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This commit is contained in:
Alexander Stefanov 2020-05-11 23:32:07 +00:00
parent 038cf86210
commit af80a2aa08
26 changed files with 3249 additions and 0 deletions
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12
Linux-PAM-0.99.3.0-pbuild-rh.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am Linux-PAM-1.3.0.tpg/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am 2018-01-26 10:28:36.017629000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0.tpg/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am 2018-01-26 10:31:20.974981732 +0100
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
pam_console_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
pam_console_apply_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
+configfile.tab.h: configfile.tab.c
+
configfile.tab.c: configfile.y
$(YACC) $(BISON_OPTS) -o $@ -p _pc_yy $<
sh $(srcdir)/sed-static $@

59
Linux-PAM-1.1.1-xauth-groups.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
--- Linux-PAM-1_2_0/modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c.0512~ 2015-04-27 16:57:39.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1_2_0/modules/pam_xauth/pam_xauth.c 2015-06-11 17:30:15.830251670 +0200
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static const char * const xauthpaths[] =
* given input on stdin, and storing any output it generates. */
static int
run_coprocess(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *input, char **output,
- uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const char *command, ...)
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const char *name, const char *command, ...)
{
int ipipe[2], opipe[2], i;
char buf[LINE_MAX];
@@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ run_coprocess(pam_handle_t *pamh, const
pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "setgroups() failed: %m");
_exit (err);
}
+
+ /* Mandriva Linux specific:
+ * we need to set the extra groups because in high security levels
+ * access to /usr/X11R6/bin dir is controlled by a group */
+ initgroups(name, gid);
+
if (setuid(uid) == -1)
{
int err = errno;
@@ -180,6 +186,7 @@ run_coprocess(pam_handle_t *pamh, const
}
/* Run the command. */
execv(command, (char *const *) args);
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "pam_xauth: execvp of %s failed: %m", command);
/* Never reached. */
_exit(1);
}
@@ -524,7 +531,7 @@ pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh,
(unsigned long) getuid(), (unsigned long) getgid());
}
if (run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
- getuid(), getgid(),
+ getuid(), getgid(), rpwd->pw_name,
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nlist", display,
NULL) == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -583,7 +590,7 @@ pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh,
(unsigned long) getgid());
}
run_coprocess(pamh, NULL, &cookie,
- getuid(), getgid(),
+ getuid(), getgid(), rpwd->pw_name,
xauth, "-f", cookiefile,
"nlist", t, NULL);
}
@@ -725,7 +732,7 @@ pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh,
(unsigned long) tpwd->pw_gid);
}
run_coprocess(pamh, cookie, &tmp,
- tpwd->pw_uid, tpwd->pw_gid,
+ tpwd->pw_uid, tpwd->pw_gid, tpwd->pw_name,
xauth, "-f", cookiefile, "nmerge", "-", NULL);
/* We don't need to keep a copy of these around any more. */

345
Linux-PAM-1.1.8-move-from-varrun-to-run.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/include/security/_pam_macros.h Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/libpam/include/security/_pam_macros.h
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/include/security/_pam_macros.h 2017-02-10 10:10:15.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/libpam/include/security/_pam_macros.h 2019-11-05 15:16:37.308119619 +0000
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
*/
#ifndef _PAM_LOGFILE
-#define _PAM_LOGFILE "/var/run/pam-debug.log"
+#define _PAM_LOGFILE "/run/pam-debug.log"
#endif
static void _pam_output_debug_info(const char *file, const char *fn
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am 2019-11-05 15:11:43.887117889 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/Makefile.am 2019-11-05 15:16:37.323119619 +0000
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
EXTRA_DIST = README $(man_MANS) $(CONFFILES) sed-static configfile.y configfile.l
-LOCKDIR = /var/run/console
+LOCKDIR = /run/console
LOCKMODE = 755
securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/console.handlers Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/console.handlers
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/console.handlers 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/console.handlers 2019-11-05 15:16:37.323119619 +0000
@@ -12,6 +12,6 @@
# Example:
# console consoledevs tty[0-9][0-9]* vc/[0-9][0-9]* :[0-9]\.[0-9] :[0-9]
# echo lock wait Locking console for user on tty
-# touch unlock wait /var/run/console-unlocked
+# touch unlock wait /run/console-unlocked
console consoledevs /dev/tty[0-9][0-9]* tty[0-9][0-9]* vc/[0-9][0-9]* :[0-9]+\.[0-9]+ :[0-9]+
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console.8 Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console.8
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console.8 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console.8 2019-11-05 15:16:37.323119619 +0000
@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@
session optional pam_console.so
.br
.SH FILES
-\fI/var/run/console/\fP
+\fI/run/console/\fP
.br
-\fI/var/run/console/console.lock\fP
+\fI/run/console/console.lock\fP
.br
\fI/etc/security/console.apps\fP
.br
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console.c Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console.c
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console.c 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console.c 2019-11-05 15:16:37.323119619 +0000
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* This software may be used under the terms of the GNU General Public
* License, available in the file COPYING accompanying this file.
*
- * /var/run/console/console.lock is the file used to control access to
+ * /run/console/console.lock is the file used to control access to
* devices. It is created when the first console user logs in,
* and that user has the control of the console until they have
* logged out of all concurrent login sessions. That is,
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@
* console access to files/devices is not available to any one of
* the users (B in this case).
*
- * /var/run/console/<username> is used for reference counting
+ * /run/console/<username> is used for reference counting
* and to make console authentication easy -- if it exists, then
* <username> is logged on console.
*
- * A system startup script should remove /var/run/console/console.lock
- * and everything in /var/run/console/
+ * A system startup script should remove /run/console/console.lock
+ * and everything in /run/console/
*/
#include "config.h"
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@
int argc, const char **argv)
{
/* getuid() must return an id that maps to a username as a filename in
- * /var/run/console/
+ * /run/console/
* and the service name must be listed in
* /etc/security/console-apps
*/
@@ -517,12 +517,12 @@
pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
- /* Create /var/run/console/console.lock if it does not exist
- * Create /var/run/console/<username> if it does not exist
+ /* Create /run/console/console.lock if it does not exist
+ * Create /run/console/<username> if it does not exist
* Increment its use count
* Change file ownerships and permissions as given in
* /etc/security/console.perms IFF returned use count was 0
- * and we created /var/run/console/console.lock
+ * and we created /run/console/console.lock
*/
int got_console = 0;
int count = 0;
@@ -588,13 +588,13 @@
pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
- /* Get /var/run/console/<username> use count, leave it locked
+ /* Get /run/console/<username> use count, leave it locked
* If use count is now 1:
- * If /var/run/console/console.lock contains <username>"
+ * If /run/console/console.lock contains <username>"
* Revert file ownerships and permissions as given in
* /etc/security/console.perms
- * Decrement /var/run/console/<username>, removing both it and
- * /var/run/console/console.lock if 0, unlocking /var/run/console/<username>
+ * Decrement /run/console/<username>, removing both it and
+ * /run/console/console.lock if 0, unlocking /run/console/<username>
* in any case.
*/
int fd;
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console_apply.8 Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console_apply.8
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_console/pam_console_apply.8 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_console/pam_console_apply.8 2019-11-05 15:16:37.323119619 +0000
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
\fBpam_console_apply\fP is a helper executable which sets or resets permissions
on device nodes.
.br
-If \fI/var/run/console.lock\fP exists, \fBpam_console_apply\fP will grant
+If \fI/run/console.lock\fP exists, \fBpam_console_apply\fP will grant
permissions to the user listed therein. If the lock file does not exist,
permissions are reset according to defaults set in \fIconsole.perms\fP files,
normally configured to set permissions on devices so that \fBroot\fP
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
Load other fstab file than the default one (\fI/etc/fstab\fP).
.IP -r
Signals \fBpam_console_apply\fP to reset permissions. The default is to set
-permissions so that the user listed in \fI/var/run/console.lock\fP has access
+permissions so that the user listed in \fI/run/console.lock\fP has access
to the devices, and to reset permissions if no such file exists.
.IP -t
Use <tty> to match console class in console.perms file. The default is tty0.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
by \fBpam_console_apply\fP. If they aren't specified permissions are
changed on all files specified in the \fIconsole.perms\fP file.
.SH FILES
-\fI/var/run/console.lock\fP
+\fI/run/console.lock\fP
.br
\fI/etc/security/console.perms\fP
.br
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.8.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.8.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.8.xml 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.8.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
The directory where the user files with the failure records are kept. The
- default is <filename>/var/run/faillock</filename>.
+ default is <filename>/run/faillock</filename>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
<title>FILES</title>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
- <term><filename>/var/run/faillock/*</filename></term>
+ <term><filename>/run/faillock/*</filename></term>
<listitem>
<para>the files logging the authentication failures for users</para>
</listitem>
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
# authentication attempts.
#
# The directory where the user files with the failure records are kept.
-# The default is /var/run/faillock.
-# dir = /var/run/faillock
+# The default is /run/faillock.
+# dir = /run/faillock
#
# Will log the user name into the system log if the user is not found.
# Enabled if option is present.
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf.5.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf.5.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf.5.xml 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.conf.5.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.310119619 +0000
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
The directory where the user files with the failure records are kept. The
- default is <filename>/var/run/faillock</filename>.
+ default is <filename>/run/faillock</filename>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.h Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.h
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.h 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.h 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
unsigned int count; /* number of records */
};
-#define FAILLOCK_DEFAULT_TALLYDIR "/var/run/faillock"
+#define FAILLOCK_DEFAULT_TALLYDIR "/run/faillock"
#define FAILLOCK_DEFAULT_CONF "/etc/security/faillock.conf"
int open_tally(const char *dir, const char *user, uid_t uid, int create);
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml 2019-10-16 14:26:05.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
<title>FILES</title>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
- <term><filename>/var/run/faillock/*</filename></term>
+ <term><filename>/run/faillock/*</filename></term>
<listitem>
<para>the files logging the authentication failures for users</para>
</listitem>
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/README Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/README
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/README 2017-05-18 07:45:41.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/README 2019-11-05 15:16:37.308119619 +0000
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
DESCRIPTION
pam_nologin is a PAM module that prevents users from logging into the system
-when /var/run/nologin or /etc/nologin exists. The contents of the file are
+when /run/nologin or /etc/nologin exists. The contents of the file are
displayed to the user. The pam_nologin module has no effect on the root user's
ability to log in.
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
file=/path/nologin
- Use this file instead the default /var/run/nologin or /etc/nologin.
+ Use this file instead the default /run/nologin or /etc/nologin.
successok
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8 Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8 2017-05-18 07:45:41.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
.PP
pam_nologin is a PAM module that prevents users from logging into the system when
-/var/run/nologin
+/run/nologin
or
/etc/nologin
exists\&. The contents of the file are displayed to the user\&. The pam_nologin module has no effect on the root user\*(Aqs ability to log in\&.
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
\fBfile=\fR\fB\fI/path/nologin\fR\fR
.RS 4
Use this file instead the default
-/var/run/nologin
+/run/nologin
or
/etc/nologin\&.
.RE
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8.xml 2017-02-10 10:10:15.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.8.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
<para>
pam_nologin is a PAM module that prevents users from logging into
- the system when <filename>/var/run/nologin</filename> or
+ the system when <filename>/run/nologin</filename> or
<filename>/etc/nologin</filename> exists. The contents
of the file are displayed to the user. The pam_nologin module
has no effect on the root user's ability to log in.
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Use this file instead the default
- <filename>/var/run/nologin</filename> or
+ <filename>/run/nologin</filename> or
<filename>/etc/nologin</filename>.
</para>
</listitem>
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.c Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.c
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.c 2017-02-10 10:10:15.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_nologin/pam_nologin.c 2019-11-05 15:16:37.309119619 +0000
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
#include <security/pam_ext.h>
-#define DEFAULT_NOLOGIN_PATH "/var/run/nologin"
+#define DEFAULT_NOLOGIN_PATH "/run/nologin"
#define COMPAT_NOLOGIN_PATH "/etc/nologin"
/*
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8 Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8 2017-05-18 07:45:50.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8 2019-11-05 15:16:37.310119619 +0000
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
.\}
.SH "FILES"
.PP
-/var/run/pam_timestamp/\&.\&.\&.
+/run/pam_timestamp/\&.\&.\&.
.RS 4
timestamp files and directories
.RE
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8.xml 2017-02-10 10:10:15.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.8.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.310119619 +0000
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
<title>FILES</title>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
- <term><filename>/var/run/pam_timestamp/...</filename></term>
+ <term><filename>/run/pam_timestamp/...</filename></term>
<listitem>
<para>timestamp files and directories</para>
</listitem>
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8 Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8 2017-05-18 07:45:50.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8 2019-11-05 15:16:37.310119619 +0000
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
.\}
.SH "FILES"
.PP
-/var/run/sudo/\&.\&.\&.
+/run/sudo/\&.\&.\&.
.RS 4
timestamp files and directories
.RE
diff -Naur Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8.xml Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8.xml 2017-02-10 10:10:15.000000000 +0000
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1.tpg/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp_check.8.xml 2019-11-05 15:16:37.310119619 +0000
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
<title>FILES</title>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
- <term><filename>/var/run/sudo/...</filename></term>
+ <term><filename>/run/sudo/...</filename></term>
<listitem>
<para>timestamp files and directories</para>
</listitem>

