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When the verify_signature function is called with the RSASSA_PSS signature algorithm and a somewhat well-formed public key, invalid signatures can be incorrectly verified due to this change [1]. This is primarily because of the introduction of the following code, where a return check is missing before the goto: if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { rc = pk_bytes_from_subpubkey((unsigned char **) &pk_ptr, &pk_len); goto end2; } This code executes before the call to psa_verify_message. The unconditional goto end2; branch leads to the immediate return of rc. If the call to pk_bytes_from_subpubkey succeeds (i.e., the key is formatted correctly), the signature is verified regardless of its actual content. This change [1] was included in the v2.11 release. Therefore, anyone using this release with the PSA Crypto implementation must apply this patch to ensure proper signature verification. [1]: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/ trusted-firmware-a/+/55aed7d798f3d48d6aa08d58eb46c4cda318bcfb/drivers/ auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_psa_crypto.c#447 Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com> Reported-by: Ryan Everett <ryan.everett@arm.com> Change-Id: Ib484d97a04b7a82dd72592c8b5b153d577d01fc9
759 lines
19 KiB
C
759 lines
19 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <string.h>
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/* mbed TLS headers */
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#include <mbedtls/gcm.h>
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#include <mbedtls/md.h>
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#include <mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h>
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#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
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#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
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#include <mbedtls/psa_util.h>
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#include <mbedtls/version.h>
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#include <mbedtls/x509.h>
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#include <psa/crypto.h>
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#include <psa/crypto_platform.h>
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#include <psa/crypto_types.h>
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#include <psa/crypto_values.h>
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#include <common/debug.h>
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#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
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#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
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#include <plat/common/platform.h>
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#define LIB_NAME "mbed TLS PSA"
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/* Maximum length of R_S pair in the ECDSA signature in bytes */
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#define MAX_ECDSA_R_S_PAIR_LEN 64U
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/* Size of ASN.1 length and tag in bytes*/
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#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN 1U
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#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG 1U
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#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
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CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
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/*
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* CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE value is as per current stronger algorithm available
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* so make sure that mbed TLS MD maximum size must be lesser than this.
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*/
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CASSERT(CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE >= MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
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assert_mbedtls_md_size_overflow);
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#endif /*
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* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
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* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
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*/
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/*
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* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
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* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
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* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
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* }
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*
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* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
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* }
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*
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* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* digest OCTET STRING
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* }
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*/
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/*
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* We pretend using an external RNG (through MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
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* mbedTLS config option) so we need to provide an implementation of
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* mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). Provide a fake one, since we do not
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* actually have any external RNG and TF-A itself doesn't engage in
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* cryptographic operations that demands randomness.
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*/
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psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
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mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
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uint8_t *output, size_t output_size,
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size_t *output_length)
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{
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return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY;
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}
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/*
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* Initialize the library and export the descriptor
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*/
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static void init(void)
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{
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/* Initialize mbed TLS */
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mbedtls_init();
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/* Initialise PSA mbedTLS */
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psa_status_t status = psa_crypto_init();
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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ERROR("Failed to initialize %s crypto (%d).\n", LIB_NAME, status);
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panic();
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}
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INFO("PSA crypto initialized successfully!\n");
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}
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#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
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CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
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static void construct_psa_key_alg_and_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg,
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_family,
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psa_algorithm_t *psa_alg,
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psa_key_type_t *psa_key_type)
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{
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psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
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switch (pk_alg) {
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case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:
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*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg);
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*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY;
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break;
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case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
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*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_md_alg);
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*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_ecc_family);
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break;
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default:
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*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
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*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
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break;
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}
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}
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#if TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
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TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
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/*
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* This is a helper function to detect padding byte (if the MSB bit of the
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* first data byte is set to 1, for example 0x80) and on detection, ignore the
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* padded byte(0x00) and increase the buffer pointer beyond padded byte and
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* decrease the length of the buffer by 1.
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*
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* On Success returns 0, error otherwise.
