Software supply chain attacks aim to inject malicious code into a
software product. There are several ways a malicious code can be
injected into a software product (open-source project).
These include:
- Malicious code commits
- Malicious dependencies
- Malicious toolchains
This document provides analysis of software supply chain attack
threats for the TF-A project
Change-Id: I03545d65a38dc372f3868a16c725b7378640a771
Signed-off-by: Lauren Wehrmeister <lauren.wehrmeister@arm.com>
Added a threat model for PSA firmware update as well as TBBR FWU aka
firmware recovery.
Change-Id: I2396e13144076d7294f61f6817e1a8646225c6c2
Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com>
Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (Arm CCA) support, underpinned by
Arm Realm Management Extension (RME) support, brings in a few important
software and hardware architectural changes in TF-A, which warrants a
new security analysis of the code base. Results of this analysis are
captured in a new threat model document, provided in this patch.
The main changes introduced in TF-A to support Arm CCA / RME are:
- Presence of a new threat agent: realm world clients.
- Availability of Arm CCA Hardware Enforced Security (HES) to support
measured boot and trusted boot.
- Configuration of the Granule Protection Tables (GPT) for
inter-world memory protection.
This is only an initial version of the threat model and we expect to
enrich it in the future.
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Manish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>
Change-Id: Iab84dc724df694511508f90dc76b6d469c4cccd5
The top-level page for threat model documents is evidently out-dated,
as it contains text which no longer makes sense on its own. Most
likely it relates back to the days where we had a single threat model
document.
Reword it accordingly. While we are at it, explain the motivation and
structure of the documents.
Change-Id: I63c8f38ec32b6edbfd1b4332eeaca19a01ae70e9
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Top level sections are not numbered. Adding numbers makes referring to
sections easier. For example the Maintainers page changes from
"about/3.1" to simply "1.3.1".
Signed-off-by: Boyan Karatotev <boyan.karatotev@arm.com>
Change-Id: If90a18ee8d6a6858d58f0687f31ea62b69399e04
Threat model for EL3 SPMC.
The mitigations are based on the guidance
provided in FF-A v1.1 EAC0 spec.
Signed-off-by: Shruti Gupta <shruti.gupta@arm.com>
Change-Id: I7f4c9370b6eefe6d1a7d1afac27e8b3a7b476072
Threat model for the current, BL1-only R-class support.
Signed-off-by: Gary Morrison <gary.morrison@arm.com>
Change-Id: I8479d5cb30f3cf3919281cc8dc1f21cada9511e0
This is the first release of the public Trusted
Firmware A class threat model. This release
provides the baseline for future updates to be
applied as required by developments to the
TF-A code base.
Signed-off-by: Zelalem Aweke <zelalem.aweke@arm.com>
Change-Id: I3c9aadc46196837679f0b1377bec9ed4fc42ff11