20
pam-1.1.6-limits-user.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_limits/limits.conf.limits Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_limits/limits.conf
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_limits/limits.conf.limits 2012-08-15 13:08:43.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.6/modules/pam_limits/limits.conf 2013-03-14 16:43:37.615087671 +0100
@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
# /etc/security/limits.conf
#
+#This file sets the resource limits for the users logged in via PAM.
+#It does not affect resource limits of the system services.
+#
+#Also note that configuration files in /etc/security/limits.d directory,
+#which are read in alphabetical order, override the settings in this
+#file in case the domain is the same or more specific.
+#That means for example that setting a limit for wildcard domain here
+#can be overriden with a wildcard setting in a config file in the
+#subdirectory, but a user specific setting here can be overriden only
+#with a user specific setting in the subdirectory.
+#
#Each line describes a limit for a user in the form:
#
#<domain> <type> <item> <value>

31
pam-1.1.8-audit-user-mgmt.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/pam_tally2.c.audit-user-mgmt Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/pam_tally2.c
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/pam_tally2.c.audit-user-mgmt 2013-06-18 16:11:21.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/pam_tally2.c 2014-10-17 12:09:12.965490940 +0200
@@ -997,9 +997,9 @@ main( int argc UNUSED, char **argv )
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
char buf[64];
int audit_fd = audit_open();
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "pam_tally2 uid=%u reset=%hu", uid, cline_reset);
- audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ACCT,
- buf, NULL, NULL, ttyname(STDIN_FILENO), 1);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "pam_tally2 reset=%hu", cline_reset);
+ audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_MGMT, NULL,
+ buf, NULL, uid, NULL, NULL, ttyname(STDIN_FILENO), 1);
if (audit_fd >=0)
close(audit_fd);
#endif
@@ -1040,11 +1040,10 @@ main( int argc UNUSED, char **argv )
}
else if ( !cline_reset ) {
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
- char buf[64];
int audit_fd = audit_open();
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "pam_tally2 uid=all reset=0");
- audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ACCT,
- buf, NULL, NULL, ttyname(STDIN_FILENO), 1);
+ audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_MGMT, NULL,
+ "pam_tally2-reset-all-accts reset=0", "*", -1,
+ NULL, NULL, ttyname(STDIN_FILENO), 1);
if (audit_fd >=0)
close(audit_fd);
#endif

67
pam-1.1.8-full-relro.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_filter/upperLOWER/Makefile.am.relro Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_filter/upperLOWER/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_filter/upperLOWER/Makefile.am.relro 2014-09-10 17:17:20.273401344 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_filter/upperLOWER/Makefile.am 2014-09-10 17:17:07.857115369 +0200
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ securelibfilterdir = $(SECUREDIR)/pam_fi
AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
-I$(srcdir)/.. @PIE_CFLAGS@
-AM_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
+AM_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
LDADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
securelibfilter_PROGRAMS = upperLOWER
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_mkhomedir/Makefile.am.relro Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_mkhomedir/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_mkhomedir/Makefile.am.relro 2013-06-18 16:11:21.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_mkhomedir/Makefile.am 2014-09-10 17:18:42.922304935 +0200
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ endif
sbin_PROGRAMS = mkhomedir_helper
mkhomedir_helper_SOURCES = mkhomedir_helper.c
+mkhomedir_helper_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
+mkhomedir_helper_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
mkhomedir_helper_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/Makefile.am.relro Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/Makefile.am.relro 2013-06-18 16:11:21.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_tally2/Makefile.am 2014-09-10 17:22:04.339944040 +0200
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
pam_tally2_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
endif
+pam_tally2_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
+pam_tally2_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
pam_tally2_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la $(LIBAUDIT)
securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_tally2.la
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_timestamp/Makefile.am.relro Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_timestamp/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_timestamp/Makefile.am.relro 2013-06-18 16:11:21.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_timestamp/Makefile.am 2014-08-13 16:02:49.906688139 +0200
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pam_timestamp_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
pam_timestamp_check_SOURCES = pam_timestamp_check.c
pam_timestamp_check_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
pam_timestamp_check_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
-pam_timestamp_check_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
+pam_timestamp_check_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
hmacfile_SOURCES = hmacfile.c hmacsha1.c sha1.c
hmacfile_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am.relro Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am.relro 2013-06-18 16:11:21.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.1.8/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2014-08-13 16:02:49.906688139 +0200
@@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
passverify.c
unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
-unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @LIBAUDIT@
unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
passverify.c
unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
-unix_update_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-z,now @PIE_LDFLAGS@
unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN

16
pam-1.3.0-unix-nomsg.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c.nomsg Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c.nomsg 2016-04-11 13:08:47.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c 2017-04-20 16:51:24.853106709 +0200
@@ -687,12 +687,6 @@ pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int
return PAM_SUCCESS;
} else if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl) ||
(on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) && _unix_comesfromsource(pamh, user, 0, 1))) {
- /* instruct user what is happening */
- if (off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) {
- retval = pam_info(pamh, _("Changing password for %s."), user);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
- return retval;
- }
retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, &pass_old, NULL);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {

88
pam-1.3.1-authtok-verify-fix.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From 27d04a849fd9f9cfd4b35eb80d687817830183df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 12:22:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam_get_authtok_verify: Avoid duplicate password verification
If password was already verified by previous modules in the stack
it does not need to be verified by pam_get_authtok_verify either.
* libpam/pam_get_authtok.c (pam_get_authtok_internal): Set the authtok_verified
appropriately.
(pam_get_authtok_verify): Do not prompt if authtok_verified is set and
set it when the password is verified.
* libpam/pam_private.h: Add authtok_verified to the pam handle struct.
* libpam/pam_start.c (pam_start): Initialize authtok_verified.
---
libpam/pam_get_authtok.c | 10 ++++++++++
libpam/pam_private.h | 1 +
libpam/pam_start.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/libpam/pam_get_authtok.c b/libpam/pam_get_authtok.c
index 800c6e5..99eb25f 100644
--- a/libpam/pam_get_authtok.c
+++ b/libpam/pam_get_authtok.c
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ pam_get_authtok_internal (pam_handle_t *pamh, int item,
}
else if (chpass)
{
+ pamh->authtok_verified = 0;
+
retval = pam_prompt (pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &resp[0],
PROMPT1, authtok_type,
strlen (authtok_type) > 0?" ":"");
@@ -184,6 +186,9 @@ pam_get_authtok_internal (pam_handle_t *pamh, int item,
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
return retval;
+ if (chpass > 1)
+ pamh->authtok_verified = 1;
+
return pam_get_item(pamh, item, (const void **)authtok);
}
@@ -214,6 +219,9 @@ pam_get_authtok_verify (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **authtok,
if (authtok == NULL || pamh->choice != PAM_CHAUTHTOK)
return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+ if (pamh->authtok_verified)
+ return pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (const void **)authtok);
+
if (prompt != NULL)
{
retval = pam_prompt (pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &resp,
@@ -252,5 +260,7 @@ pam_get_authtok_verify (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **authtok,
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
return retval;
+ pamh->authtok_verified = 1;
+
return pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (const void **)authtok);
}
diff --git a/libpam/pam_private.h b/libpam/pam_private.h
index 7ff9f75..58a26f5 100644
--- a/libpam/pam_private.h
+++ b/libpam/pam_private.h
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct pam_handle {
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
int audit_state; /* keep track of reported audit messages */
#endif
+ int authtok_verified;
};
/* Values for select arg to _pam_dispatch() */
diff --git a/libpam/pam_start.c b/libpam/pam_start.c
index 328416d..e27c64b 100644
--- a/libpam/pam_start.c
+++ b/libpam/pam_start.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int pam_start (
#endif
(*pamh)->xdisplay = NULL;
(*pamh)->authtok_type = NULL;
+ (*pamh)->authtok_verified = 0;
memset (&((*pamh)->xauth), 0, sizeof ((*pamh)->xauth));
if (((*pamh)->pam_conversation = (struct pam_conv *)
--
2.20.1

