Merge changes from topic "ja/spm_rme" into integration

* changes:
  docs: change FVP argument in RME configuration
  feat(fvp): added calls to unprotect/protect memory
This commit is contained in:
Olivier Deprez 2024-02-07 17:21:39 +01:00 committed by TrustedFirmware Code Review
commit ce19ebd264
5 changed files with 94 additions and 8 deletions

View file

@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ Use the following command to run the tests on FVP.
-C bp.ve_sysregs.exit_on_shutdown=1 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
-C bp.dram_size=4 \
-C bp.secure_memory=1 \
-C bp.secure_memory=0 \
-C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_ROOT_IDR0=3 \
-C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.SMMU_ROOT_IIDR=0x43B \
-C pci.pci_smmuv3.mmu.root_register_page_offset=0x20000 \

View file

@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
#define SMC_OK ULL(0)
#define SMC_UNK -1
#define SMC_PREEMPTED -2 /* Not defined by the SMCCC */
#define SMC_DENIED -3 /* Not defined by the SMCCC */
#define SMC_INVALID_PARAM -4 /* Not defined by the SMCCC */
/* Return codes for Arm Architecture Service SMC calls */
#define SMC_ARCH_CALL_SUCCESS 0

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2016-2019,2021-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2016-2019,2021-2024, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -42,6 +42,16 @@
#define ARM_SIP_SET_INTERRUPT_PENDING U(0x82000100)
#endif
/**
* Arm SiP Service Call for the SPM to leverage RME to protect a give memory range.
* Protected memory range is one whose PAS was made secure.
* Unprotect relates to reverting a protect operation.
*/
#if SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 && ENABLE_RME
#define PLAT_PROTECT_MEM_SMC64 0xC2000101
#define PLAT_UNPROTECT_MEM_SMC64 0xC2000102
#endif
/* SiP handler specific to each Arm platform. */
uintptr_t plat_arm_sip_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,

View file

@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
@ -12,10 +13,73 @@
#include <plat/arm/common/arm_sip_svc.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
#if ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
#include <lib/gpt_rme/gpt_rme.h>
#endif
#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP
#include <services/el3_spmd_logical_sp.h>
#endif
#if (ENABLE_RME == 1) && (defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 == 1)
static uint64_t plat_protect_memory(bool protect,
bool secure_origin,
const uint64_t base,
const size_t size,
void *handle)
{
uint64_t ret = SMC_INVALID_PARAM;
uint64_t last_updated = 0;
if (!secure_origin) {
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* Shall not be reached. */
}
if ((base % PAGE_SIZE_4KB) != 0U &&
(size % PAGE_SIZE_4KB) != 0U) {
VERBOSE("Base address must be aligned to 4k.\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_INVALID_PARAM);
/* Shall not be reached. */
}
if ((ULONG_MAX - base) < size) {
VERBOSE("Base + Size results in overflow.\n");
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_INVALID_PARAM);
/* Shall not be reached. */
}
for (uint64_t it = base; it < (base + size); it += PAGE_SIZE_4KB) {
/*
* If protect is true, add memory to secure PAS.
* Else unprotect it, making part of non-secure PAS.
*/
ret = protect
? gpt_delegate_pas(it, PAGE_SIZE_4KB,
SMC_FROM_SECURE)
: gpt_undelegate_pas(it, PAGE_SIZE_4KB,
SMC_FROM_SECURE);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
last_updated = it;
break;
case -EINVAL:
SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_INVALID_PARAM, last_updated);
break; /* Shall not be reached. */
case -EPERM:
SMC_RET2(handle, SMC_DENIED, last_updated);
break; /* Shall not be reached. */
default:
ERROR("Unexpected return\n");
panic();
}
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_OK);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_RME && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 */
uintptr_t plat_arm_sip_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2,
@ -25,13 +89,14 @@ uintptr_t plat_arm_sip_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
void *handle,
u_register_t flags)
{
#if PLAT_TEST_SPM
bool secure_origin;
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
secure_origin = is_caller_secure(flags);
(void) secure_origin;
switch (smc_fid) {
#if PLAT_TEST_SPM
case ARM_SIP_SET_INTERRUPT_PENDING:
if (!secure_origin) {
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
@ -42,11 +107,20 @@ uintptr_t plat_arm_sip_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_OK);
break; /* Not reached */
default:
break;
}
#endif
#if (ENABLE_RME == 1) && (defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 == 1)
case PLAT_PROTECT_MEM_SMC64:
INFO("Sip Call - Protect memory\n");
return plat_protect_memory(true, secure_origin, x1, x2, handle);
break;
case PLAT_UNPROTECT_MEM_SMC64:
INFO("Sip Call - Unprotect memory\n");
return plat_protect_memory(false, secure_origin, x1, x2, handle);
break;
#endif
}
#if ENABLE_SPMD_LP
return plat_spmd_logical_sp_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
cookie, handle, flags);

View file

@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ uint64_t spmd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
unsigned int linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
spmd_spm_core_context_t *ctx = spmd_get_context();
bool secure_origin;
int32_t ret;
int ret;
uint32_t input_version;
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */