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https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware.git
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The enablement code for the PMU is scattered and difficult to track down. Factor out the feature into its own lib/extensions folder and consolidate the implementation. Treat it is as an architecturally mandatory feature as it is currently. Additionally, do some cleanup on AArch64. Setting overflow bits in PMCR_EL0 is irrelevant for firmware so don't do it. Then delay the PMU initialisation until the context management stage which simplifies the early environment assembly. One side effect is that the PMU might count before this happens so reset all counters to 0 to prevent any leakage. Finally, add an enable to manage_extensions_realm() as realm world uses the pmu. This introduces the HPMN fixup to realm world. Signed-off-by: Boyan Karatotev <boyan.karatotev@arm.com> Change-Id: Ie13a8625820ecc5fbfa467dc6ca18025bf6a9cd3
448 lines
14 KiB
C
448 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <arch_helpers.h>
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#include <arch_features.h>
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#include <bl31/bl31.h>
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#include <common/debug.h>
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#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
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#include <context.h>
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#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
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#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/pmuv3.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace.h>
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#include <lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h>
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#include <lib/spinlock.h>
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#include <lib/utils.h>
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#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_v2.h>
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#include <plat/common/common_def.h>
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#include <plat/common/platform.h>
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#include <platform_def.h>
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#include <services/rmmd_svc.h>
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#include <smccc_helpers.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/sve.h>
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#include "rmmd_initial_context.h"
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#include "rmmd_private.h"
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/*******************************************************************************
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* RMM boot failure flag
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******************************************************************************/
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static bool rmm_boot_failed;
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/*******************************************************************************
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* RMM context information.
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******************************************************************************/
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rmmd_rmm_context_t rmm_context[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
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/*******************************************************************************
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* RMM entry point information. Discovered on the primary core and reused
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* on secondary cores.
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******************************************************************************/
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static entry_point_info_t *rmm_ep_info;
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Static function declaration.
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******************************************************************************/
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static int32_t rmm_init(void);
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/*******************************************************************************
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* This function takes an RMM context pointer and performs a synchronous entry
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* into it.
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******************************************************************************/
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uint64_t rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx)
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{
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uint64_t rc;
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assert(rmm_ctx != NULL);
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cm_set_context(&(rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx), REALM);
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/* Restore the realm context assigned above */
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cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(REALM);
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cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(REALM);
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cm_set_next_eret_context(REALM);
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/* Enter RMM */
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rc = rmmd_rmm_enter(&rmm_ctx->c_rt_ctx);
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/*
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* Save realm context. EL1 and EL2 Non-secure
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* contexts will be restored before exiting to
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* Non-secure world, therefore there is no need
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* to clear EL1 and EL2 context registers.
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*/
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cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(REALM);
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cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(REALM);
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return rc;
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* This function returns to the place where rmmd_rmm_sync_entry() was
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* called originally.
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******************************************************************************/
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__dead2 void rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(uint64_t rc)
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{
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rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
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/* Get context of the RMM in use by this CPU. */
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assert(cm_get_context(REALM) == &(ctx->cpu_ctx));
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/*
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* The RMMD must have initiated the original request through a
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* synchronous entry into RMM. Jump back to the original C runtime
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* context with the value of rc in x0;
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*/
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rmmd_rmm_exit(ctx->c_rt_ctx, rc);
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panic();
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}
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static void rmm_el2_context_init(el2_sysregs_t *regs)
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{
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regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SPSR_EL2 >> 3] = REALM_SPSR_EL2;
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regs->ctx_regs[CTX_SCTLR_EL2 >> 3] = SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Realm world.
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******************************************************************************/
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static void manage_extensions_realm(cpu_context_t *ctx)
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{
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if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
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/*
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* Enable SVE and FPU in realm context when it is enabled for NS.
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* Realm manager must ensure that the SVE and FPU register
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* contexts are properly managed.
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*/
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sve_enable(ctx);
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}
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pmuv3_enable(ctx);
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Jump to the RMM for the first time.
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******************************************************************************/
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static int32_t rmm_init(void)
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{
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long rc;
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rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[plat_my_core_pos()];
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INFO("RMM init start.\n");
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/* Enable architecture extensions */
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manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
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/* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */
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rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx);
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rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx);
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if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) {
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ERROR("RMM init failed: %ld\n", rc);
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/* Mark the boot as failed for all the CPUs */
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rmm_boot_failed = true;
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return 0;
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}
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INFO("RMM init end.\n");
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return 1;
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Load and read RMM manifest, setup RMM.
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******************************************************************************/
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int rmmd_setup(void)
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{
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size_t shared_buf_size __unused;
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uintptr_t shared_buf_base;
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uint32_t ep_attr;
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unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
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rmmd_rmm_context_t *rmm_ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id];
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struct rmm_manifest *manifest;
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int rc;
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/* Make sure RME is supported. */
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assert(get_armv9_2_feat_rme_support() != 0U);
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rmm_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(REALM);
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if (rmm_ep_info == NULL) {
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WARN("No RMM image provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting "
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"device without RMM initialization. SMCs destined for "
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"RMM will return SMC_UNK\n");
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return -ENOENT;
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}
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/* Under no circumstances will this parameter be 0 */
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assert(rmm_ep_info->pc == RMM_BASE);
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/* Initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */
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ep_attr = EP_REALM;
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if ((read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) != 0U) {
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ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG;
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}
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SET_PARAM_HEAD(rmm_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr);
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rmm_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL2,
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MODE_SP_ELX,
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DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
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shared_buf_size =
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plat_rmmd_get_el3_rmm_shared_mem(&shared_buf_base);
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assert((shared_buf_size == SZ_4K) &&
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((void *)shared_buf_base != NULL));
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/* Load the boot manifest at the beginning of the shared area */
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manifest = (struct rmm_manifest *)shared_buf_base;
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rc = plat_rmmd_load_manifest(manifest);
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if (rc != 0) {
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ERROR("Error loading RMM Boot Manifest (%i)\n", rc);
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return rc;
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}
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flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)shared_buf_base, shared_buf_size);
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/*
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* Prepare coldboot arguments for RMM:
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* arg0: This CPUID (primary processor).
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* arg1: Version for this Boot Interface.
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* arg2: PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT.
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* arg3: Base address for the EL3 <-> RMM shared area. The boot
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* manifest will be stored at the beginning of this area.
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*/
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = RMM_EL3_INTERFACE_VERSION;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = shared_buf_base;
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/* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */
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cm_setup_context(&rmm_ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info);
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INFO("RMM setup done.\n");
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/* Register init function for deferred init. */
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bl31_register_rmm_init(&rmm_init);
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return 0;
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Forward SMC to the other security state
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******************************************************************************/
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static uint64_t rmmd_smc_forward(uint32_t src_sec_state,
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uint32_t dst_sec_state, uint64_t x0,
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uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2, uint64_t x3,
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uint64_t x4, void *handle)
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{
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cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(dst_sec_state);
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/* Save incoming security state */
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cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state);
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cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(src_sec_state);
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/* Restore outgoing security state */
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cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state);
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cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(dst_sec_state);
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cm_set_next_eret_context(dst_sec_state);
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/*
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* As per SMCCCv1.2, we need to preserve x4 to x7 unless
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* being used as return args. Hence we differentiate the
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* onward and backward path. Support upto 8 args in the
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* onward path and 4 args in return path.
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* Register x4 will be preserved by RMM in case it is not
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* used in return path.
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*/
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if (src_sec_state == NON_SECURE) {
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SMC_RET8(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4,
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SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5),
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SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6),
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SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X7));
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}
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SMC_RET5(ctx, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4);
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* This function handles all SMCs in the range reserved for RMI. Each call is
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* either forwarded to the other security state or handled by the RMM dispatcher
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******************************************************************************/
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uint64_t rmmd_rmi_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2,
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uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie,
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void *handle, uint64_t flags)
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{
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uint32_t src_sec_state;
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/* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMI SMC as unknown */
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if (rmm_boot_failed) {
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WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMI call\n");
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
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src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags);
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/* RMI must not be invoked by the Secure world */
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if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
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WARN("RMMD: RMI invoked by secure world.\n");
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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/*
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* Forward an RMI call from the Normal world to the Realm world as it
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* is.