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**/
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static inline int ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(unsigned char **buf_start,
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size_t *buf_len)
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{
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unsigned char *local_buf = *buf_start;
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/* Check for negative number */
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if ((local_buf[0] & 0x80U) != 0U) {
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return -1;
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}
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if ((local_buf[0] == 0U) && (local_buf[1] > 0x7FU) &&
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(*buf_len > 1U)) {
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*buf_start = &local_buf[1];
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(*buf_len)--;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* This is a helper function that gets a pointer to the encoded ECDSA publicKey
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* and its length (as per RFC5280) and returns corresponding decoded publicKey
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* and its length. As well, it retrieves the family of ECC key in the PSA
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* format.
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*
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* This function returns error(CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE) on ASN.1 parsing failure,
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* otherwise success(0).
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**/
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static int get_ecdsa_pkinfo_from_asn1(unsigned char **pk_start,
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unsigned int *pk_len,
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psa_ecc_family_t *psa_ecc_family)
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{
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mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid, alg_params;
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mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
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int rc;
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unsigned char *pk_end;
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size_t len;
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size_t curve_bits;
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unsigned char *pk_ptr = *pk_start;
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pk_end = pk_ptr + *pk_len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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pk_end = pk_ptr + len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &alg_oid, &alg_params);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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if (alg_params.tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) {
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if (mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(&alg_params, &grp_id) != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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*psa_ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id,
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&curve_bits);
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} else {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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pk_end = pk_ptr + len - (alg_oid.len + alg_params.len +
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2 * (SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN + SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG));
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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*pk_start = pk_ptr;
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*pk_len = len;
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
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* r INTEGER,
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* s INTEGER
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* }
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*
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* This helper function that gets a pointer to the encoded ECDSA signature and
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* its length (as per RFC5280) and returns corresponding decoded signature
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* (R_S pair) and its size.
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*
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* This function returns error(CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE) on ASN.1 parsing failure,
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* otherwise success(0).
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**/
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static int get_ecdsa_signature_from_asn1(unsigned char *sig_ptr,
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size_t *sig_len,
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unsigned char *r_s_pair)
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{
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int rc;
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unsigned char *sig_end;
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size_t len, r_len, s_len;
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sig_end = sig_ptr + *sig_len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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sig_end = sig_ptr + len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &r_len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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if (ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(&sig_ptr, &r_len) != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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(void)memcpy((void *)&r_s_pair[0], (const void *)sig_ptr, r_len);
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sig_ptr = sig_ptr + r_len;
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sig_end = sig_ptr + len - (r_len + (SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN +
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SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG));
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &s_len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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if (ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(&sig_ptr, &s_len) != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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(void)memcpy((void *)&r_s_pair[r_len], (const void *)sig_ptr, s_len);
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*sig_len = s_len + r_len;
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /*
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* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
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* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
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**/
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/*
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* This is a helper function that adjusts the start of the pk_start to point to
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* the subjectPublicKey bytes within the SubjectPublicKeyInfo block.
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*
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* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
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*
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* This function returns error(CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE) on ASN.1 parsing failure,
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* otherwise success(0).
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**/
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static int pk_bytes_from_subpubkey(unsigned char **pk_start,
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unsigned int *pk_len)
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{
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mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid, alg_params;
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int rc;
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unsigned char *pk_end;
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size_t len;
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unsigned char *pk_ptr = *pk_start;
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pk_end = pk_ptr + *pk_len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len,
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
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MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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pk_end = pk_ptr + len;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &alg_oid, &alg_params);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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pk_end = pk_ptr + len - (alg_oid.len + alg_params.len +
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2 * (SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN + SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG));
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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*pk_start = pk_ptr;
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*pk_len = len;
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* NOTE: This has been made internal in mbedtls 3.6.0 and the mbedtls team has
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* advised that it's better to copy out the declaration than it would be to
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* update to 3.5.2, where this function is exposed.
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*/
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int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid,
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const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params,
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mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
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mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg,
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void **sig_opts);
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/*
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* Verify a signature.