185
pam-1.3.1-coverity.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
diff --git a/libpam/pam_handlers.c b/libpam/pam_handlers.c
index 106ef7c..b2e94c7 100644
--- a/libpam/pam_handlers.c
+++ b/libpam/pam_handlers.c
@@ -282,7 +282,6 @@ _pam_open_config_file(pam_handle_t *pamh
{
char *p;
FILE *f;
- int err = 0;
/* Absolute path */
if (service[0] == '/') {
diff --git a/libpam_misc/misc_conv.c b/libpam_misc/misc_conv.c
index be53f34..07dce36 100644
--- a/libpam_misc/misc_conv.c
+++ b/libpam_misc/misc_conv.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int read_string(int echo, const char *prompt, char **retstr)
line[nc] = '\0';
}
*retstr = strdup(line);
- _pam_overwrite(line);
+ _pam_overwrite_n(line, sizeof(line));
if (!*retstr) {
D(("no memory for response string"));
nc = -1;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int read_string(int echo, const char *prompt, char **retstr)
D(("the timer appears to have expired"));
*retstr = NULL;
- _pam_overwrite(line);
+ _pam_overwrite_n(line, sizeof(line));
cleanexit:
diff --git a/modules/pam_access/pam_access.c b/modules/pam_access/pam_access.c
index 80d885d..3801862 100644
--- a/modules/pam_access/pam_access.c
+++ b/modules/pam_access/pam_access.c
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
const char *user=NULL;
const void *void_from=NULL;
const char *from;
- const char const *default_config = PAM_ACCESS_CONFIG;
+ const char * const default_config = PAM_ACCESS_CONFIG;
struct passwd *user_pw;
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
int rv;
diff --git a/modules/pam_limits/pam_limits.c b/modules/pam_limits/pam_limits.c
index 4bc4ae7..f8476b4 100644
--- a/modules/pam_limits/pam_limits.c
+++ b/modules/pam_limits/pam_limits.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static const char *lnames[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {
#endif
};
-static int str2rlimit(char *name) {
+static int str2rlimit(const char *name) {
int i;
if (!name || *name == '\0')
return -1;
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int str2rlimit(char *name) {
return -1;
}
-static rlim_t str2rlim_t(char *value) {
+static rlim_t str2rlim_t(const char *value) {
unsigned long long rlimit = 0;
if (!value) return (rlim_t)rlimit;
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void parse_kernel_limits(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_limit_s *pl, int
FILE *limitsfile;
const char *proclimits = "/proc/1/limits";
char line[256];
- char *units, *hard, *soft, *name;
+ const char *units, *hard, *soft, *name;
if (!(limitsfile = fopen(proclimits, "r"))) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "Could not read %s (%s), using PAM defaults", proclimits, strerror(errno));
diff --git a/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c b/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
index 96bfd98..66d202c 100644
--- a/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
+++ b/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int set_loginuid(pam_handle_t *pamh, uid_t uid)
fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
count = pam_modutil_read(fd, uid_map, sizeof(uid_map));
- if (strncmp(uid_map, host_uid_map, count) != 0)
+ if (count <= 0 || strncmp(uid_map, host_uid_map, count) != 0)
rc = PAM_IGNORE;
close(fd);
}
diff --git a/modules/pam_mkhomedir/mkhomedir_helper.c b/modules/pam_mkhomedir/mkhomedir_helper.c
index 9e204c1..4b8d6b7 100644
--- a/modules/pam_mkhomedir/mkhomedir_helper.c
+++ b/modules/pam_mkhomedir/mkhomedir_helper.c
@@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ create_homedir(const struct passwd *pwd,
{
pam_syslog(NULL, LOG_DEBUG,
"unable to open or stat src file %s: %m", newsource);
+ if (srcfd >= 0)
+ close(srcfd);
closedir(d);
#ifndef PATH_MAX
diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
index f541f89..85f5efa 100644
--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ static int create_instance(struct polydir_s *polyptr, char *ipath, struct stat *
if (fstat(fd, &newstatbuf) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error stating %s, %m",
ipath);
+ close(fd);
rmdir(ipath);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
diff --git a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
index e6cf346..813f579 100644
--- a/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_pwhistory/opasswd.c
@@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ save_old_pass (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, uid_t uid,
n = strlen (buf);
#endif /* HAVE_GETLINE / HAVE_GETDELIM */
+ if (n < 1)
+ break;
+
cp = buf;
save = strdup (buf); /* Copy to write the original data back. */
if (save == NULL)
@@ -336,9 +339,6 @@ save_old_pass (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, uid_t uid,
goto error_opasswd;
}
- if (n < 1)
- break;
-
tmp = strchr (cp, '#'); /* remove comments */
if (tmp)
*tmp = '\0';
diff --git a/modules/pam_rootok/pam_rootok.c b/modules/pam_rootok/pam_rootok.c
index 17baabe..a9d9140 100644
--- a/modules/pam_rootok/pam_rootok.c
+++ b/modules/pam_rootok/pam_rootok.c
@@ -66,14 +66,17 @@ log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
int audit_fd;
va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
audit_fd = audit_open();
if (audit_fd >= 0) {
char *buf;
+ int ret;
- if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (ret < 0)
return 0;
audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0);
@@ -83,6 +86,7 @@ log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
}
#endif
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return 0;
diff --git a/modules/pam_sepermit/pam_sepermit.c b/modules/pam_sepermit/pam_sepermit.c
index c653290..f37af0f 100644
--- a/modules/pam_sepermit/pam_sepermit.c
+++ b/modules/pam_sepermit/pam_sepermit.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ sepermit_match(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *cfgfile, const char *user,
if (*sense == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (ignore)
*sense = PAM_IGNORE;
- if (geteuid() == 0 && exclusive && get_loginuid(pamh) == -1)
+ if (geteuid() == 0 && exclusive && get_loginuid(pamh) == (uid_t)-1)
if (sepermit_lock(pamh, user, debug) < 0)
*sense = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}

70
pam-1.3.1-fds-closing.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/pam_modutil_sanitize.c.fds-closing Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/pam_modutil_sanitize.c
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/pam_modutil_sanitize.c.fds-closing 2017-02-10 11:10:15.000000000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/libpam/pam_modutil_sanitize.c 2019-10-16 16:07:31.259021159 +0200
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
/*
* Creates a pipe, closes its write end, redirects fd to its read end.
@@ -116,27 +117,45 @@ redirect_out(pam_handle_t *pamh, enum pa
static void
close_fds(void)
{
+ DIR *dir = NULL;
+ struct dirent *dent;
+ int dfd = -1;
+ int fd;
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+
/*
* An arbitrary upper limit for the maximum file descriptor number
* returned by RLIMIT_NOFILE.
*/
- const int MAX_FD_NO = 65535;
+ const unsigned int MAX_FD_NO = 65535;
/* The lower limit is the same as for _POSIX_OPEN_MAX. */
- const int MIN_FD_NO = 20;
+ const unsigned int MIN_FD_NO = 20;
- int fd;
- struct rlimit rlim;
-
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_max > MAX_FD_NO)
- fd = MAX_FD_NO;
- else if (rlim.rlim_max < MIN_FD_NO)
- fd = MIN_FD_NO;
- else
- fd = rlim.rlim_max - 1;
+ /* If /proc is mounted, we can optimize which fd can be closed. */
+ if ((dir = opendir("/proc/self/fd")) != NULL) {
+ if ((dfd = dirfd(dir)) >= 0) {
+ while ((dent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+ fd = atoi(dent->d_name);
+ if (fd > STDERR_FILENO && fd != dfd)
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(dir);
+ }
+
+ /* If /proc isn't available, fallback to the previous behavior. */
+ if (dfd < 0) {
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_max > MAX_FD_NO)
+ fd = MAX_FD_NO;
+ else if (rlim.rlim_max < MIN_FD_NO)
+ fd = MIN_FD_NO;
+ else
+ fd = rlim.rlim_max - 1;
- for (; fd > STDERR_FILENO; --fd)
- close(fd);
+ for (; fd > STDERR_FILENO; --fd)
+ close(fd);
+ }
}
int

82
pam-1.3.1-lastlog-no-showfailed.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From c426914fa166ffb0482b6f6ad659ddf17d5dfaa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 23:41:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam_lastlog: Improve silent option documentation
The silent option explicitly silents only the last login message and not
bad logins. Add a note to the manual to make this clear.
* modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml: Clearify "silent showfailed"
---
modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
index c8f247e..bc2e1be 100644
--- a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
<para>
Don't inform the user about any previous login,
just update the <filename>/var/log/lastlog</filename> file.
+ This option does not affect display of bad login attempts.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
--
2.20.1
From 7d036249a9772c546ede1f38ad68b3f1575216d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 00:36:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam_lastlog: Respect PAM_SILENT flag
pam_lastlog module will not log info about failed login if the session
was opened with PAM_SILENT flag.
Example use case enabled by this change:
sudo --non-interactive program
If this command is run by another program expecting specific output from
the command run by sudo, the unexpected info about failed logins will
break this program.
* modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c: Respect silent option.
(_pam_session_parse): Unset LASTLOG_BTMP if PAM_SILENT is set.
---
modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
index 18bf7be..e980c04 100644
--- a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
+++ b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
@@ -135,11 +135,6 @@ _pam_session_parse(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
int ctrl=(LASTLOG_DATE|LASTLOG_HOST|LASTLOG_LINE|LASTLOG_WTMP|LASTLOG_UPDATE);
- /* does the appliction require quiet? */
- if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
- ctrl |= LASTLOG_QUIET;
- }
-
/* step through arguments */
for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
@@ -168,6 +163,12 @@ _pam_session_parse(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
}
}
+ /* does the appliction require quiet? */
+ if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
+ ctrl |= LASTLOG_QUIET;
+ ctrl &= ~LASTLOG_BTMP;
+ }
+
D(("ctrl = %o", ctrl));
return ctrl;
}
--
2.20.1

