openssl/openssl-CVE-2013-0169.5.patch

From 610dfc3ef4c4019394534023115226f4ed0e7204 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2013 17:33:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Don't crash when processing a zero-length, TLS >= 1.1
 record.

The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
---
 ssl/d1_enc.c |    1 -
 ssl/d1_pkt.c |    1 +
 ssl/s3_enc.c |   11 +++++++++--
 ssl/s3_pkt.c |    5 +++++
 ssl/t1_enc.c |   11 +++++++++--
 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index c13b495..da42348 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -245,7 +245,6 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-		rec->orig_len = rec->length;
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
 			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 46a1950..5ee7c0d 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 
 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 	rr->data=rr->input;
+	rr->orig_len=rr->length;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 	if (enc_err <= 0)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index de5354a..a5829dc 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -465,6 +465,15 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
 	}
 
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occured.
+ */
 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
@@ -531,8 +540,6 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 
-		rec->orig_len = rec->length;
-
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
 			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 2e0c173..5bd0cd4 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -398,8 +398,13 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 
 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 	rr->data=rr->input;
+	rr->orig_len=rr->length;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
 	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
 		/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 0cb3c56..aaa4a5e 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -635,6 +635,15 @@ err:
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
@@ -746,8 +755,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-		rec->orig_len = rec->length;
-
 		ret = 1;
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
 			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-- 
1.7.9.5