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Fixes of unreleased buffer, deadcode and wrong variable type detected by coverity scan. Addresses-Coverity-ID: 510809: Resource leaks (RESOURCE_LEAK) Addresses-Coverity-ID: 510806: Control flow issues (DEADCODE) Addresses-Coverity-ID: 510794 Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) Signed-off-by: Raymond Mao <raymond.mao@linaro.org>
505 lines
13 KiB
C
505 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
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/*
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* PKCS#7 parser using MbedTLS PKCS#7 library
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2024 Linaro Limited
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* Author: Raymond Mao <raymond.mao@linaro.org>
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*/
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#include <log.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
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static void pkcs7_free_mbedtls_ctx(struct pkcs7_mbedtls_ctx *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx) {
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kfree(ctx->content_data);
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kfree(ctx);
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}
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}
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static void pkcs7_free_sinfo_mbedtls_ctx(struct pkcs7_sinfo_mbedtls_ctx *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx) {
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kfree(ctx->authattrs_data);
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kfree(ctx->content_data_digest);
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kfree(ctx);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Parse Authenticate Attributes
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* TODO: Shall we consider to integrate decoding of authenticate attribute into
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* MbedTLS library?
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*
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* There are two kinds of structure for the Authenticate Attributes being used
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* in U-Boot.
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*
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* Type 1 - contains in a PE/COFF EFI image:
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*
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* [C.P.0] {
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 (OID_contentType)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 (OID_msIndirectData)
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* }
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* }
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 (OID_signingTime)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.UTCTime '<siging_time>'
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* }
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* }
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 (OID_messageDigest)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.OCTETSTRING <digest>
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* }
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* }
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 (OID_smimeCapabilites)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* <...>
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* }
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* }
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* }
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* }
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*
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* Type 2 - contains in an EFI Capsule:
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*
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* [C.P.0] {
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 (OID_contentType)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 (OID_data)
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* }
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* }
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 (OID_signingTime)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.UTCTime '<siging_time>'
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* }
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* }
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* U.P.SEQUENCE {
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* U.P.OBJECTIDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 (OID_messageDigest)
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* U.P.SET {
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* U.P.OCTETSTRING <digest>
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* }
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* }
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*}
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*
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* Note:
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* They have different Content Type (OID_msIndirectData or OID_data).
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* OID_smimeCapabilites only exists in a PE/COFF EFI image.
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*/
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static int authattrs_parse(struct pkcs7_message *msg, void *aa, size_t aa_len,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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{
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unsigned char *p = aa;
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unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *)aa + aa_len;
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size_t len = 0;
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int ret;
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unsigned char *inner_p;
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size_t seq_len = 0;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &seq_len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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while (!mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &seq_len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
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inner_p = p;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CONTENTTYPE, inner_p, len)) {
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inner_p += len;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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/*
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* We should only support 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 (OID_data)
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* for PKCS7 DATA that is used in EFI Capsule and
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* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 (OID_msIndirectData) for
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* MicroSoft Authentication Code that is used in EFI
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* Secure Boot.
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*/
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if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_MICROSOFT_INDIRECTDATA,
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inner_p, len) &&
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MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA,
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inner_p, len))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGEDIGEST, inner_p,
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len)) {
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inner_p += len;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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sinfo->msgdigest = inner_p;
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sinfo->msgdigest_len = len;
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_SIGNINGTIME, inner_p,
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len)) {
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mbedtls_x509_time st;
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inner_p += len;
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ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(&inner_p, p + seq_len, &st);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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sinfo->signing_time = x509_get_timestamp(&st);
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_SMIMECAP, inner_p,
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len)) {
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
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msg->data_type != OID_data)
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_MICROSOFT_SPOPUSINFO, inner_p,
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len)) {
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_MICROSOFT_STATETYPE, inner_p,
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len)) {
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if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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p += seq_len;
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}
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msg->have_authattrs = true;
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/*
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* Skip the leading tag byte (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
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* MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) to satisfy pkcs7_digest() when calculating
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* the digest of authattrs.