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*
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* Parameters are passed using the DER encoding format following the ASN.1
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* structures detailed above.
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*/
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static int verify_signature(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
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void *sig_ptr, unsigned int sig_len,
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void *sig_alg, unsigned int sig_alg_len,
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void *pk_ptr, unsigned int pk_len)
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{
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mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_oid, sig_params;
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mbedtls_asn1_buf signature;
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
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mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
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int rc;
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void *sig_opts = NULL;
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unsigned char *p, *end;
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unsigned char *local_sig_ptr;
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size_t local_sig_len;
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psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_family = 0U;
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__unused unsigned char reformatted_sig[MAX_ECDSA_R_S_PAIR_LEN] = {0};
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/* construct PSA key algo and type */
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psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
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psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
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psa_key_id_t psa_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_NULL;
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psa_key_type_t psa_key_type;
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psa_algorithm_t psa_alg;
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/* Get pointers to signature OID and parameters */
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p = (unsigned char *)sig_alg;
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end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_alg_len);
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid, &sig_params);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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/* Get the actual signature algorithm (MD + PK) */
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rc = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&sig_oid, &sig_params, &md_alg, &pk_alg, &sig_opts);
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if (rc != 0) {
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return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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}
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/* Get the signature (bitstring) */
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p = (unsigned char *)sig_ptr;
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end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_len);
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signature.tag = *p;
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rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &signature.len);
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if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != signature.len)) {
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rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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goto end2;
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}
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local_sig_ptr = p;
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local_sig_len = signature.len;
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#if TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
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TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
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if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
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rc = get_ecdsa_signature_from_asn1(local_sig_ptr,
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&local_sig_len,
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reformatted_sig);
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if (rc != 0) {
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goto end2;
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}
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local_sig_ptr = reformatted_sig;
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rc = get_ecdsa_pkinfo_from_asn1((unsigned char **)&pk_ptr,
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&pk_len,
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&psa_ecc_family);
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if (rc != 0) {
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goto end2;
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}
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}
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#endif /*
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* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
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* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
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**/
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/* Convert this pk_alg and md_alg to PSA key type and key algorithm */
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construct_psa_key_alg_and_type(pk_alg, md_alg, psa_ecc_family,
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&psa_alg, &psa_key_type);
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if ((psa_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) || (psa_key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE)) {
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rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
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goto end2;
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}
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/* filled-in key_attributes */
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psa_set_key_algorithm(&psa_key_attr, psa_alg);
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psa_set_key_type(&psa_key_attr, psa_key_type);
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psa_set_key_usage_flags(&psa_key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
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/*
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* Note: In the implementation of the psa_import_key function in
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* version 3.6.0, the function expects the starting pointer of the
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* subject public key instead of the starting point of
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* SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
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* This is only needed while dealing with RSASSA_PSS (RSA Signature
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* scheme with Appendix based on Probabilistic Signature Scheme)
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* algorithm.
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*/
|
|
if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
|
|
rc = pk_bytes_from_subpubkey((unsigned char **) &pk_ptr, &pk_len);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the key_id using import API */
|
|
status = psa_import_key(&psa_key_attr,
|
|
pk_ptr,
|
|
(size_t)pk_len,
|
|
&psa_key_id);
|
|
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hash calculation and Signature verification of the given data payload
|
|
* is wrapped under the psa_verify_message function.
|
|
*/
|
|
status = psa_verify_message(psa_key_id, psa_alg,
|
|
data_ptr, data_len,
|
|
local_sig_ptr, local_sig_len);
|
|
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
|
|
goto end1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Signature verification success */
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
end1:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Destroy the key if it is created successfully
|
|
*/
|
|
psa_destroy_key(psa_key_id);
|
|
end2:
|
|
mbedtls_free(sig_opts);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Match a hash
|
|
*
|
|
* Digest info is passed in DER format following the ASN.1 structure detailed
|
|
* above.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int verify_hash(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
|
|
void *digest_info_ptr, unsigned int digest_info_len)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_asn1_buf hash_oid, params;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *end, *hash;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Digest info should be an MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, but padding after
|
|
* it is allowed. This is necessary to support multiple hash
|
|
* algorithms.