227
pam-1.3.1-lastlog-unlimited-fsize.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
From 3a3e70739834cd5cbd17469907ef718c81ae40c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 11:50:28 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] pam_lastlog: document the 'unlimited' option
Signed-off-by: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
---
modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
index bc2e1be..f10e94a 100644
--- a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.8.xml
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
<arg choice="opt">
inactive=&lt;days&gt;
</arg>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ unlimited
+ </arg>
</cmdsynopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
@@ -196,6 +199,18 @@
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>unlimited</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ If the <emphasis>fsize</emphasis> limit is set, this option can be
+ used to override it, preventing failures on systems with large UID
+ values that lead lastlog to become a huge sparse file.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</refsect1>
@@ -300,6 +315,9 @@
<refsect1 id='pam_lastlog-see_also'>
<title>SEE ALSO</title>
<para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>limits.conf</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
<citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>pam.conf</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
</citerefentry>,
--
2.20.1
From 9349333a9ae958205294cd25e97fd6b4805bd82b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 23:08:30 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] pam_lastlog: prevent crash due to reduced 'fsize' limit
It a reduced fsize limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf and
pam_limits is in use pam_lastlog may cause a crash, e.g.
----- begin /etc/pam.d/su ----
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
auth required pam_env.so
auth required pam_unix.so nullok
account required pam_unix.so
password required pam_unix.so nullok
session required pam_limits.so
session required pam_env.so
session required pam_unix.so
session optional pam_lastlog.so
----- end /etc/pam.d/su -----
----- begin /etc/security/limits.d/fsize.conf -----
* soft fsize 1710
* hard fsize 1710
----- end /etc/security/limits.d/fsize.conf -----
# id user1
uid=1000(user1) gid=1000(user1) groups=1000(user1)
# su - user1
Last login: Wed Sep 11 01:52:44 UTC 2019 on console
$ exit
# id user2
uid=60000(user2) gid=60000(user2) groups=60000(user2)
# su - user2
File size limit exceeded
This happens because pam_limits sets RLIMIT_FSIZE before pam_lastlog
attempts to write /var/log/lastlog, leading to a SIGXFSZ signal.
In order to fix this, and an 'unlimited' option, which leads to saving
the 'fsize' limit and set it to unlimited before writing lastlog. After
that, restore the saved value. If 'fsize' is already unlimited nothing
is done.
Failing to set the 'fsize' limit is not a fatal error. With luck the
configured limit will suffice, so we try to write lastlog anyway, even
under the risk of dying due to a SIGXFSZ.
Failing to restore the 'fsize' limit is a fatal error, since we don't
want to keep it unlimited.
Signed-off-by: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
---
modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
index e980c04..a135c9f 100644
--- a/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
+++ b/modules/pam_lastlog/pam_lastlog.c
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -82,15 +84,16 @@ struct lastlog {
/* argument parsing */
-#define LASTLOG_DATE 01 /* display the date of the last login */
-#define LASTLOG_HOST 02 /* display the last host used (if set) */
-#define LASTLOG_LINE 04 /* display the last terminal used */
-#define LASTLOG_NEVER 010 /* display a welcome message for first login */
-#define LASTLOG_DEBUG 020 /* send info to syslog(3) */
-#define LASTLOG_QUIET 040 /* keep quiet about things */
-#define LASTLOG_WTMP 0100 /* log to wtmp as well as lastlog */
-#define LASTLOG_BTMP 0200 /* display failed login info from btmp */
-#define LASTLOG_UPDATE 0400 /* update the lastlog and wtmp files (default) */
+#define LASTLOG_DATE 01 /* display the date of the last login */
+#define LASTLOG_HOST 02 /* display the last host used (if set) */
+#define LASTLOG_LINE 04 /* display the last terminal used */
+#define LASTLOG_NEVER 010 /* display a welcome message for first login */
+#define LASTLOG_DEBUG 020 /* send info to syslog(3) */
+#define LASTLOG_QUIET 040 /* keep quiet about things */
+#define LASTLOG_WTMP 0100 /* log to wtmp as well as lastlog */
+#define LASTLOG_BTMP 0200 /* display failed login info from btmp */
+#define LASTLOG_UPDATE 0400 /* update the lastlog and wtmp files (default) */
+#define LASTLOG_UNLIMITED 01000 /* unlimited file size (ignore 'fsize' limit) */
static int
_pam_auth_parse(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv,
@@ -158,6 +161,8 @@ _pam_session_parse(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
ctrl &= ~(LASTLOG_WTMP|LASTLOG_UPDATE);
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"showfailed")) {
ctrl |= LASTLOG_BTMP;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*argv,"unlimited")) {
+ ctrl |= LASTLOG_UNLIMITED;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unknown option: %s", *argv);
}
@@ -373,6 +378,12 @@ static int
last_login_write(pam_handle_t *pamh, int announce, int last_fd,
uid_t uid, const char *user)
{
+ static struct rlimit no_limit = {
+ RLIM_INFINITY,
+ RLIM_INFINITY
+ };
+ struct rlimit old_limit;
+ int setrlimit_res;
struct flock last_lock;
struct lastlog last_login;
time_t ll_time;
@@ -427,6 +438,31 @@ last_login_write(pam_handle_t *pamh, int announce, int last_fd,
sleep(LASTLOG_IGNORE_LOCK_TIME);
}
+ /*
+ * Failing to set the 'fsize' limit is not a fatal error. We try to write
+ * lastlog anyway, under the risk of dying due to a SIGXFSZ.
+ */
+ D(("setting limit for 'fsize'"));
+
+ if ((announce & LASTLOG_UNLIMITED) == 0) { /* don't set to unlimted */
+ setrlimit_res = -1;
+ } else if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &old_limit) == 0) {
+ if (old_limit.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) { /* already unlimited */
+ setrlimit_res = -1;
+ } else {
+ setrlimit_res = setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &no_limit);
+ if (setrlimit_res != 0)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "Could not set limit for 'fsize': %m");
+ }
+ } else {
+ setrlimit_res = -1;
+ if (errno == EINVAL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "Limit for 'fsize' not supported: %m");
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "Could not get limit for 'fsize': %m");
+ }
+ }
+
D(("writing to the lastlog file"));
if (pam_modutil_write (last_fd, (char *) &last_login,
sizeof (last_login)) != sizeof(last_login)) {
@@ -434,6 +470,18 @@ last_login_write(pam_handle_t *pamh, int announce, int last_fd,
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
}
+ /*
+ * Failing to restore the 'fsize' limit is a fatal error.
+ */
+ D(("restoring limit for 'fsize'"));
+ if (setrlimit_res == 0) {
+ setrlimit_res = setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &old_limit);
+ if (setrlimit_res != 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not restore limit for 'fsize': %m");
+ retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
last_lock.l_type = F_UNLCK;
(void) fcntl(last_fd, F_SETLK, &last_lock); /* unlock */
D(("unlocked"));
--
2.20.1