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*/
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sinfo->authattrs = aa + 1;
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sinfo->authattrs_len = aa_len - 1;
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return 0;
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}
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static int x509_populate_content_data(struct pkcs7_message *msg,
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mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7_ctx)
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{
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struct pkcs7_mbedtls_ctx *mctx;
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if (!pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data ||
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!pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data_len)
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return 0;
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mctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*mctx), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mctx)
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return -ENOMEM;
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mctx->content_data = kmemdup(pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data,
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pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data_len,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mctx->content_data) {
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pkcs7_free_mbedtls_ctx(mctx);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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msg->data = mctx->content_data;
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msg->data_len = pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data_len;
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msg->data_hdrlen = pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data_hdrlen;
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msg->data_type = pkcs7_ctx->content_data.data_type;
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msg->mbedtls_ctx = mctx;
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return 0;
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}
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static int x509_populate_sinfo(struct pkcs7_message *msg,
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mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *mb_sinfo,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info **sinfo)
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{
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_info;
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struct public_key_signature *s;
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
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struct pkcs7_sinfo_mbedtls_ctx *mctx;
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int ret;
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signed_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!signed_info)
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return -ENOMEM;
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s = kzalloc(sizeof(*s), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!s) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_no_sig;
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}
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mctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*mctx), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mctx) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_no_mctx;
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}
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/*
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* Hash algorithm:
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*
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* alg_identifier = digestAlgorithm (DigestAlgorithmIdentifier)
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* MbedTLS internally checks this field to ensure
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* it is the same as digest_alg_identifiers.
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* sig_alg_identifier = digestEncryptionAlgorithm
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* (DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier)
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* MbedTLS just saves this field without any actions.
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* See function pkcs7_get_signer_info() for reference.
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*
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* Public key algorithm:
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* No information related to public key algorithm under MbedTLS signer
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* info. Assume that we are using RSA.
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*/
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ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&mb_sinfo->alg_identifier, &md_alg);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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s->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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/* Translate the hash algorithm */
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switch (md_alg) {
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case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
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s->hash_algo = "sha1";
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s->digest_size = SHA1_SUM_LEN;
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break;
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case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
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s->hash_algo = "sha256";
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s->digest_size = SHA256_SUM_LEN;
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break;
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case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
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s->hash_algo = "sha384";
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s->digest_size = SHA384_SUM_LEN;
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break;
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case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
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s->hash_algo = "sha512";
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s->digest_size = SHA512_SUM_LEN;
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break;
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/* Unsupported algo */
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case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
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case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
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default:
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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}
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/*
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* auth_ids holds AuthorityKeyIdentifier, aka akid
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* auth_ids[0]:
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* [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] - generated from "Issuer + Serial number"
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* [CMS ver 3] - generated from skid (subjectKeyId)
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* auth_ids[1]: generated from skid (subjectKeyId)
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*
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* Assume that we are using PKCS#7 (msg->version=1),
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* not CMS ver 3 (msg->version=3).
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*/
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s->auth_ids[0] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(mb_sinfo->serial.p,
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mb_sinfo->serial.len,
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mb_sinfo->issuer_raw.p,
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mb_sinfo->issuer_raw.len);
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if (!s->auth_ids[0]) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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}
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/* skip s->auth_ids[1], no subjectKeyId in MbedTLS signer info ctx */
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/*
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* Encoding can be pkcs1 or raw, but only pkcs1 is supported.
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* Set the encoding explicitly to pkcs1.