|
|
*/
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)digest_info_ptr;
|
|
end = p + digest_info_len;
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end = p + len;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the hash algorithm */
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &hash_oid, ¶ms);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Hash should be octet string type and consume all bytes */
|
|
rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
|
|
if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != len)) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
hash = p;
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&hash_oid, &md_alg);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
|
|
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
|
|
/* Length of hash must match the algorithm's size */
|
|
if (len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_md_alg)) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate Hash and compare it against the retrieved hash from
|
|
* the certificate (one shot API).
|
|
*/
|
|
status = psa_hash_compare(psa_md_alg,
|
|
data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
|
|
(const uint8_t *)hash, len);
|
|
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
/*
|
|
* Map a generic crypto message digest algorithm to the corresponding macro used
|
|
* by Mbed TLS.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t md_type(enum crypto_md_algo algo)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (algo) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA512:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA384:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD_SHA256:
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Invalid hash algorithm. */
|
|
return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate a hash
|
|
*
|
|
* output points to the computed hash
|
|
*/
|
|
static int calc_hash(enum crypto_md_algo md_algo, void *data_ptr,
|
|
unsigned int data_len,
|
|
unsigned char output[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
size_t hash_length;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
|
|
|
|
/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
|
|
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type(md_algo));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the hash of the data, it is safe to pass the
|
|
* 'output' hash buffer pointer considering its size is always
|
|
* bigger than or equal to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE.
|
|
*/
|
|
status = psa_hash_compute(psa_md_alg, data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
|
|
(uint8_t *)output, CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE,
|
|
&hash_length);
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /*
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
|
|
* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
/*
|
|
* Stack based buffer allocation for decryption operation. It could
|
|
* be configured to balance stack usage vs execution speed.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE 128
|
|
|
|
static int aes_gcm_decrypt(void *data_ptr, size_t len, const void *key,
|
|
unsigned int key_len, const void *iv,
|
|
unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
|
|
unsigned int tag_len)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
|
|
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
|
|
unsigned char buf[DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char tag_buf[CRYPTO_MAX_TAG_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char *pt = data_ptr;
|
|
size_t dec_len;
|
|
int diff, i, rc;
|
|
size_t output_length __unused;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, key, key_len * 8);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
goto exit_gcm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, NULL, 0);
|
|
#else
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
goto exit_gcm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (len > 0) {
|
|
dec_len = MIN(sizeof(buf), len);
|
|
|
|
#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, dec_len, pt, buf);
|
|
#else
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt, dec_len, buf, sizeof(buf), &output_length);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
goto exit_gcm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pt, buf, dec_len);
|
|
pt += dec_len;
|
|
len -= dec_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
|
|
#else
|
|
rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &output_length, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
goto exit_gcm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
|
|
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
|
|
diff |= ((const unsigned char *)tag)[i] ^ tag_buf[i];
|
|
|
|
if (diff != 0) {
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
goto exit_gcm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* GCM decryption success */
|
|
rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
exit_gcm:
|
|
mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Authenticated decryption of an image
|
|
*/
|
|
static int auth_decrypt(enum crypto_dec_algo dec_algo, void *data_ptr,
|
|
size_t len, const void *key, unsigned int key_len,
|
|
unsigned int key_flags, const void *iv,
|
|
unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
|
|
unsigned int tag_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
assert((key_flags & ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER) == 0);
|
|
|
|
switch (dec_algo) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_GCM_DECRYPT:
|
|
rc = aes_gcm_decrypt(data_ptr, len, key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
|
|
tag, tag_len);
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Register crypto library descriptor
|
|
*/
|
|
#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
|
|
auth_decrypt, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY
|
|
#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
|
|
auth_decrypt, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY
|
|
REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, NULL, NULL, calc_hash, NULL, NULL);
|
|
#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
|