755
pam-1.3.1-motd-multiple-paths.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
diff --git a/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.8.xml b/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.8.xml
index 906c4ed..4e2110c 100644
--- a/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.8.xml
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
<arg choice="opt">
motd=<replaceable>/path/filename</replaceable>
</arg>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ motd_dir=<replaceable>/path/dirname.d</replaceable>
+ </arg>
</cmdsynopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
@@ -31,10 +34,49 @@
<para>
pam_motd is a PAM module that can be used to display
arbitrary motd (message of the day) files after a successful
- login. By default the <filename>/etc/motd</filename> file is
- shown. The message size is limited to 64KB.
+ login. By default, pam_motd shows files in the
+ following locations:
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ <simplelist type='vert'>
+ <member><filename>/etc/motd</filename></member>
+ <member><filename>/run/motd</filename></member>
+ <member><filename>/usr/lib/motd</filename></member>
+ <member><filename>/etc/motd.d/</filename></member>
+ <member><filename>/run/motd.d/</filename></member>
+ <member><filename>/usr/lib/motd.d/</filename></member>
+ </simplelist>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Each message size is limited to 64KB.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If <filename>/etc/motd</filename> does not exist,
+ then <filename>/run/motd</filename> is shown. If
+ <filename>/run/motd</filename> does not exist, then
+ <filename>/usr/lib/motd</filename> is shown.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Similar overriding behavior applies to the directories.
+ Files in <filename>/etc/motd.d/</filename> override files
+ with the same name in <filename>/run/motd.d/</filename> and
+ <filename>/usr/lib/motd.d/</filename>. Files in <filename>/run/motd.d/</filename>
+ override files with the same name in <filename>/usr/lib/motd.d/</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Files the in the directories listed above are displayed in
+ lexicographic order by name.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ To silence a message,
+ a symbolic link with target <filename>/dev/null</filename>
+ may be placed in <filename>/etc/motd.d</filename> with
+ the same filename as the message to be silenced. Example:
+ Creating a symbolic link as follows silences <filename>/usr/lib/motd.d/my_motd</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ <command>ln -s /dev/null /etc/motd.d/my_motd</command>
</para>
-
</refsect1>
<refsect1 id="pam_motd-options">
@@ -47,8 +89,10 @@
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
- The <filename>/path/filename</filename> file is displayed
- as message of the day.
+ The <filename>/path/filename</filename> file is displayed
+ as message of the day. Multiple paths to try can be
+ specified as a colon-separated list. By default this option
+ is set to <filename>/etc/motd:/run/motd:/usr/lib/motd</filename>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -59,16 +103,17 @@
<listitem>
<para>
The <filename>/path/dirname.d</filename> directory is scanned
- and each file contained inside of it is displayed.
+ and each file contained inside of it is displayed. Multiple
+ directories to scan can be specified as a colon-separated list.
+ By default this option is set to <filename>/etc/motd.d:/run/motd.d:/usr/lib/motd.d</filename>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
<para>
- When no options are given, the default is to display both
- <filename>/etc/motd</filename> and the contents of
- <filename>/etc/motd.d</filename>. Specifying either option (or both)
- will disable this default behavior.
+ When no options are given, the default behavior applies for both
+ options. Specifying either option (or both) will disable the
+ default behavior for both options.
</para>
</refsect1>
diff --git a/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.c b/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.c
index cc828d7..ec3ebd5 100644
--- a/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
*/
#define PAM_SM_SESSION
-#define DEFAULT_MOTD "/etc/motd"
-#define DEFAULT_MOTD_D "/etc/motd.d"
+#define DEFAULT_MOTD "/etc/motd:/run/motd:/usr/lib/motd"
+#define DEFAULT_MOTD_D "/etc/motd.d:/run/motd.d:/usr/lib/motd.d"
#include <security/pam_modules.h>
#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
@@ -97,12 +97,234 @@ static void try_to_display_directory(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *dirname)
}
}
+/*
+ * Split a DELIM-separated string ARG into an array.
+ * Outputs a newly allocated array of strings OUT_ARG_SPLIT
+ * and the number of strings OUT_NUM_STRS.
+ * Returns 0 in case of error, 1 in case of success.
+ */
+static int pam_split_string(const pam_handle_t *pamh, char *arg, char delim,
+ char ***out_arg_split, uint *out_num_strs)
+{
+ char *arg_extracted = NULL;
+ const char *arg_ptr = arg;
+ char **arg_split = NULL;
+ char delim_str[2];
+ int i = 0;
+ uint num_strs = 0;
+ int retval = 0;
+
+ delim_str[0] = delim;
+ delim_str[1] = '\0';
+
+ if (arg == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (arg_ptr != NULL) {
+ num_strs++;
+ arg_ptr = strchr(arg_ptr + sizeof(const char), delim);
+ }
+
+ arg_split = (char **)calloc(num_strs, sizeof(char *));
+ if (arg_split == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "pam_motd: failed to allocate string array");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ arg_extracted = strtok_r(arg, delim_str, &arg);
+ while (arg_extracted != NULL && i < num_strs) {
+ arg_split[i++] = arg_extracted;
+ arg_extracted = strtok_r(NULL, delim_str, &arg);
+ }
+
+ retval = 1;
+
+ out:
+ *out_num_strs = num_strs;
+ *out_arg_split = arg_split;
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* Join A_STR and B_STR, inserting a "/" between them if one is not already trailing
+ * in A_STR or beginning B_STR. A pointer to a newly allocated string holding the
+ * joined string is returned in STRP_OUT.
+ * Returns -1 in case of error, or the number of bytes in the joined string in
+ * case of success. */
+static int join_dir_strings(char **strp_out, const char *a_str, const char *b_str)
+{
+ int has_sep = 0;
+ int retval = -1;
+ char *join_strp = NULL;
+
+ if (strp_out == NULL || a_str == NULL || b_str == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strlen(a_str) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ has_sep = (a_str[strlen(a_str) - 1] == '/') || (b_str[0] == '/');
+
+ retval = asprintf(&join_strp, "%s%s%s", a_str,
+ (has_sep == 1) ? "" : "/", b_str);
+
+ if (retval < 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *strp_out = join_strp;
+
+ out:
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int compare_strings(const void * a, const void * b)
+{
+ const char *a_str = *(char **)a;
+ const char *b_str = *(char **)b;
+
+ if (a_str == NULL && b_str == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (a_str == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if (b_str == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else {
+ return strcmp(a_str, b_str);
+ }
+}
+
+static int filter_dirents(const struct dirent *d)
+{
+ return (d->d_type == DT_REG || d->d_type == DT_LNK);
+}
+
+static void try_to_display_directories_with_overrides(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ char **motd_dir_path_split, int num_motd_dirs)
+{
+ struct dirent ***dirscans = NULL;
+ int *dirscans_sizes = NULL;
+ int dirscans_size_total = 0;
+ char **dirnames_all = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int i_dirnames = 0;
+
+ if (pamh == NULL || motd_dir_path_split == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (num_motd_dirs < 1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((dirscans = (struct dirent ***)calloc(num_motd_dirs,
+ sizeof(struct dirent **))) == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "pam_motd: failed to allocate dirent arrays");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((dirscans_sizes = (int *)calloc(num_motd_dirs, sizeof(int))) == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "pam_motd: failed to allocate dirent array sizes");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_motd_dirs; i++) {
+ dirscans_sizes[i] = scandir(motd_dir_path_split[i], &(dirscans[i]),
+ filter_dirents, alphasort);
+ if (dirscans_sizes[i] < 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "pam_motd: error scanning directory %s", motd_dir_path_split[i]);
+ dirscans_sizes[i] = 0;
+ }
+ dirscans_size_total += dirscans_sizes[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space for all file names found in the directories, including duplicates. */
+ if ((dirnames_all = (char **)calloc(dirscans_size_total,
+ sizeof(char *))) == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "pam_motd: failed to allocate dirname array");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dirscans_size_total; i++) {
+ dirnames_all[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_motd_dirs; i++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < dirscans_sizes[i]; j++) {
+ dirnames_all[i_dirnames] = dirscans[i][j]->d_name;
+ i_dirnames++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ qsort(dirnames_all, dirscans_size_total,
+ sizeof(const char *), compare_strings);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dirscans_size_total; i++) {
+ int j;
+
+ if (dirnames_all[i] == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip duplicate file names. */
+ if (i > 0 && strcmp(dirnames_all[i], dirnames_all[i - 1]) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < num_motd_dirs; j++) {
+ char *abs_path = NULL;
+
+ if (join_dir_strings(&abs_path, motd_dir_path_split[j],
+ dirnames_all[i]) < 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (abs_path != NULL) {
+ int fd = open(abs_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ try_to_display_fd(pamh, fd);
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* We displayed a file, skip to the next file name. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ _pam_drop(abs_path);
+ }
+ }
+
+ out:
+ _pam_drop(dirnames_all);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_motd_dirs; i++) {
+ int j;
+ for (j = 0; j < dirscans_sizes[i]; j++) {
+ _pam_drop(dirscans[i][j]);
+ }
+ _pam_drop(dirscans[i]);
+ }
+ _pam_drop(dirscans_sizes);
+ _pam_drop(dirscans);
+
+ return;
+}
+
int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
int retval = PAM_IGNORE;
const char *motd_path = NULL;
+ char *motd_path_copy = NULL;
+ int num_motd_paths = 0;
+ char **motd_path_split = NULL;
const char *motd_dir_path = NULL;
+ char *motd_dir_path_copy = NULL;
+ int num_motd_dir_paths = 0;
+ char **motd_dir_path_split = NULL;
if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
return retval;
@@ -141,16 +363,52 @@ int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
}
if (motd_path != NULL) {
- int fd = open(motd_path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ motd_path_copy = strdup(motd_path);
+ }
+
+ if (motd_path_copy != NULL) {
+ if (pam_split_string(pamh, motd_path_copy, ':',
+ &motd_path_split, &num_motd_paths) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (motd_dir_path != NULL) {
+ motd_dir_path_copy = strdup(motd_dir_path);
+ }
- if (fd >= 0) {
- try_to_display_fd(pamh, fd);
- close(fd);
+ if (motd_dir_path_copy != NULL) {
+ if (pam_split_string(pamh, motd_dir_path_copy, ':',
+ &motd_dir_path_split, &num_motd_dir_paths) == 0) {
+ goto out;
}
}
- if (motd_dir_path != NULL)
- try_to_display_directory(pamh, motd_dir_path);
+ if (motd_path_split != NULL) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_motd_paths; i++) {
+ int fd = open(motd_path_split[i], O_RDONLY, 0);
+
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ try_to_display_fd(pamh, fd);
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* We found and displayed a file, move onto next filename. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (motd_dir_path_split != NULL)
+ try_to_display_directories_with_overrides(pamh, motd_dir_path_split,
+ num_motd_dir_paths);
+
+ out:
+ _pam_drop(motd_path_copy);
+ _pam_drop(motd_path_split);
+ _pam_drop(motd_dir_path_copy);
+ _pam_drop(motd_dir_path_split);
return retval;
}
diff --git a/xtests/Makefile.am b/xtests/Makefile.am
index a6d6f8d..4d5aba3 100644
--- a/xtests/Makefile.am
+++ b/xtests/Makefile.am
@@ -32,7 +32,10 @@ EXTRA_DIST = run-xtests.sh tst-pam_dispatch1.pamd tst-pam_dispatch2.pamd \
tst-pam_substack5.pamd tst-pam_substack5a.pamd tst-pam_substack5.sh \
tst-pam_assemble_line1.pamd tst-pam_assemble_line1.sh \
tst-pam_pwhistory1.pamd tst-pam_pwhistory1.sh \
- tst-pam_time1.pamd time.conf
+ tst-pam_time1.pamd time.conf \
+ tst-pam_motd.sh tst-pam_motd1.sh tst-pam_motd2.sh \
+ tst-pam_motd3.sh tst-pam_motd4.sh tst-pam_motd1.pamd \
+ tst-pam_motd2.pamd tst-pam_motd3.pamd tst-pam_motd4.pamd
XTESTS = tst-pam_dispatch1 tst-pam_dispatch2 tst-pam_dispatch3 \
tst-pam_dispatch4 tst-pam_dispatch5 \
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ XTESTS = tst-pam_dispatch1 tst-pam_dispatch2 tst-pam_dispatch3 \
tst-pam_access1 tst-pam_access2 tst-pam_access3 \
tst-pam_access4 tst-pam_limits1 tst-pam_succeed_if1 \
tst-pam_group1 tst-pam_authfail tst-pam_authsucceed \
- tst-pam_pwhistory1 tst-pam_time1
+ tst-pam_pwhistory1 tst-pam_time1 tst-pam_motd
NOSRCTESTS = tst-pam_substack1 tst-pam_substack2 tst-pam_substack3 \
tst-pam_substack4 tst-pam_substack5 tst-pam_assemble_line1
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd.c b/xtests/tst-pam_motd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bba2f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_misc.h>
+
+static struct pam_conv conv = {
+ misc_conv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh=NULL;
+ char *tst_arg = NULL;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (argc > 1)
+ tst_arg = argv[1];
+
+ retval = pam_start(tst_arg, NULL, &conv, &pamh);
+
+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
+
+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
+
+ if (pam_end(pamh,retval) != PAM_SUCCESS) { /* close Linux-PAM */
+ pamh = NULL;
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ return ( retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? 0:1 ); /* indicate success */
+}
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd.sh b/xtests/tst-pam_motd.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9080128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -e
+
+./tst-pam_motd1.sh
+./tst-pam_motd2.sh
+./tst-pam_motd3.sh
+./tst-pam_motd4.sh
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.pamd b/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.pamd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ddea82c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.pamd
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+session required pam_permit.so
+session optional pam_motd.so motd=tst-pam_motd1.d/etc/motd motd_dir=tst-pam_motd1.d/etc/motd.d
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.sh b/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cc88854
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd1.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+TST_DIR="tst-pam_motd1.d"
+
+function tst_cleanup() {
+ rm -rf "${TST_DIR}"
+ rm -f tst-pam_motd1.out
+}
+
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d
+
+# Verify the case of single motd and motd.d directory works
+echo "motd: /etc/motd" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd
+echo "motd: /etc/motd.d/test" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/test
+
+./tst-pam_motd tst-pam_motd1 > tst-pam_motd1.out
+
+RET=$?
+
+motd_to_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd1.out | grep "motd: /etc/motd")
+if [ -z "${motd_to_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+motd_dir_to_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd1.out | grep "motd: /etc/motd.d/test")
+if [ -z "${motd_dir_to_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+tst_cleanup
+exit $RET
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.pamd b/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.pamd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8200191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.pamd
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+session required pam_permit.so
+session optional pam_motd.so motd=tst-pam_motd2.d/etc/motd:tst-pam_motd2.d/run/motd:tst-pam_motd2.d/usr/lib/motd motd_dir=tst-pam_motd2.d/etc/motd.d:tst-pam_motd2.d/run/motd.d:tst-pam_motd2.d/usr/lib/motd.d
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.sh b/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d26ea92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd2.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+TST_DIR="tst-pam_motd2.d"
+
+function tst_cleanup() {
+ rm -rf "${TST_DIR}"
+ rm -f tst-pam_motd2.out
+}
+
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d
+
+echo "motd: /etc/motd" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd
+echo "motd: /run/motd" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd
+echo "motd: /usr/lib/motd" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd
+
+# Drop a motd file in test directories such that every overriding
+# condition (for 3 directories in this case) will be seen.
+echo "motd: e0r0u1 in usr/lib - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d/e0r0u1.motd
+echo "motd: e0r1u0 in run - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/e0r1u0.motd
+echo "motd: e0r1u1 in usr/lib - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d/e0r1u1.motd
+echo "motd: e0r1u1 in run - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/e0r1u1.motd
+echo "motd: e1r0u0 in etc - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/e1r0u0.motd
+echo "motd: e1r0u1 in usr/lib - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d/e1r0u1.motd
+echo "motd: e1r0u1 in etc - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/e1r0u1.motd
+echo "motd: e1r1u0 in run - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/e1r1u0.motd
+echo "motd: e1r1u0 in etc - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/e1r1u0.motd
+echo "motd: e1r1u1 in usr/lib - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d/e1r1u1.motd
+echo "motd: e1r1u1 in run - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/e1r1u1.motd
+echo "motd: e1r1u1 in etc - will show" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/e1r1u1.motd
+
+./tst-pam_motd tst-pam_motd2 > tst-pam_motd2.out
+
+RET=$?
+
+motd_to_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd2.out | grep "motd: /etc/motd")
+if [ -z "${motd_to_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+motd_dir_not_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd2.out | grep "not show")
+if [ -n "${motd_dir_not_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+tst_cleanup
+exit $RET
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.pamd b/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.pamd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8b8cbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.pamd
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+session required pam_permit.so
+session optional pam_motd.so motd=tst-pam_motd3.d/etc/motd:tst-pam_motd3.d/run/motd:tst-pam_motd3.d/usr/lib/motd motd_dir=tst-pam_motd3.d/etc/motd.d:tst-pam_motd3.d/run/motd.d:tst-pam_motd3.d/usr/lib/motd.d
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.sh b/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e18856b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd3.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+TST_DIR="tst-pam_motd3.d"
+
+function tst_cleanup() {
+ rm -rf "${TST_DIR}"
+ rm -f tst-pam_motd3.out
+}
+
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d
+
+# Verify motd is still displayed when not overridden
+echo "motd: test-show in run - show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/test-show.motd
+
+# Test overridden by a symlink to a file that isn't /dev/null; symlink target should show
+echo "motd: hidden-by-symlink in usr/lib - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/usr/lib/motd.d/hidden-by-symlink.motd
+echo "motd: test-from-symlink - show" > ${TST_DIR}/test-from-symlink.motd
+ln -sr ${TST_DIR}/test-from-symlink.motd ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/hidden-by-symlink.motd
+
+# Test hidden by a null symlink
+echo "motd: hidden-by-null-symlink in run - not show" > ${TST_DIR}/run/motd.d/hidden-by-null-symlink.motd
+ln -s /dev/null ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd.d/hidden-by-null-symlink.motd
+
+./tst-pam_motd tst-pam_motd3 > tst-pam_motd3.out
+
+RET=$?
+
+motd_dir_not_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd3.out | grep "not show")
+if [ -n "${motd_dir_not_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+motd_test_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd3.out | grep "test-show.*- show")
+if [ -z "${motd_test_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+motd_general_symlink_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd3.out | grep "test-from-symlink.*- show")
+if [ -z "${motd_general_symlink_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+tst_cleanup
+exit $RET
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.pamd b/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.pamd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dc311a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.pamd
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+session required pam_permit.so
+session optional pam_motd.so motd=tst-pam_motd4.d/etc/motd
diff --git a/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.sh b/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..6022177
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xtests/tst-pam_motd4.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+TST_DIR="tst-pam_motd4.d"
+
+function tst_cleanup() {
+ rm -rf "${TST_DIR}"
+ rm -f tst-pam_motd4.out
+}
+
+mkdir -p ${TST_DIR}/etc
+
+# Verify the case of single motd with no motd_dir given in tst-pam_motd4.pamd
+echo "motd: /etc/motd" > ${TST_DIR}/etc/motd
+
+./tst-pam_motd tst-pam_motd4 > tst-pam_motd4.out
+
+RET=$?
+
+motd_to_show_output=$(cat tst-pam_motd4.out | grep "motd: /etc/motd")
+if [ -z "${motd_to_show_output}" ];
+then
+ tst_cleanup
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+tst_cleanup
+exit $RET

