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doc: verified-boot: fix typos

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Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
This commit is contained in:
Masahiro Yamada 2017-08-22 15:19:20 +09:00 • committed by Tom Rini
parent 10b078d836
commit e43f74ac0b
2 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
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10
doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt
View file

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ $ openssl rsa -in keys/dev.key -pubout
Device Tree Bindings Device Tree Bindings
-------------------- --------------------
The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to
allow thes signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file. allow the signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file.
Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called
signature@1, signature@2, etc. signature@1, signature@2, etc.
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ all available signing keys until one matches.
- required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the - required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the
image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are
normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are
"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verfication "image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verification
of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to
verify those). verify those).
@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ configuration 3 with kernel 1 and fdt 2:
With signed images, nothing protects against this. Whether it gains an With signed images, nothing protects against this. Whether it gains an
advantage for the attacker is debatable, but it is not secure. advantage for the attacker is debatable, but it is not secure.
To solved this problem, we support signed configurations. In this case it To solve this problem, we support signed configurations. In this case it
is the configurations that are signed, not the image. Each image has its is the configurations that are signed, not the image. Each image has its
own hash, and we include the hash in the configuration signature. own hash, and we include the hash in the configuration signature.
@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ Enabling FIT Verification
In addition to the options to enable FIT itself, the following CONFIGs must In addition to the options to enable FIT itself, the following CONFIGs must
be enabled: be enabled:
CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verfication in FITs CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verification in FITs
CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing
WARNING: When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check WARNING: When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check
@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY
Testing Testing
------- -------
An easy way to test signing and verfication is to use the test script An easy way to test signing and verification is to use the test script
provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version
of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm' of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm'
command loading and verifying images. command loading and verifying images.

2
doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt
View file

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ include hashes to verify images, so it is relatively straightforward to
add signatures as well. add signatures as well.
The public key can be stored in U-Boot's CONFIG_OF_CONTROL device tree in The public key can be stored in U-Boot's CONFIG_OF_CONTROL device tree in
a standard place. Then when a FIT it loaded it can be verified using that a standard place. Then when a FIT is loaded it can be verified using that
public key. Multiple keys and multiple signatures are supported. public key. Multiple keys and multiple signatures are supported.
See signature.txt for more information. See signature.txt for more information.