TF-A supports reading input data from UART interfaces. This opens up
an attack vector for arbitrary data to be injected into TF-A, which is
not covered in the threat model right now.
Fill this gap by:
- Updating the data flow diagrams. Data may flow from the UART into
TF-A (and not only the other way around).
- Documenting the threats inherent to reading untrusted data from a
UART.
Change-Id: I508da5d2f7ad5d20717b958d76ab9337c5eca50f
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
This is the first release of the public Trusted
Firmware A class threat model. This release
provides the baseline for future updates to be
applied as required by developments to the
TF-A code base.
Signed-off-by: Zelalem Aweke <zelalem.aweke@arm.com>
Change-Id: I3c9aadc46196837679f0b1377bec9ed4fc42ff11