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*/
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s->encoding = "pkcs1";
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/* Copy the signature data */
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s->s = kmemdup(mb_sinfo->sig.p, mb_sinfo->sig.len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!s->s) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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}
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s->s_size = mb_sinfo->sig.len;
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signed_info->sig = s;
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/* Save the Authenticate Attributes data if exists */
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if (!mb_sinfo->authattrs.data || !mb_sinfo->authattrs.data_len) {
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kfree(mctx);
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goto no_authattrs;
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}
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mctx->authattrs_data = kmemdup(mb_sinfo->authattrs.data,
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mb_sinfo->authattrs.data_len,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mctx->authattrs_data) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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}
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signed_info->mbedtls_ctx = mctx;
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/* If authattrs exists, decode it and parse msgdigest from it */
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ret = authattrs_parse(msg, mctx->authattrs_data,
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mb_sinfo->authattrs.data_len,
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signed_info);
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if (ret)
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goto out_err_sinfo;
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no_authattrs:
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*sinfo = signed_info;
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return 0;
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out_err_sinfo:
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pkcs7_free_sinfo_mbedtls_ctx(mctx);
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out_no_mctx:
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public_key_signature_free(s);
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out_no_sig:
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kfree(signed_info);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Free a signed information block.
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*/
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static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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{
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if (sinfo) {
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public_key_signature_free(sinfo->sig);
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pkcs7_free_sinfo_mbedtls_ctx(sinfo->mbedtls_ctx);
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kfree(sinfo);
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}
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}
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/**
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* pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
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* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
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*/
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void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
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{
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struct x509_certificate *cert;
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
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if (pkcs7) {
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while (pkcs7->certs) {
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cert = pkcs7->certs;
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pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
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x509_free_certificate(cert);
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}
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while (pkcs7->crl) {
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cert = pkcs7->crl;
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pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
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x509_free_certificate(cert);
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}
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while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
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sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
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pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
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pkcs7_free_signed_info(sinfo);
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}
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pkcs7_free_mbedtls_ctx(pkcs7->mbedtls_ctx);
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kfree(pkcs7);
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}
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}
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struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
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{
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int i;
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int ret;
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mbedtls_pkcs7 pkcs7_ctx;
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mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *mb_sinfos;
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mbedtls_x509_crt *mb_certs;
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struct pkcs7_message *msg;
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struct x509_certificate **cert;
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struct pkcs7_signed_info **sinfos;
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msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!msg) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_no_msg;
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}
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/* Parse the DER encoded PKCS#7 message using MbedTLS */
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mbedtls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7_ctx);
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ret = mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(&pkcs7_ctx, data, datalen);
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/* Check if it is a PKCS#7 message with signed data */
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if (ret != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
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goto parse_fail;
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/* Assume that we are using PKCS#7, not CMS ver 3 */
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msg->version = 1; /* 1 for [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] */
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/* Populate the certs to msg->certs */
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for (i = 0, cert = &msg->certs, mb_certs = &pkcs7_ctx.signed_data.certs;
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i < pkcs7_ctx.signed_data.no_of_certs && mb_certs;
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i++, cert = &(*cert)->next, mb_certs = mb_certs->next) {
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ret = x509_populate_cert(mb_certs, cert);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto parse_fail;
|
|
|
|
(*cert)->index = i + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip populating crl, that is not currently in-use.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Populate content data */
|
|
ret = x509_populate_content_data(msg, &pkcs7_ctx);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto parse_fail;
|
|
|
|
/* Populate signed info to msg->signed_infos */
|
|
for (i = 0, sinfos = &msg->signed_infos,
|
|
mb_sinfos = &pkcs7_ctx.signed_data.signers;
|
|
i < pkcs7_ctx.signed_data.no_of_signers && mb_sinfos;
|
|
i++, sinfos = &(*sinfos)->next, mb_sinfos = mb_sinfos->next) {
|
|
ret = x509_populate_sinfo(msg, mb_sinfos, sinfos);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto parse_fail;
|
|
|
|
(*sinfos)->index = i + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_pkcs7_free(&pkcs7_ctx);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
|
|
parse_fail:
|
|
mbedtls_pkcs7_free(&pkcs7_ctx);
|
|
pkcs7_free_message(msg);
|
|
out_no_msg:
|
|
msg = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
return msg;
|
|
}
|