mirror of
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware.git
synced 2025-04-16 09:34:18 +00:00

The buffer size allocated for the raw ECDSA signatures was too small for P-384 signatures. This led to mbedtls aborting the generation of the raw sig. Fix this by increasing the buffer size to the required value. Change-Id: I06a9cfe1f4cb2603c5fbe945714e90460c24edb8 Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett <ryan.everett@arm.com>
542 lines
14 KiB
C
542 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
#include <stddef.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
/* mbed TLS headers */
|
|
#include <mbedtls/md.h>
|
|
#include <mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h>
|
|
#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
|
|
#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
|
|
#include <mbedtls/psa_util.h>
|
|
#include <mbedtls/x509.h>
|
|
#include <psa/crypto.h>
|
|
#include <psa/crypto_platform.h>
|
|
#include <psa/crypto_types.h>
|
|
#include <psa/crypto_values.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <common/debug.h>
|
|
#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
|
|
#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
|
|
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
|
|
|
|
#define LIB_NAME "mbed TLS PSA"
|
|
|
|
/* Minimum required size for a buffer containing a raw EC signature when using
|
|
* a maximum curve size of 384 bits.
|
|
* This is calculated as 2 * (384 / 8). */
|
|
#define ECDSA_SIG_BUFFER_SIZE 96U
|
|
|
|
/* Size of ASN.1 length and tag in bytes*/
|
|
#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN 1U
|
|
#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG 1U
|
|
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
/*
|
|
* CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE value is as per current stronger algorithm available
|
|
* so make sure that mbed TLS MD maximum size must be lesser than this.
|
|
*/
|
|
CASSERT(CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE >= MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
|
|
assert_mbedtls_md_size_overflow);
|
|
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
|
|
* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
|
|
* }
|
|
*
|
|
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
|
|
* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
|
|
* }
|
|
*
|
|
* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
|
|
* digest OCTET STRING
|
|
* }
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We pretend using an external RNG (through MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
|
|
* mbedTLS config option) so we need to provide an implementation of
|
|
* mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). Provide a fake one, since we do not
|
|
* actually have any external RNG and TF-A itself doesn't engage in
|
|
* cryptographic operations that demands randomness.
|
|
*/
|
|
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
|
|
mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
|
|
uint8_t *output, size_t output_size,
|
|
size_t *output_length)
|
|
{
|
|
return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize the library and export the descriptor
|
|
*/
|
|
static void init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Initialize mbed TLS */
|
|
mbedtls_init();
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise PSA mbedTLS */
|
|
psa_status_t status = psa_crypto_init();
|
|
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ERROR("Failed to initialize %s crypto (%d).\n", LIB_NAME, status);
|
|
panic();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INFO("PSA crypto initialized successfully!\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
|
|
CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NOTE: This has been made internal in mbedtls 3.6.0 and the mbedtls team has
|
|
* advised that it's better to copy out the declaration than it would be to
|
|
* update to 3.5.2, where this function is exposed.
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid,
|
|
const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg,
|
|
void **sig_opts);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a helper function which parses a SignatureAlgorithm OID.
|
|
* It extracts the pk algorithm and constructs a psa_algorithm_t object
|
|
* to be used by PSA calls.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int construct_psa_alg(void *sig_alg, unsigned int sig_alg_len,
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, psa_algorithm_t *psa_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
|
|
void *sig_opts = NULL;
|
|
mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg_oid, params;
|
|
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig_alg;
|
|
unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) sig_alg + sig_alg_len;
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_alg_oid, ¶ms);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&sig_alg_oid, ¶ms, &md_alg, pk_alg, &sig_opts);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
switch (*pk_alg) {
|
|
case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:
|
|
*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg);
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
break;
|
|
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
|
|
*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_md_alg);
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
mbedtls_free(sig_opts);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Helper functions for mbedtls PK contexts.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void initialize_pk_context(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, bool *pk_initialized)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_pk_init(pk);
|
|
*pk_initialized = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void cleanup_pk_context(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, bool *pk_initialized)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*pk_initialized) {
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
|
|
*pk_initialized = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify a signature.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters are passed using the DER encoding format following the ASN.1
|
|
* structures detailed above.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int verify_signature(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
|
|
void *sig_ptr, unsigned int sig_len,
|
|
void *sig_alg, unsigned int sig_alg_len,
|
|
void *pk_ptr, unsigned int pk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *end;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context pk;
|
|
bool pk_initialized = false;
|
|
int rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
psa_status_t psa_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
|
psa_key_id_t psa_key_id;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_alg;
|
|
__unused unsigned char reformatted_sig[ECDSA_SIG_BUFFER_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
unsigned char *local_sig_ptr;
|
|
size_t local_sig_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Load the key into the PSA key store. */
|
|
initialize_pk_context(&pk, &pk_initialized);
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *) pk_ptr;
|
|
end = p + pk_len;
|
|
rc = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &pk);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, &psa_key_attr);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = construct_psa_alg(sig_alg, sig_alg_len, &pk_alg, &psa_alg);
|
|
if (rc != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
psa_set_key_algorithm(&psa_key_attr, psa_alg);
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(&pk, &psa_key_attr, &psa_key_id);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Optimize mbedtls heap usage by freeing the pk context now. */
|
|
cleanup_pk_context(&pk, &pk_initialized);
|
|
|
|
/* Extract the signature from sig_ptr. */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *) sig_ptr;
|
|
end = p + sig_len;
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &local_sig_len);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end1;
|
|
}
|
|
local_sig_ptr = p;
|
|
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
|
|
TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
|
|
if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
|
|
/* Convert the DER ASN.1 signature to raw format. */
|
|
size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&psa_key_attr);
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(key_bits, p, local_sig_len,
|
|
reformatted_sig, ECDSA_SIG_BUFFER_SIZE,
|
|
&local_sig_len);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end1;
|
|
}
|
|
local_sig_ptr = reformatted_sig;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
|
|
* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the signature. */
|
|
psa_status = psa_verify_message(psa_key_id, psa_alg,
|
|
data_ptr, data_len,
|
|
local_sig_ptr, local_sig_len);
|
|
if (psa_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
/* The signature has been successfully verified. */
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end1:
|
|
/* Destroy the key from the PSA subsystem. */
|
|
psa_destroy_key(psa_key_id);
|
|
end2:
|
|
/* Free the pk context, if it is initialized. */
|
|
cleanup_pk_context(&pk, &pk_initialized);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Match a hash
|
|
*
|
|
* Digest info is passed in DER format following the ASN.1 structure detailed
|
|
* above.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int verify_hash(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
|
|
void *digest_info_ptr, unsigned int digest_info_len)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_asn1_buf hash_oid, params;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *end, *hash;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Digest info should be an MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, but padding after
|
|
* it is allowed. This is necessary to support multiple hash
|
|
* algorithms.
