arm-trusted-firmware/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c
Dan Handley 97043ac98e Reduce deep nesting of header files
Reduce the number of header files included from other header
files as much as possible without splitting the files. Use forward
declarations where possible. This allows removal of some unnecessary
"#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__" statements.

Also, review the .c and .S files for which header files really need
including and reorder the #include statements alphabetically.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#31

Change-Id: Iec92fb976334c77453e010b60bcf56f3be72bd3e
2014-05-06 13:57:48 +01:00

149 lines
5.4 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used
* to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
* prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <bl_common.h>
#include <context_mgmt.h>
#include <platform.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "tspd_private.h"
/*******************************************************************************
* Given a secure payload entrypoint, register width, cpu id & pointer to a
* context data structure, this function will create a secure context ready for
* programming an entry into the secure payload.
******************************************************************************/
int32_t tspd_init_secure_context(uint64_t entrypoint,
uint32_t rw,
uint64_t mpidr,
tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx)
{
uint32_t scr, sctlr;
el1_sys_regs_t *el1_state;
uint32_t spsr;
/* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */
assert(tsp_ctx);
/*
* We support AArch64 TSP for now.
* TODO: Add support for AArch32 TSP
*/
assert(rw == TSP_AARCH64);
/*
* This might look redundant if the context was statically
* allocated but this function cannot make that assumption.
*/
memset(tsp_ctx, 0, sizeof(*tsp_ctx));
/* Set the right security state and register width for the SP */
scr = read_scr();
scr &= ~SCR_NS_BIT;
scr &= ~SCR_RW_BIT;
if (rw == TSP_AARCH64)
scr |= SCR_RW_BIT;
/* Get a pointer to the S-EL1 context memory */
el1_state = get_sysregs_ctx(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
/*
* Program the SCTLR_EL1 such that upon entry in S-EL1, caches and MMU are
* disabled and exception endianess is set to be the same as EL3
*/
sctlr = read_sctlr_el3();
sctlr &= SCTLR_EE_BIT;
sctlr |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1;
write_ctx_reg(el1_state, CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr);
/* Set this context as ready to be initialised i.e OFF */
tsp_ctx->state = TSP_STATE_OFF;
/* Associate this context with the cpu specified */
tsp_ctx->mpidr = mpidr;
cm_set_context(mpidr, &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, SECURE);
spsr = make_spsr(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, rw);
cm_set_el3_eret_context(SECURE, entrypoint, spsr, scr);
cm_init_exception_stack(mpidr, SECURE);
return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function takes an SP context pointer and:
* 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx.
* 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) on the stack
* frame and saves a reference to this state.
* 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers
* from the tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx)
{
uint64_t rc;
assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx == 0);
/* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */
assert(cm_get_context(read_mpidr(), SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
rc = tspd_enter_sp(&tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx);
#if DEBUG
tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0;
#endif
return rc;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function takes an SP context pointer and:
* 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx.
* 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the
* stack frame using the reference to this state saved in tspd_enter_sp().
* 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state
* as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those.
******************************************************************************/
void tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx, uint64_t ret)
{
/* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */
assert(cm_get_context(read_mpidr(), SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
assert(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx != 0);
tspd_exit_sp(tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx, ret);
/* Should never reach here */
assert(0);
}