136
pam-1.3.1-namespace-mntopts.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.conf.5.xml b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.conf.5.xml
index c7698cb..a94b49e 100644
--- a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.conf.5.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.conf.5.xml
@@ -122,9 +122,14 @@
<para><emphasis>mntopts</emphasis>=<replaceable>value</replaceable>
- value of this flag is passed to the mount call when the tmpfs mount is
done. It allows for example the specification of the maximum size of the
- tmpfs instance that is created by the mount call. See <citerefentry>
- <refentrytitle>mount</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> for details.
+ tmpfs instance that is created by the mount call. In addition to
+ options specified in the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>tmpfs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> manual the <emphasis>nosuid</emphasis>,
+ <emphasis>noexec</emphasis>, and <emphasis>nodev</emphasis> flags
+ can be used to respectively disable setuid bit effect, disable running
+ executables, and disable devices to be interpreted on the mounted
+ tmpfs filesystem.
</para>
<para>
diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
index f541f89..0fd59fb 100644
--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
@@ -230,6 +230,78 @@ static int parse_iscript_params(char *params, struct polydir_s *poly)
return 0;
}
+struct mntflag {
+ const char *name;
+ size_t size;
+ unsigned long flag;
+};
+
+#define LITERAL_AND_SIZE(x) x, sizeof(x)
+
+static const struct mntflag mntflags[] = {
+ { LITERAL_AND_SIZE("noexec"), MS_NOEXEC },
+ { LITERAL_AND_SIZE("nosuid"), MS_NOSUID },
+ { LITERAL_AND_SIZE("nodev"), MS_NODEV }
+ };
+
+static int filter_mntopts(const char *opts, char **filtered,
+ unsigned long *mountflags)
+{
+ size_t origlen = strlen(opts);
+ const char *end;
+ char *dest;
+
+ *filtered = NULL;
+ *mountflags = 0;
+
+ if (origlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ dest = *filtered = calloc(1, origlen);
+ if (*filtered == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ do {
+ size_t len;
+ int i;
+
+ end = strchr(opts, ',');
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ len = strlen(opts);
+ } else {
+ len = end - opts;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(mntflags)/sizeof(mntflags[0])); i++) {
+ if (mntflags[i].size - 1 != len)
+ continue;
+ if (strncmp(mntflags[i].name, opts, len) == 0) {
+ *mountflags |= mntflags[i].flag;
+ opts = end;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opts != end) {
+ if (dest != *filtered) {
+ *dest = ',';
+ ++dest;
+ }
+ strncpy(dest, opts, len);
+ dest += len;
+ }
+
+ opts = end + 1;
+ } while (end != NULL);
+
+ if (dest == *filtered) {
+ /* nothing left */
+ free(dest);
+ *filtered = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly,
struct instance_data *idata)
{
@@ -289,7 +361,8 @@ static int parse_method(char *method, struct polydir_s *poly,
break;
}
free(poly->mount_opts); /* if duplicate mntopts specified */
- if ((poly->mount_opts = strdup(flag+namelen+1)) == NULL) {
+ poly->mount_opts = NULL;
+ if (filter_mntopts(flag+namelen+1, &poly->mount_opts, &poly->mount_flags) != 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_CRIT, "Memory allocation error");
return -1;
}
@@ -1484,7 +1557,7 @@ static int ns_setup(struct polydir_s *polyptr,
}
if (polyptr->method == TMPFS) {
- if (mount("tmpfs", polyptr->dir, "tmpfs", 0, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
+ if (mount("tmpfs", polyptr->dir, "tmpfs", polyptr->mount_flags, polyptr->mount_opts) < 0) {
pam_syslog(idata->pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error mounting tmpfs on %s, %m",
polyptr->dir);
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
index 47ebcc3..1522386 100644
--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
+++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.h
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ struct polydir_s {
unsigned int flags; /* polydir flags */
char *init_script; /* path to init script */
char *mount_opts; /* mount options for tmpfs mount */
+ unsigned long mount_flags; /* mount flags for tmpfs mount */
uid_t owner; /* user which should own the polydir */
gid_t group; /* group which should own the polydir */
mode_t mode; /* mode of the polydir */

24
pam-1.3.1-noflex.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/Makefile.am.noflex Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/Makefile.am.noflex 2017-02-10 11:10:15.000000000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/Makefile.am 2018-05-18 14:53:50.300997606 +0200
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
#
-SUBDIRS = man specs sag adg mwg
+SUBDIRS = man sag adg mwg
CLEANFILES = *~
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/Makefile.am.noflex Linux-PAM-1.3.1/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/Makefile.am.noflex 2018-05-18 14:53:50.301997629 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/Makefile.am 2018-05-18 14:55:31.576353800 +0200
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.9 gnu dist-bzip2 dist-xz check-news
-SUBDIRS = libpam tests libpamc libpam_misc modules po conf doc examples xtests
+SUBDIRS = libpam tests libpamc libpam_misc modules po doc examples xtests
CLEANFILES = *~

78
pam-1.3.1-redhat-modules.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/configure.ac.redhat-modules Linux-PAM-1.3.1/configure.ac
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/configure.ac.redhat-modules 2018-05-18 12:57:57.000000000 +0200
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/configure.ac 2018-11-26 12:58:14.623545121 +0100
@@ -611,10 +611,12 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile libpam/Makefil
libpam_misc/Makefile conf/Makefile conf/pam_conv1/Makefile \
po/Makefile.in \
modules/Makefile \
+ modules/pam_chroot/Makefile modules/pam_console/Makefile \
+ modules/pam_postgresok/Makefile \
modules/pam_access/Makefile modules/pam_cracklib/Makefile \
modules/pam_debug/Makefile modules/pam_deny/Makefile \
modules/pam_echo/Makefile modules/pam_env/Makefile \
- modules/pam_faildelay/Makefile \
+ modules/pam_faildelay/Makefile modules/pam_faillock/Makefile \
modules/pam_filter/Makefile modules/pam_filter/upperLOWER/Makefile \
modules/pam_ftp/Makefile modules/pam_group/Makefile \
modules/pam_issue/Makefile modules/pam_keyinit/Makefile \
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/sag/pam_faillock.xml.redhat-modules Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/sag/pam_faillock.xml
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/sag/pam_faillock.xml.redhat-modules 2018-11-26 12:58:14.623545121 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/doc/sag/pam_faillock.xml 2018-11-26 12:58:14.623545121 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE section PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.4//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.4/docbookx.dtd">
+<section id='sag-pam_faillock'>
+ <title>pam_faillock - temporarily locking access based on failed authentication attempts during an interval</title>
+ <cmdsynopsis>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//cmdsynopsis[@id = "pam_faillock-cmdsynopsisauth"]/*)'/>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ <cmdsynopsis>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//cmdsynopsis[@id = "pam_faillock-cmdsynopsisacct"]/*)'/>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-description'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-description"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-options'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-options"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-types'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-types"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-return_values'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-return_values"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-examples'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-examples"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+ <section id='sag-pam_faillock-author'>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="../../modules/pam_faillock/pam_faillock.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_faillock-author"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+</section>
diff -up Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/Makefile.am.redhat-modules Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/Makefile.am
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/Makefile.am.redhat-modules 2017-02-10 11:10:15.000000000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/Makefile.am 2018-11-26 12:58:14.623545121 +0100
@@ -3,13 +3,14 @@
#
SUBDIRS = pam_access pam_cracklib pam_debug pam_deny pam_echo \
+ pam_chroot pam_console pam_postgresok pam_faillock \
pam_env pam_exec pam_faildelay pam_filter pam_ftp \
pam_group pam_issue pam_keyinit pam_lastlog pam_limits \
pam_listfile pam_localuser pam_loginuid pam_mail \
pam_mkhomedir pam_motd pam_namespace pam_nologin \
pam_permit pam_pwhistory pam_rhosts pam_rootok pam_securetty \
pam_selinux pam_sepermit pam_shells pam_stress \
- pam_succeed_if pam_tally pam_tally2 pam_time pam_timestamp \
+ pam_succeed_if pam_time pam_timestamp \
pam_tty_audit pam_umask \
pam_unix pam_userdb pam_warn pam_wheel pam_xauth

33
pam-1.3.1-tty-audit-manfix.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From e31dd6c7d0faa7a06d3ebd50a0b6957b9f822d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 18:13:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam_tty_audit: Manual page clarification about password
logging
* modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml: Explanation why passwords
can be sometimes logged even when the option is not set.
---
modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml b/modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml
index 59a3406..e346c68 100644
--- a/modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_tty_audit/pam_tty_audit.8.xml
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@
greater than or equal to <replaceable>min_uid</replaceable> will be
matched.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Please note that passwords in some circumstances may be logged by TTY auditing
+ even if the <option>log_passwd</option> is not used. For example, all input to
+ an ssh session will be logged - even if there is a password being typed into
+ some software running at the remote host because only the local TTY state
+ affects the local TTY auditing.
+ </para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1 id='pam_tty_audit-examples'>
--
2.20.1

34
pam-1.3.1-unix-bcrypt_b.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From f7abb8c1ef3aa31e6c2564a8aaf69683a77c2016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Esser?= <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 15:01:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Use bcrypt b-variant for computing new hashes.
Bcrypt hashes used the "$2a$" prefix since 1997.
However, in 2011 an implementation bug was discovered in bcrypt
affecting the handling of characters in passphrases with the 8th
bit set.
Besides fixing the bug, OpenBSD 5.5 introduced the "$2b$" prefix
for a behavior that exactly matches crypt_blowfish's "$2y$", and
the crypt_blowfish implementation supports it as well since v1.1.
That said new computed bcrypt hashes should use the "$2b$" prefix.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Use bcrypt b-variant.
---
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 9c1771e2..1f433b3a 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
/* algoid = "$1" */
return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
} else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
- algoid = "$2a$";
+ algoid = "$2b$";
} else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
algoid = "$5$";
} else if (on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {

73
pam-1.3.1-unix-checksalt_syslog.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From 86eed7ca01864b9fd17099e57f10f2b9b6b568a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Esser?= <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 22:33:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Report unusable hashes found by checksalt to
syslog.
libxcrypt can be build-time configured to support (or not support)
various hashing methods. Future versions will also have support for
runtime configuration by the system's vendor and/or administrator.
For that reason adminstrator should be notified by pam if users cannot
log into their account anymore because of such a change in the system's
configuration of libxcrypt.
Also check for malformed hashes, like descrypt hashes starting with
"$2...", which might have been generated by unsafe base64 encoding
functions as used in glibc <= 2.16.
Such hashes are likely to be rejected by many recent implementations
of libcrypt.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c (verify_pwd_hash): Report unusable
hashes found by checksalt to syslog.
---
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index eb2444bb..2c808eb5 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -103,6 +103,42 @@ verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
* Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
* libcrypt knows about it? We should try it.
*/
+#if defined(CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE) && CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE
+ /* Get the status of the hash from checksalt */
+ int retval_checksalt = crypt_checksalt(hash);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for hashing methods that are disabled by
+ * libcrypt configuration and/or system preset.
+ */
+ if (retval_checksalt == CRYPT_SALT_METHOD_DISABLED) {
+ /*
+ * pam_syslog() needs a pam handle,
+ * but that's not available here.
+ */
+ helper_log_err(LOG_ERR,
+ "pam_unix(verify_pwd_hash): The method "
+ "for computing the hash \"%.6s\" has been "
+ "disabled in libcrypt by the preset from "
+ "the system's vendor and/or administrator.",
+ hash);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for malformed hashes, like descrypt hashes
+ * starting with "$2...", which might have been
+ * generated by unsafe base64 encoding functions
+ * as used in glibc <= 2.16.
+ * Such hashes are likely to be rejected by many
+ * recent implementations of libcrypt.
+ */
+ if (retval_checksalt == CRYPT_SALT_INVALID) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_ERR,
+ "pam_unix(verify_pwd_hash): The hash \"%.6s\""
+ "does not use a method known by the version "
+ "of libcrypt this system is supplied with.",
+ hash);
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
struct crypt_data *cdata;
cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));

40
pam-1.3.1-unix-crypt_checksalt.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 62425bf2a0c72d0e23139d0b285547a7add26251 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Esser?= <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 19:49:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Add support for crypt_checksalt, if libcrypt
supports it.
libxcrypt v4.3 has added the crypt_checksalt function to whether
the prefix at the begining of a given hash string refers to a
supported hashing method.
Future revisions of this function will add support to check whether
the hashing method, the prefix refers to, was disabled or considered
deprecated by the system's factory presets or system administrator.
Furthermore it will be able to detect whether the parameters, which
are used by the corresponding hashing method, being encoded in the
hash string are not considered to be strong enough anymore.
*modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Add support for crypt_checksalt.
---
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 1f433b3a..6132130a 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -244,7 +244,13 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(int check_shadow_expiry,
D(("account expired"));
return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
}
+#if defined(CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE) && CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE
+ if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0 ||
+ crypt_checksalt(spent->sp_pwdp) == CRYPT_SALT_METHOD_LEGACY ||
+ crypt_checksalt(spent->sp_pwdp) == CRYPT_SALT_TOO_CHEAP) {
+#else
if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+#endif
D(("need a new password"));
*daysleft = 0;
return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;

104
pam-1.3.1-unix-fix_checksalt_syslog.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
From d8d11db2cef65da5d2afa7acf21aa9c8cd88abed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:11:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Use pam_syslog instead of helper_log_err.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c (verify_pwd_hash): Add pamh argument via
PAMH_ARG_DECL. Call pam_syslog() instead of helper_log_err().
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Adjust the declaration of verify_pwd_hash().
* modules/pam_unix/support.c (_unix_verify_password): Add the pamh argument
to verify_pwd_hash() call.
---
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
modules/pam_unix/passverify.h | 6 +++---
modules/pam_unix/support.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 2c808eb5..80e32767 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ strip_hpux_aging(char *hash)
}
}
-int
-verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
+ const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
{
size_t hash_len;
char *pp = NULL;
@@ -116,11 +116,10 @@ verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
* pam_syslog() needs a pam handle,
* but that's not available here.
*/
- helper_log_err(LOG_ERR,
- "pam_unix(verify_pwd_hash): The method "
- "for computing the hash \"%.6s\" has been "
- "disabled in libcrypt by the preset from "
- "the system's vendor and/or administrator.",
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "The support for password hash \"%.6s\" "
+ "has been disabled in libcrypt "
+ "configuration.",
hash);
}
/*
@@ -132,12 +131,15 @@ verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
* recent implementations of libcrypt.
*/
if (retval_checksalt == CRYPT_SALT_INVALID) {
- helper_log_err(LOG_ERR,
- "pam_unix(verify_pwd_hash): The hash \"%.6s\""
- "does not use a method known by the version "
- "of libcrypt this system is supplied with.",
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "The password hash \"%.6s\" is unknown to "
+ "libcrypt.",
hash);
}
+#else
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ (void)pamh;
+#endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
struct crypt_data *cdata;
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
index 086c28ac..e9a88fbf 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@
#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
-int
-verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok);
-
int
is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd);
@@ -65,6 +62,9 @@ read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords);
#define PAMH_ARG(...) pamh, __VA_ARGS__
#endif
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
+ const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok);
+
PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
const char *password, unsigned long long ctrl, int rounds);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
index 6894288d..ea5594d2 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
}
}
} else {
- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(pamh, p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
}
if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {

95
pam-1.3.1-unix-gensalt-autoentropy.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
From 05aa693b7db6b818d31e41f0cab1d5fb4f49600e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Esser?= <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 15:58:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Prefer a gensalt function, that supports auto
entropy.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: Initialize rounds parameter to 0.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Prefer gensalt with auto entropy.
* modules/pam_unix/support.c: Fix sanitizing of rounds parameter.
---
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c | 2 +-
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 13 +++++++++++++
modules/pam_unix/support.c | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1.orig/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int
unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
int retval;
int remember = -1;
- int rounds = -1;
+ int rounds = 0;
int pass_min_len = 0;
/* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1.orig/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -375,7 +375,12 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_has
const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds)
{
const char *algoid;
+#if defined(CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE) && CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE > 64
+ /* Strings returned by crypt_gensalt_rn will be no longer than this. */
+ char salt[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+#else
char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
+#endif
char *sp;
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
struct crypt_data *cdata = NULL;
@@ -406,6 +411,13 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_has
return crypted;
}
+#if defined(CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY) && CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY
+ /*
+ * Any version of libcrypt supporting auto entropy is
+ * guaranteed to have crypt_gensalt_rn().
+ */
+ sp = crypt_gensalt_rn(algoid, rounds, NULL, 0, salt, sizeof(salt));
+#else
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_GENSALT_R
if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
char entropy[17];
@@ -423,6 +435,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_has
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_GENSALT_R
}
#endif
+#endif /* CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY */
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
sp = NULL;
cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/support.c
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1.orig/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
if (val) {
*rounds = strtol(val, NULL, 10);
+ set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
free (val);
}
}
@@ -254,11 +255,13 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
if (*rounds < 4 || *rounds > 31)
*rounds = 5;
} else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
- if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX))
+ if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX)) {
/* don't care about bogus values */
+ *rounds = 0;
unset(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
- if (*rounds >= 10000000)
+ } else if (*rounds >= 10000000) {
*rounds = 9999999;
+ }
}
}

57
pam-1.3.1-unix-improve-logging.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From a6845905869ccabb5eb802be37241eabec085dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 16:52:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Add logging useful for debugging problems
Two messages added about obtaining the username are guarded
by the debug option as these should not be normally
logged - they can be useful for debugging but they do not
indicate any special condition.
The message about authenticating user with blank password is
still just LOG_DEBUG priority but it is logged unconditionally
because it is somewhat extraordinary condition to have an user
with blank password.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c (pam_sm_authenticate): Replace
D() macro calls which are not enabled on production builds with
regular pam_syslog() calls.
---
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
index 681e49d..3fca945 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -130,15 +130,16 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
AUTH_RETURN;
}
if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
- D(("username [%s] obtained", name));
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained", name);
} else {
- D(("trouble reading username"));
if (retval == PAM_CONV_AGAIN) {
D(("pam_get_user/conv() function is not ready yet"));
/* it is safe to resume this function so we translate this
* retval to the value that indicates we're happy to resume.
*/
retval = PAM_INCOMPLETE;
+ } else if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "could not obtain username");
}
AUTH_RETURN;
}
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
/* if this user does not have a password... */
if (_unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)) {
- D(("user '%s' has blank passwd", name));
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "user [%s] has blank password; authenticated without it", name);
name = NULL;
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
AUTH_RETURN;
--
2.20.1

105
pam-1.3.1-unix-no-fallback.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1.orig/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
@@ -293,11 +293,10 @@
<listitem>
<para>
When a user changes their password next,
- encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm. If the
- SHA256 algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm. The
+ SHA256 algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> function,
- fall back to MD5.
+ </citerefentry> function.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -308,11 +307,10 @@
<listitem>
<para>
When a user changes their password next,
- encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm. If the
- SHA512 algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm. The
+ SHA512 algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> function,
- fall back to MD5.
+ </citerefentry> function.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -323,11 +321,10 @@
<listitem>
<para>
When a user changes their password next,
- encrypt it with the blowfish algorithm. If the
- blowfish algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ encrypt it with the blowfish algorithm. The
+ blowfish algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> function,
- fall back to MD5.
+ </citerefentry> function.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -338,11 +335,10 @@
<listitem>
<para>
When a user changes their password next,
- encrypt it with the gost-yescrypt algorithm. If the
- gost-yescrypt algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ encrypt it with the gost-yescrypt algorithm. The
+ gost-yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> function,
- fall back to MD5.
+ </citerefentry> function.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -353,11 +349,10 @@
<listitem>
<para>
When a user changes their password next,
- encrypt it with the yescrypt algorithm. If the
- yescrypt algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ encrypt it with the yescrypt algorithm. The
+ yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
- </citerefentry> function,
- fall back to MD5.
+ </citerefentry> function.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
===================================================================
--- Linux-PAM-1.3.1.orig/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -466,10 +466,9 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_has
sp = crypt(password, salt);
#endif
if (!sp || strncmp(algoid, sp, strlen(algoid)) != 0) {
- /* libxcrypt/libc doesn't know the algorithm, use MD5 */
+ /* libxcrypt/libc doesn't know the algorithm, error out */
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Algo %s not supported by the crypto backend, "
- "falling back to MD5\n",
+ "Algo %s not supported by the crypto backend.\n",
on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "yescrypt" :
on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "gost_yescrypt" :
on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) ? "blowfish" :
@@ -481,7 +480,7 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_has
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
free(cdata);
#endif
- return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+ return NULL;
}
sp = x_strdup(sp);
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R