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*/
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if (src_sec_state == SMC_FROM_NON_SECURE) {
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VERBOSE("RMMD: RMI call from non-secure world.\n");
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return rmmd_smc_forward(NON_SECURE, REALM, smc_fid,
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x1, x2, x3, x4, handle);
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}
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if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) {
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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switch (smc_fid) {
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case RMM_RMI_REQ_COMPLETE: {
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uint64_t x5 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5);
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return rmmd_smc_forward(REALM, NON_SECURE, x1,
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x2, x3, x4, x5, handle);
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}
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default:
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WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* This cpu has been turned on. Enter RMM to initialise R-EL2. Entry into RMM
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* is done after initialising minimal architectural state that guarantees safe
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* execution.
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******************************************************************************/
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static void *rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler(const void *arg)
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{
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long rc;
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uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
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rmmd_rmm_context_t *ctx = &rmm_context[linear_id];
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if (rmm_boot_failed) {
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/* RMM Boot failed on a previous CPU. Abort. */
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ERROR("RMM Failed to initialize. Ignoring for CPU%d\n",
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linear_id);
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Prepare warmboot arguments for RMM:
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* arg0: This CPUID.
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* arg1 to arg3: Not used.
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*/
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg0 = linear_id;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg1 = 0ULL;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg2 = 0ULL;
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rmm_ep_info->args.arg3 = 0ULL;
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/* Initialise RMM context with this entry point information */
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cm_setup_context(&ctx->cpu_ctx, rmm_ep_info);
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/* Enable architecture extensions */
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manage_extensions_realm(&ctx->cpu_ctx);
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/* Initialize RMM EL2 context. */
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rmm_el2_context_init(&ctx->cpu_ctx.el2_sysregs_ctx);
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rc = rmmd_rmm_sync_entry(ctx);
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if (rc != E_RMM_BOOT_SUCCESS) {
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ERROR("RMM init failed on CPU%d: %ld\n", linear_id, rc);
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/* Mark the boot as failed for any other booting CPU */
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rmm_boot_failed = true;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize RMM on secondary */
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SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, rmmd_cpu_on_finish_handler);
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/* Convert GPT lib error to RMMD GTS error */
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static int gpt_to_gts_error(int error, uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t address)
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{
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int ret;
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if (error == 0) {
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return E_RMM_OK;
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}
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if (error == -EINVAL) {
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ret = E_RMM_BAD_ADDR;
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} else {
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/* This is the only other error code we expect */
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assert(error == -EPERM);
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ret = E_RMM_BAD_PAS;
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}
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ERROR("RMMD: PAS Transition failed. GPT ret = %d, PA: 0x%"PRIx64 ", FID = 0x%x\n",
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error, address, smc_fid);
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return ret;
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* This function handles RMM-EL3 interface SMCs
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******************************************************************************/
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uint64_t rmmd_rmm_el3_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2,
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uint64_t x3, uint64_t x4, void *cookie,
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void *handle, uint64_t flags)
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{
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uint32_t src_sec_state;
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int ret;
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/* If RMM failed to boot, treat any RMM-EL3 interface SMC as unknown */
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if (rmm_boot_failed) {
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WARN("RMMD: Failed to boot up RMM. Ignoring RMM-EL3 call\n");
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
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src_sec_state = caller_sec_state(flags);
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if (src_sec_state != SMC_FROM_REALM) {
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WARN("RMMD: RMM-EL3 call originated from secure or normal world\n");
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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switch (smc_fid) {
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case RMM_GTSI_DELEGATE:
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ret = gpt_delegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
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SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1));
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case RMM_GTSI_UNDELEGATE:
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ret = gpt_undelegate_pas(x1, PAGE_SIZE_4KB, SMC_FROM_REALM);
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SMC_RET1(handle, gpt_to_gts_error(ret, smc_fid, x1));
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case RMM_ATTEST_GET_PLAT_TOKEN:
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ret = rmmd_attest_get_platform_token(x1, &x2, x3);
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SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2);
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case RMM_ATTEST_GET_REALM_KEY:
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ret = rmmd_attest_get_signing_key(x1, &x2, x3);
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SMC_RET2(handle, ret, x2);
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case RMM_BOOT_COMPLETE:
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VERBOSE("RMMD: running rmmd_rmm_sync_exit\n");
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rmmd_rmm_sync_exit(x1);
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default:
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WARN("RMMD: Unsupported RMM-EL3 call 0x%08x\n", smc_fid);
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SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
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}
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}
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