Merge "fix(docs): replace deprecated urls under tfa/docs" into integration

docs/perf/psci-performance-instr.rst

@@ -13,12 +13,13 @@ analysis.
 Performance Measurement Framework
 ---------------------------------
 
-The Performance Measurement Framework `PMF`_ is a framework that provides
+The Performance Measurement Framework :ref:`PMF <firmware_design_pmf>`
-mechanisms for collecting and retrieving timestamps at runtime from the
+is a framework that provides mechanisms for collecting and retrieving timestamps
-Performance Measurement Unit (`PMU`_). The PMU is a generalized abstraction for
+at runtime from the Performance Measurement Unit
-accessing CPU hardware registers used to measure hardware events. This means,
+(:ref:`PMU <Performance Monitoring Unit>`).
-for instance, that the PMU might be used to place instrumentation points at
+The PMU is a generalized abstraction for accessing CPU hardware registers used to
-logical locations in code for tracing purposes.
+measure hardware events. This means, for instance, that the PMU might be used to
+place instrumentation points at logical locations in code for tracing purposes.
 
 TF-A utilises the PMF as a backend for the two instrumentation services it
 provides--PSCI Statistics and Runtime Instrumentation. The PMF is used by
@@ -112,6 +113,4 @@ was requested, it is captured in the warm boot path.
 
 *Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
 
-.. _PMF: ../design/firmware-design.html#performance-measurement-framework
-.. _PMU: performance-monitoring-unit.html
 .. _PSCI: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/latest/

docs/perf/psci-performance-juno.rst

@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ The following source trees and binaries were used:
 - TF-A [`v2.9-rc0`_]
 - TFTF [`v2.9-rc0`_]
 
-Please see the Runtime Instrumentation `Testing Methodology`_ page for more
+Please see the Runtime Instrumentation :ref:`Testing Methodology
-details.
+<Runtime Instrumentation Methodology>`
+page for more details.
 
 Procedure
 ---------
@@ -418,4 +419,3 @@ effects, given that these measurements are at the nano-second level.
 .. _Juno R1 platform: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/100122/latest/
 .. _TF master as of 31/01/2017: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/?id=c38b36d
 .. _v2.9-rc0: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/?h=v2.9-rc0
-.. _Testing Methodology: ../perf/psci-performance-methodology.html

docs/perf/psci-performance-n1sdp.rst

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ The following source trees and binaries were used:
 - TFTF [`v2.9-rc0`_]
 - SCP/MCP `Prebuilt Images`_
 
-Please see the Runtime Instrumentation `Testing Methodology`_ page for more
+Please see the Runtime Instrumentation :ref:`Testing Methodology
-details.
+<Runtime Instrumentation Methodology>` page for more details.
 
 Procedure
 ---------
@@ -200,4 +200,3 @@ core to the deepest power level.
 .. _user guide: https://gitlab.arm.com/arm-reference-solutions/arm-reference-solutions-docs/-/blob/master/docs/n1sdp/user-guide.rst
 .. _Prebuilt Images:  https://downloads.trustedfirmware.org/tf-a/css_scp_2.11.0/n1sdp/release/
 .. _N1SDP: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101489/latest
-.. _Testing Methodology: ../perf/psci-performance-methodology.html

docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ are considered untrusted by TF-A.
   +-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
 
 
+.. _threat_analysis:
+
 ***************
 Threat Analysis
 ***************

docs/threat_model/threat_model_el3_spm.rst

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ EL3 SPMC Threat Model
 ************
 Introduction
 ************
-This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `EL3 Secure Partition Manager`_
+This document provides a threat model for the TF-A :ref:`EL3 Secure Partition Manager`
 (EL3 SPM) implementation. The EL3 SPM implementation is based on the
 `Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile`_ specification.
 
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ Target of Evaluation
 ********************
 In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the ``Secure Partition Manager Core``
 component (SPMC) within the EL3 firmware.
-The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
+<threat_analysis>`.
 
 The scope for this threat model is:
 
@@ -70,8 +71,8 @@ Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted.
 Threat Analysis
 ***************
 
-This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+This threat model follows a similar methodology to the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
-The following sections define:
+<threat_analysis>`. The following sections define:
 
 - Trust boundaries
 - Assets
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ The following threat agents are identified:
 Threat types
 ============
 
-The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_
+The following threat categories as exposed in the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
+<threat_analysis>`
 are re-used:
 
 - Spoofing
@@ -642,9 +644,7 @@ element of the data flow diagram.
 
 ---------------
 
-*Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
 
 .. _Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest
-.. _EL3 Secure Partition Manager: ../components/el3-spmc.html
-.. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis
 .. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases

docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ SPMC Threat Model
 ************************
 Introduction
 ************************
-This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `Secure Partition Manager`_
+This document provides a threat model for the TF-A :ref:`Secure Partition Manager`
 (SPM) implementation or more generally the S-EL2 reference firmware running on
 systems implementing the FEAT_SEL2 (formerly Armv8.4 Secure EL2) architecture
 extension. The SPM implementation is based on the `Arm Firmware Framework for
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ Target of Evaluation
 ************************
 In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the S-EL2 firmware or the
 ``Secure Partition Manager Core`` component (SPMC).
-The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
+<threat_analysis>`.
 
 The scope for this threat model is:
 
@@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted.
 Threat Analysis
 *********************
 
-This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+This threat model follows a similar methodology to the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
+<threat_analysis>`.
 The following sections define:
 
 - Trust boundaries
@@ -141,7 +143,8 @@ The following threat agents are identified:
 Threat types
 ============================
 
-The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_
+The following threat categories as exposed in the :ref:`Generic TF-A threat model
+<threat_analysis>`
 are re-used:
 
 - Spoofing
@@ -1333,7 +1336,5 @@ element of the data flow diagram.
 *Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
 
 .. _Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest
-.. _Secure Partition Manager: ../components/secure-partition-manager.html
-.. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis
 .. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases