP website].
Please refer to the FVP documentation for a detailed description of the model
parameter options. A brief description of the important ones that affect the ARM
Trusted Firmware and normal world software behavior is provided below.
Note the instructions in the following sections assume that Linaro Release 16.06
is being used.
### Obtaining the Flattened Device Trees
Depending on the FVP configuration and Linux configuration used, different
FDT files are required. FDTs for the Foundation and Base FVPs can be found in
the Trusted Firmware source directory under `fdts/`. The Foundation FVP has a
subset of the Base FVP components. For example, the Foundation FVP lacks CLCD
and MMC support, and has only one CPU cluster.
Note: It is not recommended to use the FDTs built along the kernel because not
all FDTs are available from there.
* `fvp-base-gicv2-psci.dtb`
For use with both AEMv8 and Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVPs with
Base memory map configuration.
* `fvp-base-gicv2-psci-aarch32.dtb`
For use with AEMv8 and Cortex-A32 Base FVPs running Linux in AArch32 state
with Base memory map configuration.
* `fvp-base-gicv3-psci.dtb`
(Default) For use with both AEMv8 and Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVPs with Base
memory map configuration and Linux GICv3 support.
* `fvp-base-gicv3-psci-aarch32.dtb`
For use with AEMv8 and Cortex-A32 Base FVPs running Linux in AArch32 state
with Base memory map configuration and Linux GICv3 support.
* `fvp-foundation-gicv2-psci.dtb`
For use with Foundation FVP with Base memory map configuration.
* `fvp-foundation-gicv3-psci.dtb`
(Default) For use with Foundation FVP with Base memory map configuration
and Linux GICv3 support.
### Running on the Foundation FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following `Foundation_Platform` parameters should be used to boot Linux with
4 CPUs using the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/Foundation_Platform \
--cores=4 \
--secure-memory \
--visualization \
--gicv3 \
--data="<path-to>/<bl1-binary>"@0x0 \
--data="<path-to>/<FIP-binary>"@0x08000000 \
--data="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
--block-device="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
Notes:
* BL1 is loaded at the start of the Trusted ROM.
* The Firmware Image Package is loaded at the start of NOR FLASH0.
* The Linux kernel image and device tree are loaded in DRAM.
* The default use-case for the Foundation FVP is to use the `--gicv3` option
and enable the GICv3 device in the model. Note that without this option,
the Foundation FVP defaults to legacy (Versatile Express) memory map which
is not supported by ARM Trusted Firmware.
### Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C bp.secureflashloader.fname="<path-to>/<bl1-binary>" \
-C bp.flashloader0.fname="<path-to>/<FIP-binary>" \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
### Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch32 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu0.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu1.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu2.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu3.CONFIG64=0 \
-C bp.secureflashloader.fname="<path-to>/<bl1-binary>" \
-C bp.flashloader0.fname="<path-to>/<FIP-binary>" \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
### Running on the Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVP with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C bp.secureflashloader.fname="<path-to>/<bl1-binary>" \
-C bp.flashloader0.fname="<path-to>/<FIP-binary>" \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
### Running on the Cortex-A32 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to BL1 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 4 CPUs using the AArch32 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C bp.secureflashloader.fname="<path-to>/<bl1-binary>" \
-C bp.flashloader0.fname="<path-to>/<FIP-binary>" \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
### Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP with reset to BL31 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04023000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl31-binary>"@0x04023000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl32-binary>"@0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl33-binary>"@0x88000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
Notes:
* Since a FIP is not loaded when using BL31 as reset entrypoint, the
`--data="<path-to><bl31|bl32|bl33-binary>"@<base-address-of-binary>`
parameter is needed to load the individual bootloader images in memory.
BL32 image is only needed if BL31 has been built to expect a Secure-EL1
Payload.
* The `-C cluster<X>.cpu<Y>.RVBAR=@<base-address-of-bl31>` parameter, where
X and Y are the cluster and CPU numbers respectively, is used to set the
reset vector for each core.
* Changing the default value of `ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION` will also require
changing the value of
`--data="<path-to><bl32-binary>"@<base-address-of-bl32>` to the new value of
`BL32_BASE`.
### Running on the AEMv8 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to SP_MIN entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A` parameters should be used to boot Linux
with 8 CPUs using the AArch32 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_AEMv8A-AEMv8A \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu0.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu1.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu2.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster1.cpu3.CONFIG64=0 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster1.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster1.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster1.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster1.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl32-binary>"@0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl33-binary>"@0x88000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
Note: The load address of `<bl32-binary>` depends on the value `BL32_BASE`.
It should match the address programmed into the RVBAR register as well.
### Running on the Cortex-A57-A53 Base FVP with reset to BL31 entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 8 CPUs using the AArch64 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A57x4-A53x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu0.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu1.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu2.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
-C cluster1.cpu3.RVBARADDR=0x04023000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl31-binary>"@0x04023000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl32-binary>"@0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl33-binary>"@0x88000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
### Running on the Cortex-A32 Base FVP (AArch32) with reset to SP_MIN entrypoint
The following `FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4` model parameters should be used to
boot Linux with 4 CPUs using the AArch32 build of ARM Trusted Firmware.
<path-to>/FVP_Base_Cortex-A32x4 \
-C pctl.startup=0.0.0.0 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.tzc_400.diagnostics=1 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C cluster0.cpu0.RVBARADDR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu1.RVBARADDR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu2.RVBARADDR=0x04001000 \
-C cluster0.cpu3.RVBARADDR=0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl32-binary>"@0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<bl33-binary>"@0x88000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<fdt>"@0x83000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
-C bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path="<path-to>/<file-system-image>"
10. Running the software on Juno
---------------------------------
This version of the ARM Trusted Firmware has been tested on Juno r0 and Juno r1.
To execute the software stack on Juno, the version of the Juno board recovery
image indicated in the [Linaro Release Notes] must be installed. If you have an
earlier version installed or are unsure which version is installed, please
re-install the recovery image by following the [Instructions for using Linaro's
deliverables on Juno][Juno Instructions].
### Preparing Trusted Firmware images
After building Trusted Firmware, the files `bl1.bin` and `fip.bin` need copying
to the `SOFTWARE/` directory of the Juno SD card.
### Other Juno software information
Please visit the [ARM Platforms Portal] to get support and obtain any other Juno
software information. Please also refer to the [Juno Getting Started Guide] to
get more detailed information about the Juno ARM development platform and how to
configure it.
### Testing SYSTEM SUSPEND on Juno
The SYSTEM SUSPEND is a PSCI API which can be used to implement system suspend
to RAM. For more details refer to section 5.16 of [PSCI]. To test system suspend
on Juno, at the linux shell prompt, issue the following command:
echo +10 > /sys/class/rtc/rtc0/wakealarm
echo -n mem > /sys/power/state
The Juno board should suspend to RAM and then wakeup after 10 seconds due to
wakeup interrupt from RTC.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
_Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
[Firmware Design]: firmware-design.md
[ARM FVP website]: https://developer.arm.com/products/system-design/fixed-virtual-platforms
[Linaro Release Notes]: https://community.arm.com/tools/dev-platforms/b/documents/posts/linaro-release-notes-deprecated
[ARM Platforms Portal]: https://community.arm.com/groups/arm-development-platforms
[Linaro SW Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10803
[Juno Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10804
[FVP Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10831
[Juno Getting Started Guide]: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dui0928e/DUI0928E_juno_arm_development_platform_gsg.pdf
[DS-5]: http://www.arm.com/products/tools/software-tools/ds-5/index.php
[mbed TLS Repository]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls.git
[mbed TLS Security Center]: https://tls.mbed.org/security
[PSCI]: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0022c/DEN0022C_Power_State_Coordination_Interface.pdf "Power State Coordination Interface PDD (ARM DEN 0022C)"
[Trusted Board Boot]: trusted-board-boot.md
[Firmware Update]: ./firmware-update.md
[PSCI Lib Integration]: ./psci-lib-integration-guide.md
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