arm-trusted-firmware/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_main.c
Masahiro Yamada 57d1e5faf2 Fix pointer type mismatch of handlers
Commit 4c0d039076 ("Rework type usage in Trusted Firmware") changed
the type usage in struct declarations, but did not touch the definition
side.  Fix the type mismatch.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-04-27 18:35:02 +09:00

449 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2015-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/*******************************************************************************
* This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
* plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
* SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
* executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
* the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
* handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
* responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
******************************************************************************/
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <bl31.h>
#include <bl_common.h>
#include <context_mgmt.h>
#include <debug.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <platform.h>
#include <runtime_svc.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <tlk.h>
#include <uuid.h>
#include "tlkd_private.h"
extern const spd_pm_ops_t tlkd_pm_ops;
/*******************************************************************************
* Per-cpu Secure Payload state
******************************************************************************/
tlk_context_t tlk_ctx;
/*******************************************************************************
* CPU number on which TLK booted up
******************************************************************************/
static uint32_t boot_cpu;
/* TLK UID: RFC-4122 compliant UUID (version-5, sha-1) */
DEFINE_SVC_UUID(tlk_uuid,
0xbd11e9c9, 0x2bba, 0x52ee, 0xb1, 0x72,
0x46, 0x1f, 0xba, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x63);
static int32_t tlkd_init(void);
/*******************************************************************************
* Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
* (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
* into the SP for its initialisation.
******************************************************************************/
static int32_t tlkd_setup(void)
{
entry_point_info_t *tlk_ep_info;
/*
* Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
* absence is a critical failure.
*/
tlk_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
if (!tlk_ep_info) {
WARN("No SP provided. Booting device without SP"
" initialization. SMC`s destined for SP"
" will return SMC_UNK\n");
return 1;
}
/*
* If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
* signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
* registering any handlers
*/
if (!tlk_ep_info->pc)
return 1;
/*
* Inspect the SP image's SPSR and determine it's execution state
* i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64.
*/
tlkd_init_tlk_ep_state(tlk_ep_info,
(tlk_ep_info->spsr >> MODE_RW_SHIFT) & MODE_RW_MASK,
tlk_ep_info->pc,
&tlk_ctx);
/*
* All TLK SPD initialization done. Now register our init function
* with BL31 for deferred invocation
*/
bl31_register_bl32_init(&tlkd_init);
return 0;
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
* time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
* context has already been created by tlkd_setup() which can be directly
* used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload.
* The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC.
******************************************************************************/
static int32_t tlkd_init(void)
{
entry_point_info_t *tlk_entry_point;
/*
* Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
* absence is a critical failure.
*/
tlk_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
assert(tlk_entry_point);
cm_init_my_context(tlk_entry_point);
/*
* TLK runs only on a single CPU. Store the value of the boot
* CPU for sanity checking later.
*/
boot_cpu = plat_my_core_pos();
/*
* Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload.
*/
return tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(&tlk_ctx);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
* to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
* will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
* work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
static uintptr_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2,
u_register_t x3,
u_register_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
u_register_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
gp_regs_t *gp_regs;
uint32_t ns;
uint64_t par;
/* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */
assert(handle);
/* These SMCs are only supported by a single CPU */
if (boot_cpu != plat_my_core_pos())
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was
* preempted by a non-secure world IRQ.
*/
case TLK_PREEMPTED:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
* secure system register context since the SP was supposed
* to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* This is a request from the non-secure context to:
*
* a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's
* activity logs.
* b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args
* required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted
* Applications.
* c. register non-secure world's memory map with the OS
* d. open/close sessions
* e. issue commands to the Trusted Apps
* f. resume the preempted yielding SMC call.
*/
case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF:
case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF:
case TLK_REGISTER_NS_DRAM:
case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION:
case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION:
case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP:
case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT:
case TLK_RESUME_FID:
if (!ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/*
* Check if we are already processing a yielding SMC
* call. Of all the supported fids, only the "resume"
* fid expects the flag to be set.
*/
if (smc_fid == TLK_RESUME_FID) {
if (!get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
} else {
if (get_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use.
*/
assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Mark the SP state as active.
*/
set_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
/*
* TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC
* arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame
* registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in
* r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7.
*
* As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0.
*/
gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32));
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32));
SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1,
(uint32_t)(x1 >> 32));
/*
* Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses.
*
* x1 = virtual address
* x3 = type (NS/S)
*
* Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1.
*/
case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE:
/* Should be invoked only by secure world */
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */
if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR)
x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32);
if (!x1)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform
* support.
*/
/* virtual address and type: ns/s */
par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3);
/* return physical address in r0-r1 */
SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0);
/*
* This is a request from the SP to mark completion of
* a yielding function ID.
*/
case TLK_REQUEST_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* Mark the SP state as inactive.
*/
clr_yield_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to
* the non-secure world to pass the result.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the
* non-secure context and return the result.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TLK_ENTRY_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* SP has been successfully initialized. Register power
* managemnt hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops);
/*
* TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1);
break;
/*
* These function IDs are used only by TLK to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 3. powering down after an earlier psci system_off/system_reset
* request.
*/
case TLK_SUSPEND_DONE:
case TLK_RESUME_DONE:
case TLK_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* TLK reports completion. TLKD must have initiated the
* original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
* Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
* return value to the caller
*/
tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1);
break;
/*
* Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
* provide service to non-secure
*/
case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID);
/*
* Return TLK's UID to the caller
*/
case TOS_UID:
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid);
/*
* Return the version of current implementation
*/
case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
DECLARE_RT_SVC(
tlkd_tos_fast,
OEN_TOS_START,
OEN_TOS_END,
SMC_TYPE_FAST,
tlkd_setup,
tlkd_smc_handler
);
/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */
DECLARE_RT_SVC(
tlkd_tos_std,
OEN_TOS_START,
OEN_TOS_END,
SMC_TYPE_YIELD,
NULL,
tlkd_smc_handler
);
/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
DECLARE_RT_SVC(
tlkd_tap_fast,
OEN_TAP_START,
OEN_TAP_END,
SMC_TYPE_FAST,
NULL,
tlkd_smc_handler
);
/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */
DECLARE_RT_SVC(
tlkd_tap_std,
OEN_TAP_START,
OEN_TAP_END,
SMC_TYPE_YIELD,
NULL,
tlkd_smc_handler
);