|
|
*/
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)digest_info_ptr;
|
|
end = p + digest_info_len;
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end = p + len;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the hash algorithm */
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &hash_oid, ¶ms);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Hash should be octet string type and consume all bytes */
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
|
|
if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != len)) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
hash = p;
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&hash_oid, &md_alg);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
|
|
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
/* Length of hash must match the algorithm's size */
|
|
if (len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_md_alg)) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate Hash and compare it against the retrieved hash from
|
|
* the certificate (one shot API).
|
|
*/
|
|
status = psa_hash_compare(psa_md_alg,
|
|
data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
|
|
(const uint8_t *)hash, len);
|
|
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
/*
|
|
* Map a generic crypto message digest algorithm to the corresponding macro used
|
|
* by Mbed TLS.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t md_type(enum crypto_md_algo algo)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (algo) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA512:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA384:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA256:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Invalid hash algorithm. */
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate a hash
|
|
*
|
|
* output points to the computed hash
|
|
*/
|
|
static int calc_hash(enum crypto_md_algo md_algo, void *data_ptr,
|
|
unsigned int data_len,
|
|
unsigned char output[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
size_t hash_length;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
|
|
|
|
/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
|
|
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type(md_algo));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the hash of the data, it is safe to pass the
|
|
* 'output' hash buffer pointer considering its size is always
|
|
* bigger than or equal to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE.
|
|
*/
|
|
status = psa_hash_compute(psa_md_alg, data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
|
|
(uint8_t *)output, CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE,
|
|
&hash_length);
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
/*
|
|
* Stack based buffer allocation for decryption operation. It could
|
|
* be configured to balance stack usage vs execution speed.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE 128
|
|
|
|
static int aes_gcm_decrypt(void *data_ptr, size_t len, const void *key,
|
|
unsigned int key_len, const void *iv,
|
|
unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
|
|
unsigned int tag_len)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
|
psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
|
psa_status_t psa_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
|
|
unsigned char buf[DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char *pt = data_ptr;
|
|
size_t dec_len;
|
|
size_t output_length;
|
|
|
|
/* Load the key into the PSA key store. */
|
|
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
|
|
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_GCM);
|
|
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
|
|
|
|
psa_status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
|
|
if (psa_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Perform the decryption. */
|
|
psa_status = psa_aead_decrypt_setup(&operation, key_id, PSA_ALG_GCM);
|
|
if (psa_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psa_status = psa_aead_set_nonce(&operation, iv, iv_len);
|
|
if (psa_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (len > 0) {
|
|
dec_len = MIN(sizeof(buf), len);
|
|
|
|
psa_status = psa_aead_update(&operation, pt, dec_len, buf,
|
|
sizeof(buf), &output_length);
|
|
if (psa_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pt, buf, output_length);
|
|
pt += output_length;
|
|
len -= dec_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the tag. */
|
|
psa_status = psa_aead_verify(&operation, NULL, 0, &output_length, tag, tag_len);
|
|
if (psa_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
psa_aead_abort(&operation);
|
|
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Authenticated decryption of an image
|
|
*/
|
|
static int auth_decrypt(enum crypto_dec_algo dec_algo, void *data_ptr,
|
|
size_t len, const void *key, unsigned int key_len,
|
|
unsigned int key_flags, const void *iv,
|
|
unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
|
|
unsigned int tag_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
assert((key_flags & ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER) == 0);
|
|
|
|
switch (dec_algo) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_GCM_DECRYPT:
|
|
rc = aes_gcm_decrypt(data_ptr, len, key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
|
|
tag, tag_len);
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Register crypto library descriptor
|
|
*/
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
|
|
auth_decrypt, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
|
|
auth_decrypt, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, NULL, NULL, calc_hash, NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
|