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All projects under the TrustedFirmware.org project now use the same security incident process, therefore update the disclosure/vulnerability reporting information in the TF-A documentation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ /!\ IMPORTANT /!\ Please note that the email address to send these reports to has changed. Please do *not* use trusted-firmware-security@arm.com anymore. Similarly, the PGP key provided to encrypt emails to the security email alias has changed as well. Please do *not* use the former one provided in the TF-A source tree. It is recommended to remove it from your keyring to avoid any mistake. Please use the new key provided on TrustedFirmware.org from now on. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Change-Id: I14eb61017ab99182f1c45d1e156b96d5764934c1 Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
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Security Handling
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=================
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Security Disclosures
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--------------------
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We disclose all security vulnerabilities we find, or are advised about, that are
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relevant to Trusted Firmware-A. We encourage responsible disclosure of
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vulnerabilities and inform users as best we can about all possible issues.
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We disclose TF-A vulnerabilities as Security Advisories, all of which are listed
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at the bottom of this page. Any new ones will, additionally, be announced as
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issues in the project's `issue tracker`_ with the ``security-advisory`` tag. You
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can receive notification emails for these by watching the "Trusted Firmware-A"
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project at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/.
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Found a Security Issue?
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-----------------------
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Although we try to keep TF-A secure, we can only do so with the help of the
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community of developers and security researchers.
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If you think you have found a security vulnerability, please **do not** report
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it in the `issue tracker`_. Instead, please follow the `TrustedFirmware.org
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security incident process`_. One of the goals of this process is to ensure
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providers of products that use TF-A have a chance to consider the implications
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of the vulnerability and its remedy before it is made public. As such, please
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follow the disclosure plan outlined in the process. We do our best to respond
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and fix any issues quickly.
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Afterwards, we encourage you to write-up your findings about the TF-A source
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code.
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Attribution
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-----------
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We will name and thank you in the :ref:`Change Log & Release Notes` distributed
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with the source code and in any published security advisory.
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Security Advisories
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-------------------
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| ID | Title |
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+===========+==================================================================+
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| |TFV-1| | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of unexpectedly |
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| | large data into secure memory |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-2| | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can allow |
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| | normal world to panic secure world |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-3| | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-4| | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or |
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| | authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in AArch32 |
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| | state |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-5| | Not initializing or saving/restoring PMCR_EL0 can leak secure |
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| | world timing information |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-6| | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to speculative processor |
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| | vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-7| | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation vulnerability |
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| | Variant 4 |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| |TFV-8| | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one |
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| | Normal World SMC client to another |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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.. _issue tracker: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/project/board/1/
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.. |TFV-1| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-1 (CVE-2016-10319)`
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.. |TFV-2| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-2 (CVE-2017-7564)`
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.. |TFV-3| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-3 (CVE-2017-7563)`
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.. |TFV-4| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-4 (CVE-2017-9607)`
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.. |TFV-5| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-5 (CVE-2017-15031)`
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.. |TFV-6| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-6 (CVE-2017-5753, CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5754)`
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.. |TFV-7| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-7 (CVE-2018-3639)`
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.. |TFV-8| replace:: :ref:`Advisory TFV-8 (CVE-2018-19440)`
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.. _TrustedFirmware.org security incident process: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/
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--------------
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*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
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