34
pam-1.3.1-unix-remove-obsolete-_unix_read_password-prototype.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From a2b72aeb86f297d349bc9e6a8f059fedf97a499a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Date: Thu, 31 May 2018 00:20:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: remove obsolete _unix_read_password prototype
The function was removed by commit Linux-PAM-1.3.0~5
so the function prototype should go as well.
* modules/pam_unix/support.h (_unix_read_password): Remove.
Complements: 7e09188c5dc4 ("pam_unix: Use pam_get_authtok() instead of
direct pam_prompt() calls.")
---
modules/pam_unix/support.h | 7 -------
1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
index b4c279c3..543e9b9f 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
@@ -164,13 +164,6 @@ extern int _unix_blankpasswd(pam_handle_t *pamh,unsigned int ctrl,
const char *name);
extern int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl);
-extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
- ,unsigned int ctrl
- ,const char *comment
- ,const char *prompt1
- ,const char *prompt2
- ,const char *data_name
- ,const void **pass);
extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);

479
pam-1.3.1-unix-yescrypt.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
From 16bd523f85ede9fa9115f80e826f2d803d7e61d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Esser?= <besser82@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 16:38:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: Add support for (gost-)yescrypt hashing methods.
libxcrypt (v4.2 and later) has added support for the yescrypt
hashing method; gost-yescrypt has been added in v4.3.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml: Documentation for (gost-)yescrypt.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c: Use 64 bit type for control flags.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c: Likewise.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: Likewise.
* modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c: Likewise.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Add support for (gost-)yescrypt.
* modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Use 64 bit type for control flags.
* modules/pam_unix/support.c: Set sane rounds for (gost-)yescrypt.
* modules/pam_unix/support.h: Add support for (gost-)yescrypt.
---
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 35 +++++++++-
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c | 4 +-
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c | 4 +-
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c | 12 ++--
modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c | 4 +-
modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 8 ++-
modules/pam_unix/passverify.h | 2 +-
modules/pam_unix/support.c | 33 ++++++----
modules/pam_unix/support.h | 101 +++++++++++++++--------------
9 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
index 1b318f11..cae2aeaa 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
@@ -331,14 +331,45 @@
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>gost_yescrypt</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the gost-yescrypt algorithm. If the
+ gost-yescrypt algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function,
+ fall back to MD5.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>yescrypt</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the yescrypt algorithm. If the
+ yescrypt algorithm is not known to the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function,
+ fall back to MD5.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
<option>rounds=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
- Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256, SHA512
- and blowfish password hashing algorithms to
+ Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256, SHA512,
+ blowfish, gost-yescrypt, and yescrypt password hashing
+ algorithms to
<replaceable>n</replaceable>.
</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
index fbc84e2f..d8d084ac 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
#include "support.h"
#include "passverify.h"
-int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
+int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
const char *user, int *daysleft)
{
int retval=0, child, fds[2];
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
int
pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
const void *void_uname;
const char *uname;
int retval, daysleft;
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
index 9d9f709d..905fc66c 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ setcred_free (pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *ptr, int err UNUSED)
int
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
int retval, *ret_data = NULL;
const char *name;
const char *p;
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ pam_sm_setcred (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
{
int retval;
const void *pretval = NULL;
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
D(("called."));
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
index f2c42513..df4c1233 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ __taddr2port (const struct netconfig *nconf, const struct netbuf *nbuf)
}
#endif
-static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl)
+static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl)
{
char *master;
char *domainname;
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl)
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user,
+static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *user,
const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat, int remember)
{
int retval, child, fds[2];
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
const char *fromwhat,
- char *towhat, unsigned int ctrl, int remember)
+ char *towhat, unsigned long long ctrl, int remember)
{
struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
int retval = 0;
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
return retval;
}
-static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned int ctrl)
+static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned long long ctrl)
{
struct passwd *pwent = NULL; /* Password and shadow password */
struct spwd *spent = NULL; /* file entries for the user */
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned in
}
static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh
- ,unsigned int ctrl
+ ,unsigned long long ctrl
,const char *pass_old
,const char *pass_new,
int pass_min_len)
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh
int
pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
- unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl, lctrl;
int retval;
int remember = -1;
int rounds = 0;
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
index 03e7dcd9..4b8af530 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int
pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
char *user_name, *service;
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
int retval;
const char *login_name;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int
pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
char *user_name, *service;
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
int retval;
D(("called."));
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 95dfe528..39e2bfac 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
}
PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
- const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds)
+ const char *password, unsigned long long ctrl, int rounds)
{
const char *algoid;
#if defined(CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE) && CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE > 64
@@ -404,6 +404,10 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
/* algoid = "$1" */
return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+ } else if (on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$y$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$gy$";
} else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
algoid = "$2b$";
} else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
@@ -466,6 +470,8 @@ PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"Algo %s not supported by the crypto backend, "
"falling back to MD5\n",
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "yescrypt" :
+ on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "gost_yescrypt" :
on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) ? "blowfish" :
on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha256" :
on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha512" : algoid);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
index caf7ae8a..086c28ac 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords);
#endif
PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
- const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds);
+ const char *password, unsigned long long ctrl, int rounds);
PAMH_ARG_DECL(int get_account_info,
const char *name, struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
index 8cbc4217..6894288d 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ search_key (const char *key, const char *filename)
/* this is a front-end for module-application conversations */
-int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
+int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
int type, const char *text)
{
int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
@@ -122,10 +122,11 @@ int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
* set the control flags for the UNIX module.
*/
-int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
- int *pass_min_len, int argc, const char **argv)
+unsigned long long _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember,
+ int *rounds, int *pass_min_len, int argc,
+ const char **argv)
{
- unsigned int ctrl;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
char *val;
int j;
@@ -243,15 +244,23 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
set(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
}
- /* Set default rounds for blowfish */
- if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) && off(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl) && rounds != NULL) {
- *rounds = 5;
- set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ /* Set default rounds for blowfish, gost-yescrypt and yescrypt */
+ if (off(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl) && rounds != NULL) {
+ if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ *rounds = 5;
+ set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ }
}
/* Enforce sane "rounds" values */
if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
- if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ if (on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ if (*rounds < 3 || *rounds > 11)
+ *rounds = 5;
+ } else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
if (*rounds < 4 || *rounds > 31)
*rounds = 5;
} else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
@@ -532,7 +541,7 @@ int _unix_comesfromsource(pam_handle_t *pamh,
#include <sys/wait.h>
static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
- unsigned int ctrl, const char *user)
+ unsigned long long ctrl, const char *user)
{
int retval, child, fds[2];
struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
@@ -658,7 +667,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
*/
int
-_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *name)
{
struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
char *salt = NULL;
@@ -706,7 +715,7 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
}
int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
- ,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl)
+ ,const char *p, unsigned long long ctrl)
{
struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
char *salt = NULL;
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
index 543e9b9f..e02c05e0 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
typedef struct {
const char *token;
- unsigned int mask; /* shall assume 32 bits of flags */
- unsigned int flag;
+ unsigned long long mask; /* shall assume 64 bits of flags */
+ unsigned long long flag;
unsigned int is_hash_algo;
} UNIX_Ctrls;
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ typedef struct {
/* the generic mask */
-#define _ALL_ON_ (~0U)
+#define _ALL_ON_ (~0ULL)
/* end of macro definitions definitions for the control flags */
@@ -98,47 +98,51 @@ typedef struct {
#define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */
#define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY 29 /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */
#define UNIX_DES 30 /* DES, default */
+#define UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS 31 /* new password hashes will use gost-yescrypt */
+#define UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS 32 /* new password hashes will use yescrypt */
/* -------------- */
-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 31 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 33 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
-#define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
+#define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS,ctrl))
static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
{
-/* symbol token name ctrl mask ctrl *
- * ----------------------- ------------------- --------------------- -------- */
-
-/* UNIX__OLD_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01, 0},
-/* UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02, 0},
-/* UNIX__IAMROOT */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 04, 0},
-/* UNIX_AUDIT */ {"audit", _ALL_ON_, 010, 0},
-/* UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS */ {"use_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060), 020, 0},
-/* UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS */ {"try_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060), 040, 0},
-/* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0},
-/* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200, 0},
-/* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400, 0},
-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0},
-/* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0},
-/* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0},
-/* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0},
-/* UNIX_MD5_PASS */ {"md5", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 020000, 1},
-/* UNIX__NULLOK */ {"nullok", _ALL_ON_^(01000), 0, 0},
-/* UNIX_DEBUG */ {"debug", _ALL_ON_, 040000, 0},
-/* UNIX_NODELAY */ {"nodelay", _ALL_ON_, 0100000, 0},
-/* UNIX_NIS */ {"nis", _ALL_ON_, 0200000, 0},
-/* UNIX_BIGCRYPT */ {"bigcrypt", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0400000, 1},
-/* UNIX_LIKE_AUTH */ {"likeauth", _ALL_ON_, 01000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD */ {"remember=", _ALL_ON_, 02000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_NOREAP */ {"noreap", _ALL_ON_, 04000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW */ {"broken_shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_SHA256_PASS */ {"sha256", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 020000000, 1},
-/* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000, 1},
-/* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000, 1},
-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0},
-/* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0, 1},
+/* symbol token name ctrl mask ctrl *
+ * --------------------------- -------------------- ------------------------- ---------------- */
+
+/* UNIX__OLD_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01, 0},
+/* UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02, 0},
+/* UNIX__IAMROOT */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 04, 0},
+/* UNIX_AUDIT */ {"audit", _ALL_ON_, 010, 0},
+/* UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS */ {"use_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060ULL), 020, 0},
+/* UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS */ {"try_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060ULL), 040, 0},
+/* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0},
+/* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600ULL), 0200, 0},
+/* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600ULL), 0400, 0},
+/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0},
+/* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0},
+/* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0},
+/* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0},
+/* UNIX_MD5_PASS */ {"md5", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 020000, 1},
+/* UNIX__NULLOK */ {"nullok", _ALL_ON_^(01000ULL), 0, 0},
+/* UNIX_DEBUG */ {"debug", _ALL_ON_, 040000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NODELAY */ {"nodelay", _ALL_ON_, 0100000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NIS */ {"nis", _ALL_ON_, 0200000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BIGCRYPT */ {"bigcrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0400000, 1},
+/* UNIX_LIKE_AUTH */ {"likeauth", _ALL_ON_, 01000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD */ {"remember=", _ALL_ON_, 02000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NOREAP */ {"noreap", _ALL_ON_, 04000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW */ {"broken_shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_SHA256_PASS */ {"sha256", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 020000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 040000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0200000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0, 1},
+/* UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS */ {"gost_yescrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 04000000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS */ {"yescrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 010000000000, 1},
};
#define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
@@ -151,20 +155,23 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
_pam_drop(xx); \
}
-extern int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl
- ,int type, const char *text);
-extern int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
- int *pass_min_len, int argc, const char **argv);
+extern int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ int type, const char *text);
+extern unsigned long long _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+ int *remember, int *rounds,
+ int *pass_min_len,
+ int argc, const char **argv);
extern int _unix_getpwnam (pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *name, int files, int nis,
struct passwd **ret);
extern int _unix_comesfromsource (pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *name, int files, int nis);
-extern int _unix_blankpasswd(pam_handle_t *pamh,unsigned int ctrl,
+extern int _unix_blankpasswd(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
const char *name);
-extern int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
- ,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl);
+extern int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name,
+ const char *p, unsigned long long ctrl);
extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
- unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+ unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *user, int *daysleft);
#endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */